Folk intuitions of Actual Causation: A Two-Pronged Debunking Explanation

How do we determine whether some candidate causal factor is an actual cause of some particular outcome? Many philosophers have wanted a view of actual causation which fits with folk intuitions of actual causation and those who wish to depart from folk intuitions of actual causation are often charged with the task of providing a plausible account of just how and where the folk have gone wrong. In this paper, I provide a range of empirical evidence aimed at showing just how and where the folk go wrong in determining whether an actual causal relation obtains. The evidence suggests that folk intuitions of actual causation are generated by two epistemically defective processes. I situate the empirical evidence within a background discussion of debunking, arguing for a two-pronged debunking explanation of folk intuitions of actual causation. I conclude that those who wish to depart from folk intuitions of actual causation should not be compelled to square their account of actual causation with the verdicts of the folk. In the dispute over actual causation, folk intuitions deserve to be rejected

Preying on Neighborhoods: First Half of 2007 Foreclosure Update

This report is one of a series of analyses of the foreclosures in Chicago performed by NTIC since 1999. The report documents the role Adjustible Rate Mortgages (ARMs) have played in the current foreclosure crisis and infers changes in lending patterns. The report also includes a summary of action steps being advocated by the Save the American Dream campaign (http://www.savetheamericandream.org), a project of NTIC

Mentalizing Objects

We have a mentalistic view of objects. This is due to the interdependence of folk psychology and folk physics, where these are interconnected by what I call Teleological Commingling. When considering events that don’t involve agents, we naturally default to tracking intentions, goal-directed processes, despite the fact that agents aren’t involved. We have a deep-seated intentionality bias which is the result of the pervasive detection of agency cues, such as order or non-randomness. And this gives rise to the Agentive Worldview: we view nature as a whole as being infused with agency and purpose. Teleological Commingling and the Agentive Worldview it gives rise to are at the core of our conception of objects. I maintain that the ordinary view of material objects is rooted in an implicit, false theory. It should be given no weight in metaphysical debates about the nature of material objects. And this problematizes the central methodological assumption that metaphysical theories of material objects should be beholden to common sense

Cognitive Science for the Revisionary Metaphysician

Many philosophers insist that the revisionary metaphysician—i.e., the metaphysician who offers a metaphysical theory which conflicts with folk intuitions—bears a special burden to explain why certain folk intuitions are mistaken. I show how evidence from cognitive science can help revisionist discharge this explanatory burden. Focusing on composition and persistence, I argue that empirical evidence indicates that the folk operate with a promiscuous teleomentalist view of composition and persistence. The folk view, I argue, deserves to be debunked. In this way, I take myself to have illustrated one key role cognitive science can play in metaphysics; namely by helping the revisionary metaphysician discharge the explanatory burden of providing a plausible explanation of how the folk have gone wrong

From punishment to universalism

Many philosophers have claimed that the folk endorse moral universalism. Some have taken the folk view to support moral universalism; others have taken the folk view to reflect a deep confusion. And while some empirical evidence supports the claim that the folk endorse moral universalism, this work has uncovered intra-domain differences in folk judgments of moral universalism. In light of all this, our question is: why do the folk endorse moral universalism? Our hypothesis is that folk judgments of moral universalism are generated in part by a desire to punish. We present evidence supporting this across three studies. On the basis of this, we argue for a debunking explanation of folk judgments of moral universalism. Our results not only further our understanding of the psychological processes underpinning folk judgments of moral universalism. They also bear on philosophical discussions of folk meta-ethics

Concept mapping and other formalisms as mindtools for representing knowledge

We seek to provide an alternative theoretical perspective on concept mapping (a formalism for representing structural knowledge) to that provided by Ray McAleese in this issue of ALT-J (auto-monitoring). We begin with an overview of concept maps as a means of describing a learner's knowledge constructs, and then discuss a broader class of tools, Mindtools, of which concept maps are a member. We proceed by defining Mindtools as formalisms for representing knowledge, and further elaborate on concept maps as a formalism for representing a particular kind of knowledge: structural knowledge. We then address McAleese's use of the term auto-monitoring and some of the steps in his model of concept maps. Finally, we describe some limitations of concept mapping as a formalism and as a cognitive learning strategy

Folk teleology drives persistence judgments

Two separate research programs have revealed two different factors that feature in our judgments of whether some entity persists. One program—inspired by Knobe—has found that normative considerations affect persistence judgments. For instance, people are more inclined to view a thing as persisting when the changes it undergoes lead to improvements. The other program—inspired by Kelemen—has found that teleological considerations affect persistence judgments. For instance, people are more inclined to view a thing as persisting when it preserves its purpose. Our goal in this paper is to determine what causes persistence judgments. Across four studies, we pit normative considerations against teleological considerations. And using causal modeling procedures, we find a consistent, robust pattern with teleological and not normative considerations directly causing persistence judgments. Our findings put teleology in the driver’s seat, while at the same time shedding further light on our folk notion of an object

Craft Entry for Minorities: The Case of Project JUSTICE

[Excerpt] Demonstrations in Chicago and Pittsburgh in 1969 focused national attention on the problem of the racial integration of the building trades. Many solutions to the problem have been suggested or tried, including efforts to create equal opportunities for blacks in apprenticeship programs. But apprenticeship programs provide only a limited means of entry to the building trades. Most construction workers who attain journeyman status do so through informal means. As Quinn Mills has observed, “Integration of the building trades will be necessarily slow if it is accomplished only through indenturing apprentices. . . . National policy regarding integration of the trades should concern itself with informal routes of entry as well as with apprenticeship.” One pioneering effort in this direction was Project JUSTICE (Journeymen Under Specific Training in Construction Employment) in Buffalo, New York. The goal of JUSTICE was to make craft journeymen of adult blacks by means of classroom instruction and on-the-job training

Deformations of colored sl(N) link homologies via foams

We generalize results of Lee, Gornik and Wu on the structure of deformed colored sl(N) link homologies to the case of non-generic deformations. To this end, we use foam technology to give a completely combinatorial construction of Wu's deformed colored sl(N) link homologies. By studying the underlying deformed higher representation theoretic structures and generalizing the Karoubi envelope approach of Bar-Natan and Morrison we explicitly compute the deformed invariants in terms of undeformed type A link homologies of lower rank and color.Comment: 64 pages, many figure