Iranian Attitudes in Advance of the Parliamentary Elections: Economics, Politics, and Foreign Affairs

While views of President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif have declined from their heights immediately after the nuclear deal, the University of Maryland has found through opinion polls -- among other viewpoints -- that the two leaders continue to enjoy very high levels of popular support in Iran, and their allies have good prospects in the upcoming elections. Views of the nuclear deal continue to be very positive, though some of its less popular aspects have become more apparent. Going forward there is support for growing engagement with the international community, especially in regard to dealing with the problem of Syria and the fight against ISIS. A new University of Maryland survey of the Iranian public finds that that nearly 8 in 10 Iranians say they have a favorable opinion of Rouhani (82 percent) and Zarif (78 percent). With Iran's parliamentary elections about a month away, nearly 6 in 10 Iranians (59 percent) want Rouhani supporters to win. More than 7 in 10 Iranians still approve of the nuclear deal. Rouhani's new efforts to engage with the international community on dealing with the conflict in Syria have received overwhelming support, with 80 percent approving. Of those who know about the Vienna agreement, 7 in 10 (72 percent) approve of it.Rouhani receives high marks for improving Iran's security (86 percent) and deepening its relations with European countries (80 percent). Two thirds (66 percent) say relations with Europe have improved and 54 percent have a favorable view of Germany -- up 10 points from 2014. Nonetheless, views of the U.S. continue to be quite negative. Seventy-one percent have an unfavorable view of the U.S. Only 1 in 3 (34 percent) have confidence that the U.S. will fulfill its obligations under the nuclear deal -- down 11 points from September 2015

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Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Agreement

The current study was conducted shortly after the JCPOA was released and approved by the U.N. Security Council. The survey seeks to understand how attitudes and expectations have changed since the nuclear deal was achieved. It also explores the relationship between Iranians’ assumptions about the terms of the deal, their expectations about its benefits and risks, and their attitudes toward their current political leaders, the United States, and the other countries in the negotiations. These assumptions, expectations, and attitudes set the context in which Iranian leaders will decide whether or not to approve the deal. They are also likely to influence how Iranian policymakers and the public respond to whatever actions the United States takes as it reviews the JCPOA and reassesses its policies towards Iran. The telephone poll of 1,000 Iranians was conducted August 8-18, 2015, by IranPoll.com, an independent, Toronto-based polling organization, for the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. The margin of error was +/- 3.2%. Full Report | Questionnaire and frequency tables. Summary of Findings 1. Iran - P5+1 Nuclear Agreement Vast majorities of Iranians approve of the nuclear agreement that was reached between Iran and the P5+1 countries in Vienna, whereas only a fifth disapprove of it. While about a third sees the agreement as mostly a victory for Iran, over four in ten see it as beneficial for both Iran and the P5+1, though Iran is perceived to have made fewer concessions. Iranians overwhelmingly approve of the performance of their negotiators. A majority of Iranians are optimistic that both the UN Security Council and the United States are likely to act in good faith and remove sanctions as the deal requires. Nevertheless, three in four continue to believe that the Majlis (Iran’s parliament) should be able to prevent the agreement from taking effect if it finds the terms to be at odds with Iran’s national interests. Also, almost all Iranians continue to believe that it is very important for Iran to develop its nuclear program. 2. Views of Rouhani As a result of the nuclear agreement, a large majority says it now has a better opinion of President Hassan Rouhani. As Iran’s parliamentary elections near, three in five Iranians now want Rouhani’s supporters to win, while only about one in five favor his critics. President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif’s already high approval ratings have risen even more since the agreement was reached while their opponents’ popularity has declined slightly. 3. Misperceptions about the Nuclear Agreement While Iranians have a positive view of the nuclear agreement, they also underestimate the scope and extent of the commitments Iran has made under the deal. Substantial majorities incorrectly believe that according to the agreement: -all U.S. sanctions, not just nuclear-related ones—will be lifted eventually; - the sanctions on Iran will start to be lifted either before or at the same time as Iran takes most of the steps it has agreed to take under the deal; -Iran has not agreed to any limitations on its nuclear research and development activities; -the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cannot inspect Iranian military sites under any conditions. Those who hold these misperceptions are far more supportive of the deal than those who don’t. Among those who don’t hold these misperceptions, support is lower, but generally half or more still approve of the deal. Also, Rouhani supporters are more likely to hold these misperceptions than critics. 4. High Expectations about Positive Effects of the Deal Iranians express high expectations that the nuclear deal will have significant positive effects in the near term. Growing majorities say that as a result of the deal they expect to see, within a year, better access to foreign medicines and medical equipment, significantly more foreign investment, a significant drop in Iran’s unemployment rate, and tangible improvement in living standards. Almost three in five Iranians now think that the economic conditions in Iran are getting better. Half of Iranians now think that rather than aiming to achieve self-sufficiency, Iran should strive to increase its trade with other countries—up from four in ten a year ago. 5. Iran’s Relations with the United States in the Wake of the Deal A majority of Iranians believes that relations with the United States will improve after the nuclear deal. Several trend questions show strong shifts on views of the United States. A majority no longer believes that Iran’s nuclear concessions will likely lead the United States to use pressure to extract more concessions on other issues. Majorities approve of Iran and the United States collaborating with each other to help the government of Iraq and counter ISIS. Large majorities continue to say that they have an unfavorable view of the United States, but a growing number believe that Iran and the United States should strive to mitigate conflicts between the two countries. 6. Changing Views of Other Countries and Economic Relations Iranians show warming attitudes toward the P5+1 countries as a whole and toward Europe. A plurality now says that it trusts the P5+1 countries, and large majorities say they expect relations with Europe to improve. Iranians also believe that as a result of the agreement, other countries view their country with more respect. Views of all P5+1 countries have become a bit more favorable and majorities now have favorable attitudes toward Germany, Russia, and China. Iranians are also showing increasing openness to economic relations with other countries

Iranian Public Opinion, One Year After the Nuclear Deal

On July 14, 2015, the United States, Iran, and five other world powers announced that they had agreed on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to resolve international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. In return for Iran strengthening its commitments never to pursue nuclear weapons, sharply limiting its dual-use capabilities, and allowing greater international scrutiny of its nuclear program, the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and the United States agreed to lift nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. Both the nuclear deal and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani were immensely popular in Iran right after the JCPOA was announced, in part because the public thought that the terms were more generous toward Iran than they actually were, and because people had high expectations about economic and political benefits. Reactions in the United States were much more mixed. A smaller majority of the American public supported the deal, but critics in Congress came close to blocking its implementation because they worried about what Iran would do if it received a windfall from sanctions relief and hoped that tightening sanctions further could convince Iran to give up all dual-use nuclear capabilities. It’s appropriate to assess how Iranian public opinion has changed in the year since the deal was signed and the six months since sanctions relief began to be implemented, given that U.S. and European leaders frequently assert that Rouhani was elected with a mandate to improve Iran’s economy by using nuclear diplomacy to get sanctions relief. Comparing shifts in Iranian public opinion over time also offers a way to test some of the predictions made by congressional critics, including that there would be a crack-down on human rights in Iran to appease the opponents of increased engagement with the West, or that giving the Iranian public only a small taste of the economic and political benefits that could flow from becoming a “normal” country would increase pressure for more sweeping changes to Iran’s domestic and foreign policies. This survey of Iranian public opinion is the sixth in a series conducted during and after the negotiations that produced the JCPOA by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland in collaboration with the Program on Public Consultation and Iranpoll.com. Some of the same questions have been asked consistently since July 2014, when negotiations had been underway for many months, but the two sides remained far apart on some important issues. Some were reworded to reflect important contextual changes, such as public understanding about the main elements of the JCPOA and the Iranian parliamentary elections earlier this year. Some new questions have been added to find out what the Iranian public thinks about issues that have become particularly salient in recent months, such as the extent to which those who have not yet seen any economic benefits from the JCPOA hold Rouhani responsible or blame factors beyond his control. The previous reports in this series, a set of assessments about American attitudes towards nuclear diplomacy with Iran, and a collection of related articles are available at: http://www.cissm.umd.edu/projects/security-cooperation-iran-challenges-and-opportunities

Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Negotiations

As the marathon negotiation between Iran and the P5+1 countries (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) nears its third self-imposed deadline on June 30, many around the world wonder if this round of negotiations is going to resolve all remaining issues, and if so, whether the officials involved are going to be able to sell the deal they have worked out back in their own capitals. As to whether or not a deal will be reached, diplomats from Iran as well as the P5+1 countries have consistently been cautiously optimistic. While all sides indicate that they are committed to reaching a deal by the June 30 deadline, recent reports suggest that gaps remain between concrete positions on the main elements of a deal. And as negotiators struggle with various elements of the deal outside their capitals, there is significant controversy inside the capitals on what would constitute a “good deal.” The U.S. Congress has passed legislation giving Congress at least a month to review the details of any agreement reached before President Obama could waive any congressionally imposed sanctions on Iran. Lawmakers and officials in Tehran have been pressing their case that any deal that would not result in speedy termination of sanctions or would open Iran’s sensitive non-nuclear military and security installations to Iran-specific inspections is unacceptable. To better understand the domestic political environments that constrain how much negotiating room the key players have, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has conducted several studies of American and Iranian public opinion on the nuclear negotiations. Its first study of American public opinion, “Americans on Negotiations with Iran,” was conducted in collaboration with the Program for Public Consultation in July 2014, followed by another study which was released on March 3, 2015. Both of these reports are available at www.cissm.umd.edu. CISSM also conducted a study of Iranian public opinion on the nuclear negotiations in collaboration with the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR) in July 2014, focusing mostly on the steps Iran would be willing to take in return for removal of unilateral and multilateral sanctions, and published the results of that study on September 17, 2014. The current study was conducted after Iran and the P5+1 reached an understanding regarding the main elements of the final deal in Lausanne, Switzerland. It seeks to illuminate the specific views and preferences of Iranian citizens regarding the ongoing nuclear negotiations, their support for a deal along the lines of the framework understanding, their assumptions regarding the elements of the final deal, and their expectations from a deal. This study also explores a broad range of Iranian political preferences and attitudes that shape the context in which the nuclear negotiations are occurring

Iranian Attitudes in Advance of the Parliamentary Elections

The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), in conjunction with the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) has been conducting a series of studies about Iranian and American public opinion to explore how public attitudes might be affecting the negotiation, ratification, and implementation of the JCPOA. This study repeats many of the questions asked in previous surveys of Iranian public opinion conducted with the University of Tehran Center for Public Opinion Research (UTCPOR) and Iranpoll.com, an independent Toronto-based polling company. The July 2014 study focused on what types of limitations and transparency measures the Iranian public might be willing to place on Iran’s nuclear program in return for sanctions relief. The May 2015 study assessed Iranian public attitudes toward the framework for a deal that negotiators made public before they worked out the detailed provisions of the JCPOA. The September 2015 study explored what the Iranian public thought about the agreement reached on July 14 of that year, including how understanding of the terms and expectations regarding sanctions relief affected attitudes toward the JCPOA, the leaders who had negotiated it, and Rouhani’s foreign policy of equitable cooperation with the West. These studies and the reports on U.S. attitudes towards the negotiations with Iran are available at: http:www.cissm.umd.edu. This study repeats a number of the same questions asked before, revealing how public attitudes and expectations have changed as Iran carried out its own review and approval process, then started shipping most of its stockpile of low enriched uranium out of Iran, disabling the Arak reactor, and taking a number of other actions prior to getting any sanctions relief. Public support for the JCPOA, for Rouhani, and for moderate candidates in the upcoming election remain strong—albeit not as strong as before—even though more Iranian’s know that the terms of the deal are not as favorable for Iran as they had previously believed. But there are also signs that Rouhani could become the victim of dashed expectations in the 2017 presidential election if he cannot translate sanctions relief into rapid economic improvements, especially reductions in unemployment. This study also includes many new questions to explore how implementation of the deal, and simultaneous debates in the U.S. Congress about imposing new sanctions on Iran for other reasons, might be influencing Iranian attitudes about working with the United States on other 4 Iranian Attitudes in Advance of the Parliamentary Elections | January 2016 problems, like terrorism and civil violence in the Middle East. In addition to repeating a question asked previously about cooperating to help the government of Iraq counter ISIS, we probed extensively into Iranian attitudes towards ISIS and other non-state actors in the region, toward various forms of involvement by Iran and other countries in Syria, and toward current diplomatic efforts to end the civil war in Syria and concentrate international military action on defeating ISIS. The data was collected from December 29, 2015 through January 15, 2016. During this period, a growing number of observers expected Implementation Day to happen soon, but there were still questions about when the IAEA would certify that Iran had fulfilled its commitments, and about whether the United States would impose new sanctions for Iran’s ballistic missile activities. This was also shortly before new visa rules took effect in the United States that might discourage Europeans from visiting Iran after sanctions were lifted. The most noteworthy development during the data collection period that may have influenced Iranian attitudes about regional security issues was Saudi Arabia’s beheading of a prominent Shia cleric on January 2. This study was designed, managed, and analyzed by CISSM in conjunction with the Program for Public Consultation, both of which are at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. The data was collected by IranPoll.com working in conjunction with UTCPOR

Iranian Public Attitudes Before & After Parliamentary Elections

This report is the latest in a series of in-depth studies about Iranian public opinion regarding the nuclear negotiations, political and economic conditions in Iran, security in the Middle East, and Iran’s foreign relations that the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has been conducting in conjunction with the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) and Iranpoll.com, an independent Toronto-based polling company. It builds on a January 2016 study conducted shortly before the International Atomic Energy Agency certified that Iran had fulfilled the nuclear commitments made in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and could start receiving sanctions relief. It includes some data collected in a second pre-election survey, as well as data from a survey done shortly after the first round of elections. CISSM’s previous studies of Iranian public opinion, and related articles and studies of American public opinion towards the nuclear negotiations with Iran are available at: http://www.cissm.umd.edu/projects/program-public-consultation

Iranian Attitudes on Iranian-U.S. Relations in the Trump Era

The transition of leadership in the United States and the 1-year anniversary of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s implementation day served as the impetus for this new study. It is the latest in a series of Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) studies of Iranian and American attitudes about Iran’s nuclear program, the negotiations that led to the nuclear deal, and other facets of the countries’ economic and security policies. Data for this study was collected in mid-December 2016, after the election of U.S. President Donald Trump

Assessing the Iran Deal

On July 14, 2015, after two years of negotiations, the United States, the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, Germany, and Iran announced they had reached agreement on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding Iran’s nuclear program. On July 20 the Security Council endorsed the agreement unanimously. Under terms agreed between the U.S. Congress and the White House, Congress has until September 17th to disapprove the JCPOA if it wants to prevent President Obama from suspending U.S. nuclear sanctions after Iran fulfills its nuclear commitments. Thus an intense debate is underway. Advocates on both sides have been making their appeals to the American public at a volume, and with a forcefulness, seen in foreign policy issues only a few times a decade. After the initial rollout of the agreement—a phase in which the White House essentially held the floor—critics of the agreement have been widely heard, both in and out of Congress. Media polls have been sporadic and inconsistent. In polls that offer respondents the opportunity to say that they do not have enough information to say, approximately half take it. In this case, the minority opposing the deal tends to outweigh those favoring it. In some polls that give respondents minimal information about the basic outlines of the deal, majorities have approved of it. Apparently Americans have low levels of information and their responses are affected by minimal inputs. Citizen Cabinet surveys are not meant to simply be another poll. Rather the goal is to find out what a representative panel of registered voters recommends when they are given a briefing and hear arguments for and against the key options. The process they go through is called a ‘policymaking simulation,’ in that the goal is to put the respondent into the shoes of a policymaker. The content of the simulation is vetted with Congressional staffers and other experts to assure accuracy and balance. Earlier Citizen Cabinet surveys on the Iran deal focused on the central debate at the time as to whether the US should make a deal based on allowing Iran limited uranium enrichment with intrusive inspections or if it should seek to ramp up economic sanctions in an effort to get Iran to give up its enrichment program entirely. Arguments for both options were found convincing but in the end, in February, 61% in a national Citizen Cabinet recommended in favor of making the deal. In June Citizen Cabinet surveys in three states (Oklahoma, Maryland, and Virginia) went through the same process but with more detail about the draft agreement. In all states seven in ten recommended the deal over ramping up sanctions. In the current Citizen Cabinet survey the simulation focused much more deeply on the terms of the deal, especially the terms that have been highly criticized by Members of Congress. Panelists were first briefed on the origins of the international dispute over Iran’s nuclear program and the main issues during the negotiations and given a detailed summary of the agreement’s main features. Then panelists evaluated a series of critiques—some general, some quite specific—prominent in the Congressional debate, and assessed a rebuttal offered for each. Panelists then assessed proposals for three alternative courses of action that have been proposed, evaluating arguments for and against each and also assessing each one’s chances of success. Finally panelists were asked what they would recommend to their member of Congress—to approve the deal, or disapprove of it, and, if the latter, what alternative course to take

The Ramifications of Rouhani's Re-election

Summary of Findings 1. Rouhani’s Re-election Seen as Endorsement of His Foreign Policy and JCPOA, Not Revolutionary Change [Page 9] There is no consensus among Iranians about what type of mandate Rouhani was given by the 57 percent of Iranians who voted to give him a second term. Fewer than 12 percent offered the same answer when asked an open-ended question. When presented with alternative interpretations, large majorities agree that Rouhani's re-election means that most Iranian people approve of his foreign policy and the nuclear deal he negotiated with the P5+1 countries. They disagree with the assertion that his re-election means most people disapprove of the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, or that they want religion to play a lesser role in policy making. 2. Approval of Nuclear Deal Increased during Presidential Campaign, Despite Disappointment with its Economic Benefit [Page 11] After steady declines in enthusiasm for the JCPOA prior to the May 2017 presidential election, approval of the agreement rose during the election process. Two in three Iranians approve of the agreement, while about a third oppose it. The agreement divides those who voted for Rouhani from those who did not. While eight in ten Rouhani voters approve of the deal, only four in ten of those who voted for Raisi approve of the agreement. Two years since the signing of the agreement, majorities believe that Iran has not received most of the promised benefits and that there have been no improvements in people’s living conditions as a result of the nuclear deal. A plurality thinks that the agreement for Iran to purchase passenger airplanes from the United States will likely have little impact on Iran’s economy. Still, there is some optimism that the deal will eventually improve people’s living conditions. 3. U.S. Seen as Actively Obstructive, Contrary to Commitment under JCPOA [Page 13] Most Iranians lack confidence that the United States will live up to its obligations under the JCPOA. They believe either that the United States is finding other ways to keep the negative effects of sanctions that were lifted under the deal, or that the United States has not even lifted the sanctions it was supposed to lift. A growing majority also believes that contrary to the terms of the agreement, the United States is trying to prevent other countries from normalizing their trade and economic relations with Iran. While a majority still express some confidence that other P5+1 countries will abide by the agreement, most say Europeans are slow in investing and trading with Iran primarily due to fear of punishment by the United States. 4. Majority Support Retaliation if U.S. Abrogates JCPOA [Page 15] Iranians expect President Donald Trump to be more hostile toward Iran than was former President Barack Obama. Seven in ten Iranians believe it likely that Trump may decide not to abide by the terms of the nuclear agreement. Attitudes about how Iran should respond if the United States violates the JCPOA have hardened: A clear majority now thinks that instead of taking the matter to the UN, Iran should retaliate by restarting the aspects of its nuclear program it has agreed to suspend under the JCPOA, if the United States abrogates the deal. A large majority see the new sanctions that Congress is likely to impose on Iran as being against the spirit of the JCPOA, with half saying it would violate the letter of the agreement as well. 5. No Appetite for Renegotiating the Nuclear Deal with Trump [Page 17] Large majorities say that Iran should refuse to increase the duration of the special nuclear limits it accepted under the JCPOA, or to terminate its nuclear enrichment program, even if offered more sanctions relief in return. 6. Majority Opposes a Halt to Missile Testing, Even in Return for More Sanctions Relief [Page 18] Over three in five say that Iran should continue testing ballistic missiles despite U.S. demands for Iran to halt such tests and find the proposition that Iran reduce testing missiles in return for the lifting of more sanctions unacceptable. Two thirds reject the notion that Rouhani’s re-election means most Iranians oppose testing of missiles by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). 7. Greater Support for Self-Sufficiency [Page 19] An increasing majority think Iran should strive to achieve economic self-sufficiency rather than focusing on increasing its trade with other countries. Six in ten say current changes in the world make it necessary for Iran to have a president who will stand up for Iran’s rights and refuse to compromise. Majorities reject offering various steps in exchange for more sanctions relief—steps such as Iran reducing its missile testing, or recognizing Israel, or ceasing its aid to the Syrian government and Hezbollah. Rejection of these steps is significantly lower, though, among those who think the nuclear deal has improved the living condition of ordinary Iranians. 8. Economy is Seen as Bad, and Reducing Unemployment is Given the Highest Priority [Page 22] Large majorities say Iran’s economic situation is bad, and less than a quarter think the economic condition of their family has improved over the last four years. Half think that the country’s economic situation is getting worse. Eight in ten say reducing unemployment should be a top priority for Rouhani in the next four years. 9. Rouhani Seen as Successful in Foreign Policy, not in Reducing Unemployment [Page 23] Majorities see Rouhani as being successful in improving Iran’s relations with other countries and getting international sanctions on Iran lifted. Majorities also see his re-election to mean that most Iranians approve of his foreign policy and the JCPOA. In fact, the nuclear agreement is regarded as Rouhani’s most important accomplishment during his first four years in office. Rouhani, however, gets low marks on the unemployment situation in Iran. Six in ten say he has been unsuccessful in reducing unemployment and half say he has thus far failed to improve the economy. 10. Rouhani's Reelection was Not Certain until Ghalibaf Left the Race [Page 25] Election polls were quite accurate in predicting the outcome of the election. Pre-election polls suggested that if Tehran mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf had been Rouhani’s main opponent rather than Raisi, the election results would have been much closer. After the second presidential debate, Rouhani was ahead of Ghalibaf by less than 6 percentage points, while his lead over Raisi was more than 20 points. While an overwhelming majority of Raisi supporters said that if Raisi pulled out they would vote for Ghalibaf, less than half of Ghalibaf supporters said they would vote for Raisi if their candidate pulled out. Indeed, when Ghalibaf pulled out of the race nearly half of his supporters switched to Rouhani and helped him pass the 50 percent threshold. 11. Turnout Helps Rouhani [Page 29] About a quarter of those who said they rarely vote in Iranian presidential elections reported that they voted in the May 2017 election, and seven in ten said they voted for Rouhani. Large majorities believe that both the Guardian Council and the Interior Ministry were fair and impartial as they fulfilled their election-related responsibilities. About five percent, however, say that they went to their voting stations but for one reason or another were not ultimately able to cast their ballots. 12. Rouhani and Zarif's Popularity Increase after Re-Election, but General Soleymani is Most Popular Political Figure [Page 30] The Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, is the most popular politician in Iran, with President Rouhani coming in second. Although Rouhani’s popularity increased somewhat during the recent election, it is still substantially lower than the first time he ran for office and after he signed the JCPOA. 13. Post-election Terrorist Attacks: ISIS Seen as Primary Culprit, but Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States Likely Helped [Page 32] A large majority of Iranians thinks that ISIS conducted the June 7 attacks in Tehran. Most Iranians also think that Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United States probably provided guidance or support to the perpetrators. 14. Strong Support for Fighting ISIS, but Not for Collaboration with U.S. [Page 33]  The June 7 attacks seem to have increased support for Iran playing a more active role in the Middle East. More than eight in ten call increasing Iran’s security a top priority; seven in ten say this about fighting ISIS and increasing Iran’s influence in the region. A growing majority of Iranians support their government helping groups that are fighting ISIS, although the number that favors sending troops has remained roughly constant. Two in three support Iran sending military personnel to Syria to help the Assad government against armed Syrian rebels, including ISIS. Support for Iran and the United States collaborating with one another to help Iraq’s government counter ISIS is at its lowest, with an increasing majority saying they would oppose such cooperation. 15. Views of P5+1 Countries [Page 35] Majorities regard Russia, China, and Germany—half of the P5+1—favorably, and the other half—the U.S., France and Britain—unfavorably. While six in ten believe that most P5+1 countries (but not the United States) will fulfill their obligations under the JCPOA, views toward all the Western powers that took part in the JCPOA negotiations are now less positive. Though a majority believes that Iran’s relations with European countries have improved as a result of the deal, only a quarter say that about the United States. Still, far from showing implacable hostility toward the West, a majority continues to think it is possible for the Islamic world and the West to find common ground