On the Perils of Stabilizing Prices When Agents are Learning.

We show that price level stabilization is not optimal in an economy where agents have incomplete knowledge about the policy implemented and try to learn it. A systematically more accommodative policy than what agents expect generates short term gains without triggering an abrupt loss of con- fidence, since agents update expectations sluggishly. In the long run agents learn the policy implemented, and the economy converges to a rational expectations equilibrium in which policy does not stabilize prices, economic volatility is high, and agents suffer the corresponding welfare losses. However, these losses are outweighed by short term gains from the learning phase

Trading Off Welfare and Immigration in Europe.

In this paper, we explore the trade-off Europe faces when choosing between immigration from poor countries and welfare spending. Using data from the European Social Survey on sixteen countries from 2002{2012, we document that voter preferences shifted in favor of redistribution but polarized over low-skill immigration. Notably, there is a sharp increase in the share of individuals supporting the welfare state but heavily opposing immigration. In order to provide an economic explanation for these phenomena, we present a model where support for both immigration and redistributive policies are potentially motivated by altruism. Using this model, we show how rising unemployment rates, shares of foreign-born citizens and aggregate education can explain observed shifts in policy preferences