Environmental Standards as Strategic Outcomes : A Simple Model

This paper examines the strategic nature of choice of environmental standards under different degrees of openness of countries. It also compares and contrasts equilibrium environmental standards and levels of pollution, local and global, with the world optimum levels. It shows that, in case of open economies, environmental standards can be strategic substitutes or complements. In equilibrium, countries set higher environmental standards in case of open economies compared to that in case of closed economies. It also shows that equilibrium standards in case of open economies are higher than the world optimum in certain situations. In contrast, countries set lower environmental standards, in equilibrium, than the world optimum in absence of international trade.Environmental standards, strategic choice, openness, world optimum

Biophysical and socioeconomic state of the Indian bengal delta (IBD) region of India from the perspectives of gender and spatial relations

This paper provides insights into the current socioeconomic and biophysical state of the Indian Bengal Delta (IBD), India. The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) Basin which spans across Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, China and India is one of the largest estuarine regions of the world. An input-output (IO) table and model show interdependencies through the supply chain up to the final demand of goods and services in the delta, in the country, and in the rest of the world. Results from the study indicate that the agricultural and fishing sectors are more predominant in the delta than in the non-delta region.UK’s Department for International Development (DFID

Environmental standards as strategic outcomes: A Simple model

This paper examines the strategic nature of choice of environmental standards under different degrees of openness of countries. It also compares and contrasts equilibrium environmental standards and levels of pollution, local and global, with the world optimum levels. It shows that, in case of open economies, environmental standards can be strategic substitutes or complements. In equilibrium, countries set higher environmental standards in case of open economies compared to that in case of closed economies. It also shows that equilibrium standards in case of open economies are higher than the world optimum in certain situations. In contrast, countries set lower environmental standards, in equilibrium, than the world optimum in absence of international trade

Environmental standards as strategic outcomes: A simple model

This paper analyses the strategic nature of choice of environmental standards considering both local and global pollution under alternative regimes of international trade. It also compares and contrasts the strategic equilibrium environmental standards and levels of pollution, local and global, with the world optimum levels. It shows that, in case of open economies, environmental standards can be either strategic substitutes or strategic complements. On the contrary, in case of closed economies, environmental standards are always strategic substitutes. It also shows that the strategic equilibrium environmental standards in case of open economies are higher than the world optimum in certain situations. Whereas, in absence of international trade, countries set, in equilibrium, lower environmental standards than the world optimum.Environmental standards Local pollution Global pollution Strategic choice World optimum

Environmental Standards as Strategic Outcomes: A Simple Model

This paper examines the strategic nature of choice of environmental standards under different degrees of openness of countries. It also compares and contrasts equilibrium environmental standards and levels of pollution, local and global, with the world optimum levels. It shows that, in case of open economies, environmental standards can be strategic substitutes or complements.environmental, country countries, pollution, optimum levels, equilibrium, substitutes, complements, economies, strategic openness, world optimum,

Environmental standards as strategic outcomes: A Simple model

This paper examines the strategic nature of choice of environmental standards under different degrees of openness of countries. It also compares and contrasts equilibrium environmental standards and levels of pollution, local and global, with the world optimum levels. It shows that, in case of open economies, environmental standards can be strategic substitutes or complements. In equilibrium, countries set higher environmental standards in case of open economies compared to that in case of closed economies. It also shows that equilibrium standards in case of open economies are higher than the world optimum in certain situations. In contrast, countries set lower environmental standards, in equilibrium, than the world optimum in absence of international trade.Environmental standards, strategic choice, openness, world optimum