Asymmetric demographic shocks and institutions: The impact on international capital flows and welfare

This paper examines the consequences of an asymmetric negative fertility shock on capital formation, saving/investment imbalance, and welfare. The framework of analysis is a Diamond-type overlapping-generations small open economy with capital market imperfection. The capital market imperfection is modelled through a symmetric wedge between foreign investor and domestic investor return on capital. The shock is transmitted to the small open economy depending on whether the wedge is below a given threshold. If the wedge is not too high, capital first flows in the small open economy to exploit the di¤erence in returns on capital. After the shock has occurred, capital is repatriated in order to �nance the old age consumption of rest of the world investors. If capital flows internationally, lifetime utility in the small open economy decreases unambiguously for individuals born one period before the shock occurs. Provided that the small open economy is initially below its golden rule, individuals born after the time the shock has occurred experience an increase in their lifetime utility.population aging; capital market imperfection; open economy; capital flows; welfare

Commodity Windfalls, Democracy, and External Debt

We examine the effects that revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms have on external debt in a panel of 93 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding is that increases in the international prices of exported commodity goods lead to a significant reduction in the level of external debt in democracies, but to no significant reduction in the level of external debt in autocracies. To explain this result, we show that in autocracies commodity windfalls lead to a statistically significant and quantitatively large increase in government expenditures. In democracies on the other hand government expenditures did not increase significantly. We also document that following commodity windfalls the risk of default on external debt decreased in democracies, but increased significantly in autocracies.commodity windfalls, debt, political institutions

Resource Rents, Democracy and Corruption: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

We examine the effect of the interaction between resource rents and democracy on corruption for a panel of 29 Sub-Saharan countries during the period from 1985 to 2007. We find that higher resource rents lead to more corruption and that the effect is significantly stronger in less democratic countries. Surprisingly, we also find that higher resource rents lead to fewer internal conflicts and that less democratic countries face not a higher but a lower likelihood of conflicts following an increase in resource rents. We argue that these findings can be explained by the ability of the political elites in less democratic countries to more effectively quell the masses through redistribution of rents to the public. We support our argument by documenting that higher resource rents lead to more (less) government spending in less (more) democratic countries. Our findings suggest that the mechanisms through which resource rents affect corruption cannot be separated from political systems.resource rents, corruption, political systems, internal conflicts

Resource Windfalls and Emerging Market Sovereign Bond Spreads: The Role of Political Institutions

We examine the effect that revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms have on sovereign bond spreads using panel data for 36 emerging market economies during the period 1997-2007. Our main finding is that commodity price booms lead to a significant reduction in the sovereign bond spread in democracies, but to a significant increase in the spread in autocracies. To explain our finding we show that, consistent with the political economy literature on the resource curse, revenue windfalls from international commodity price booms significantly increased real per capita GDP growth in democracies, while in autocracies GDP per capita growth decreased.commodity price shocks; sovereign bond spread; political institutions

Food Prices and Political Instability

We examine the effects that variations in the international food prices have on democracy and intra-state conflict using panel data for over 120 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding is that in Low Income Countries increases in the international food prices lead to a significant deterioration of democratic institutions and a significant increase in the incidence of anti-government demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict. In the High Income Countries variations in the international food prices have no significant effects on democratic institutions and measures of intra-state conflict. Our empirical results point to a significant externality of variations in international food prices on Low Income Countries' social and political stability.food prices, conflict, political institutions

Commodity Windfalls, Polarization, and Net Foreign Assets: Panel Data Evidence on the Voracity Effect

This paper examines the effect that windfalls from international commodity price booms have on net foreign assets in a panel of 145 countries during the period 1970-2007. The main finding is that windfalls from international commodity price booms lead to a significant increase in net foreign assets, but only in countries that are ethnically homogeneous. In ethnically polarized countries, net foreign assets significantly decreased. To explain this asymmetry, the paper shows that in ethnically polarized countries commodity windfalls lead to large increases in government spending, political corruption, and the risk of expropriation, with no overall effect on GDP per capita growth. The paper's findings are consistent with theoretical models of the current account that have a built-in voracity effect.commodity windfalls; net foreign assets, polarization, political economy

An Alternative Explanation for the Resource Curse: The Income Effect Channel

The paper provides an alternative explanation for the “resource curse” based on the income effect resulting from high government current spending in resource rich economies. Using a simple life cycle framework, we show that private investment in the non-resource sector is adversely affected if private agents expect extra government current spending financed through resource sector revenues in the future. This income channel of the resource curse is stronger for countries with lower degrees of openness and forward altruism. We empirically validate these findings by estimating non-hydrocarbon sector growth regressions using a panel of 25 oil-exporting countries over 1992–2005.resource curse, fiscal policy, investment and growth

Food Prices, Conflict, and Democratic Change

We examine the effects that variations in the international food prices have on democracy and intra-state conflict using panel data for over 120 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding is that in Low Income Countries increases in the international food prices lead to a significant deterioration of democratic institutions and a significant increase in the incidence of anti-government demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict. In the High Income Countries variations in the international food prices have no significant effects on democratic institutions and measures of intra-state conflict. Our empirical results point to a significant externality of variations in international food prices on Low Income Countries' social and political stability.food prices, conflict, political institutions

Rainfall, Financial Development, and Remittances: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

We use annual variations in rainfall to examine the effects that exogenous, transitory income shocks have on remittances in a panel of 41 Sub-Saharan African countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding is that on average rainfall shocks have an insignificant contemporaneous effect on remittances. However, the marginal effect is significantly decreasing in the share of domestic credit to GDP. So much so, that at high levels of credit to GDP rainfall shocks have a significant negative effect on remittances, while at low levels of credit to GDP the effect of rainfall on remittances is significantly positive.Transitory Income Shocks, Remittances, Financial Development

Commodity Price Volatility, Democracy and Economic Growth

We use a new dataset on non-resource GDP to examine the impact of commodity price volatility on economic growth in a panel of up to 158 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding is that commodity price volatility leads to a significant increase in non-resource GDP growth in democracies, but to no significant increase in autocracies. To explain this result, we show that increased commodity price volatility leads to a statistically significant and quantitatively large increase in net national saving in democracies. In autocracies, on the other hand, net national saving decreased significantly. Our results hold true when using indicators capturing the quality of economic institutions in lieu of indicators of political institutions.commodity prices, volatility, democracy, economic growth