The Rise of Market-Capitalism and the Roots of Anti-American Terrorism

We examine the role of market-capitalism in anti-American terrorism, differentiating between level- and rate-of-change-effects associated with market-capitalist development and their respective relationship with anti-U.S. violence. Using panel data for 149 countries between 1970 and 2007, we find that higher levels of capitalist development - consistent with the capitalist-peace literature - coincide with less anti-American terrorism, while the marketization process has inflammatory effects on anti-American terrorism. These findings are further corroborated by system-level time-series evidence. We argue that a higher level of market-capitalism is associated with less anti-American terrorism by creating economic interdependencies and a convergence of pro-peace values and institutions, while the destabilizing effects of the marketization process may stem from the violent opposition of various anti-market interest groups to economic, politico-institutional and cultural change initiated by a transition towards a market economy. These interest groups deliberately target the U.S. as the main proponent of modern capitalism, globalization and modernity, where anti-American terrorism serves the purpose of consolidating their respective societal position. Our findings that the U.S. may ultimately become a less likely target of transnational terrorism through the establishment of market economies, but should not disregard the disruptive political, economic and cultural effects of the marketization process in noncapitalist societies

Broker Fixed: The Racialized Social Structure and the Subjugation of Indigenous Populations in the Andes

Responding to calls to return racial analysis to indigenous Latin America, this article moves beyond the prejudicial attitudes of dominant groups to specify how native subordination gets perpetuated as a normal outcome of the organization of society. I argue that a naturalized system of indirect rule racially subordinates native populations through creating the position of mestizo “authoritarian intermediary.” Natives must depend on these cultural brokers for their personhood, while maintaining this privileged position requires facilitating indigenous exploitation. Institutional structures combine with cultural practices to generate a vicious cycle in which increased village intermediary success increases native marginalization. This racialized social structure explains my ethnographic findings that indigenous villagers continued to support the same coterie of mestizos despite their regular and sometimes extreme acts of peculation. My findings about the primacy of race suggest new directions for research into indigenous studies, ethnic mobilizations, and the global dimensions of racial domination

Clientelism and corruption: Institutional adaptation of state capture strategies in view of resource scarcity in Greece

How do strategies of state capture adapt to tight fiscal conditions? The article uses a historical institutionalist approach and content analysis to study the case of Greece. Three theoretically relevant patterns of institutional adaptation are unearthed: first, limited resources for state capture do indeed trigger self-limitation initiatives as expected, but these initiatives replace costly benefits with less costly ones. Second, different forms of capture have different implications for the terms of political competition. Third, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between clientelism and corruption, which becomes pronounced in the creative ways by which strategies of capture adjust to shifting opportunities and constraints. Clients are appointed in state offices and extract bribes directly from citizens. ‘Client corruption’ replaces extraction from the state with extraction through the state, which is less costly for the public finances: the benefit the governing party gives to its clients is the ‘right’ to extract rents for themselves

Why some countries are immune from the resource curse: The role of economic norms

The political resource curse – the detrimental effect of natural resource dependence on democracy – is a well-established correlate of authoritarianism. A long-standing puzzle, however, is why some countries seem to be immune from it. We address this issue systematically by distinguishing two kinds of economies: contract-intensive, where individuals normally obtain their incomes in the marketplace; and clientelist, where individuals normally obtain their incomes in groups that compete over state rents. We theorize that the institutionalized patronage opportunities in clientelist economies are an important precondition for the resource curse, and that nations with contract-intensive economies are immune from it. Analysis of 150 countries from 1973 to 2000 yields robust support for this view. By introducing clientelist economy as a prerequisite for the resource curse, this study offers an important advance in understanding how nations democratize