Modeling Disaster: The Failure of Management of the New England Groundfish Industry

Most of the worlds' marine fisheries are overexploited or endangered, including the New England groundfishery, once one of the world’s most prolific. After 35 years of management, stock sizes and catches are lower now than ever. We argue that New England groundfishermen are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma, from which they have failed to escape. We then suggest a set of policies to get these groudnfishermen out of their dilemma.Fishermen's dilemma, fishery management, New England fisheries

Variation of the Electorate: Veto and Purge

In the paradigm social choice problem, there is a fixed set of alternatives and a fixed set of voters. This paper considers variations of the electorate, when some subset of voters has a special voice on some subset of alternatives. Such a situation is formalized by means of the veto function. We focus on stable veto functions, and exhibit a liberal social choice function and a promotion mechanism which are stable. A notion of stability for groups whose membership itself is the social state is investigated. The latter is useful in analyzing the membership of the Politburo of the Communist Party (USSR), 1926-1930

The Borda Game

Recently, a number of authors have constructed axiomatic defences of Borda\u27s rule [2, 4, 8], In every case, it Is assumed that voters mark their ballots honestly, in accordance with their preferences. That this assumption may be unrealistic was known to Borda himself [ij. Elsewhere • [3, 5], it has been shpwn how Borda\u27s rule can reward misrepresented pref erences on the part of individual voters. This result is in the same spirit as, but not a consequence of, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem [6, 7], since Borda\u27s rule allows ties. This is in marked contrast to Condorcet\u27s rule, where such misrepresentation is not rewarded

Shapley Value And Disadvantageous Monopoly

The implication seemed to be that the Shapley value would be significant in accounting for monopoly power if it turned out that the Shapley value turned up no disadvantageous monopolies. The examples of [4, 7] lend credence to this expectation, [7] in a production context, [4] in an exchange context. There it turned out that in a large economy monopoly, as appraised by the Shapley value, definitely was advantageous. The major result of this paper is that, when these examples are generalized, it is no longer necessary that every monopoly conceivable in a given situation have a higher Shapley value than its competitive counterpart. In accounting for monopoly power, the Shapley value appears to have a limited success

Onymous Consistent Voting Systems

A great deal o£ effort has gone into alleviating the regrettable consequences of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: that every stable decisive social choice function is dictatorial. Thus, Kelly [12] explores the conse quences of relaxing decisiveness, while Peleg [14] and Dutta and Pattanaik [3] introduce various notions of strategic consistency, in which the sincere outcome stands in some determinate relation to the game outcome. This paper, draws upon both these lines of research

Power and Taxes in the USSR

This paper constructs a game theoretical model of the Soviet Union based on Aumann-Kurz tax theory. The Shapley value is computed for the party center, an atom, as well as for an ocean composed of workers and peasants. The equation relating peasant economic power to peasant political power is estimated for the period 1925-29. The power share of the peasants is estimated to be 12%, as opposed to 44% for the party center

Shapley Value and Monopoly Power In A Two-Sector Model

This paper considers the measurement of monopoly power in light of recent advances in game theory, in particular those relating to the Shapley value [2, 3, 6]. Traditional measures of monopoly power (e.g., 17]) were all based on Cournot\u27s model of monopoly [5], where the monopolist, knowing his demand curve and knowing that it is Independent of his action, maximizes his profits. Indeed, without the passivity of buyers, the hypothesis of profit maximization cannot operate, for then the situation is that of a game. The essential problem with this model, as pointed out by Aumann [1], is answering when buyers in a monopolized market become passive. Surely it takes more than one buyer, but will even a continuum of buyers be enough? Some examples in the literature [4, 9] suggest that with a very large number of buyers, monopoly will indeed be advantageous, in so far as a monopoly\u27s imputation equals its Shapley value. Testing this hypothesis is the aim of the paper

Shapley Value And Lindahl Equilibrium For An Economy With A Public Good: An Example

In an economy, there are essentially three approaches to the problem of value and distribution: pure competition (competitive equilibrium), coalition power (the core), and fair division (the Shapley value) [5]. In an economy without public goods but with a continuum of agents, all three approaches are equivalent, in the sense that they lead to the same allocation of goods and the same imputation of utility [1, 2]. For an economy with public goods, competitive equilibrium is replaced by the analogous concept of Lindahl equilibrium, the other approaches remaining the same

The Liberal Paradox and Games of Incomplete Information

The liberal paradox arose from the attempt to introduce individual human rights into the theory of social choice. Being one of the major social institutions of a liberal democracy, such rights clearly belong in any complete social choice theory. Thus Sen in his pathbreaking study argued that a person\u27s right consisted in a pair of social states (x, y) such that if the person preferred x to y or y to x so did society. Sen\u27s condition L (liberalism) then required that for each person in society there exist such a pair of social states. Two other conditions proposed by Sen were condition U (universal domain: every profile of individual preference orderings is possible) and condition P (Pareto principle: if everyone in society prefers x to y, so does society). A social choice function f chooses from a set of social opportunities S according to the rul