26 research outputs found

    Electricity Market Design 2030-2050: Moving Towards Implementation

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    Climate change and ambitious emission-reduction targets call for an extensive decarbonization of electricity systems, with increasing levels of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) and demand flexibility to balance the variable and intermittent electricity supply. A successful energy transition will lead to an economically and ecologically sustainable future with an affordable, reliable, and carbon-neutral supply of electricity. In order to achieve these objectives, a consistent and enabling market design is required. The Kopernikus Project SynErgie investigates how demand flexibility of the German industry can be leveraged and how a future-proof electricity market design should be organized, with more than 80 project partners from academia, industry, governmental and non-governmental organizations, energy suppliers, and network operators. In our SynErgie Whitepaper Electricity Spot Market Design 2030-2050 [1], we argued for a transition towards Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) (aka. nodal prices) in Germany in a single step as a core element of a sustainable German energy policy. We motivated a well-designed transition towards LMPs, discussed various challenges, and provided a new perspective on electricity market design in terms of technological opportunities, bid languages, and strategic implications. This second SynErgie Whitepaper Electricity Market Design 2030-2050: Moving Towards Implementation aims at further concretizing the future German market design and provides first guidelines for an implementation of LMPs in Germany. Numerical studies –while not being free of abstractions –give evidence that LMPs generate efficient locational price signals and contribute to manage the complex coordination challenge in (long-term) electricity markets, ultimately reducing price differences between nodes. Spot and derivatives markets require adjustments in order to enable an efficient dispatch and price discovery, while maintaining high liquidity and low transaction costs. Moreover, a successful LMP implementation requires an integration into European market coupling and appropriate interfaces for distribution grids as well as sector coupling. Strategic implications with regard to long-term investments need to be considered, along with mechanisms to support RES investments. As a facilitator for an LMP system, digital technologies should be considered jointly with the market design transition under an enabling regulatory framework. Additional policies can address distributional effects of an LMP system and further prevent market power abuse. Overall, we argue for a well-designed electricity spot market with LMPs, composed of various auctions at different time frames, delivering an efficient market clearing, considering grid constraints, co-optimizing ancillary services, and providing locational prices according to a carefully designed pricing scheme. The spot market is tightly integrated with liquid and accessible derivatives markets, embedded into European market coupling mechanisms, and allows for functional interfaces to distribution systems and other energy sectors. Long-term resource adequacy is ensured and existing RES policies transition properly to the new market design. Mechanisms to mitigate market power and distributional effects are in place and the market design leverages the potential of modern information technologies. Arapid expansion of wind andsolar capacity will be needed to decarbonize the integrated energy system but will most likely also increase the scarcity of the infrastructure. Therefore, an efficient use of the resource "grid" will be a key factor of a successful energy transition. The implementation of an LMPs system of prices with finer space and time granularity promises many upsides and can be a cornerstone for a futureproof electricity system, economic competitiveness, and a decarbonized economy and society. Among the upsides, demand response (and other market participants with opportunity costs) can be efficiently and coherently incentivized to address network constraints, a task zonal systems with redispatch fail at. The transition to LMPs requires a thorough consideration of all the details and specifications involved in the new market design. With this whitepaper, we provide relevant perspectives and first practical guidelines for this crucial milestone of the energy transition

    Electricity Spot Market Design 2030-2050

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    Driven by the climate conference in Paris in December 2015 countries worldwide are confronted with the question of how to shape their power system and how to establish alternative technologies to reduce harmful CO2 emissions. The German government plans that even before the year 2050, all electricity generated and consumed in Germany should be greenhouse gas neutral [1]. To successfully integrate renewable energies, a future energy system must be able to handle the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources such as wind and solar. One important means to address such electricity production variability is demand-side flexibility. Here, industry plays a major role in responding to variable electricity supply with adequate flexibility. This is where the Kopernikus project SynErgie comes in with more than 80 project partners from academia, industry, governmental, and non-governmental organizations as well as energy suppliers and network operators. The Kopernikus project SynErgie investigates how to best leverage demand-side flexibility in the German industry. The current electricity market design in Germany is not well suited to deal with increasing levels of renewable energy, and it does not embrace demand-side flexibility. Almost 6GW of curtailed power in 2019 provide evidence that changes are needed with respect to the rules governing electricity markets. These rules were designed at a time when electricity generation was concentrated on a few large and dispatchable conventional power plants and demand was considered inelastic. The SynErgie Cluster IV investigates how a future-proof electricity market design should be organized. The corresponding Work Package IV.3.1 more specifically deals with analyzing and designing allocation and pricing rules on electricity spot markets. The resulting design must be well suited to accommodate demand-side flexibility and address the intermittent nature of important renewable energy sources. This whitepaper is the result of a fruitful collaboration among the partners involved in SynErgie Cluster IV which include Germany’s leading research organizations and practitioners in the field. The collaboration led to an expert workshop in October 2020 with participation from a number of international energy market experts such as Mette Bjørndal (NHH), Endre Bjørndal (NHH), Peter Cramton (University of Maryland and University of Cologne), and Raphael Heffron (University of Dundee). The whitepaper details the key recommendations from this workshop. In particular, the whitepaper recommends a move to a locational, marginal price-based system together with new bidding formats allowing to better express flexibility. We argue in favor of a one-step introduction of locational, marginal prices instead of repeatedly splitting existing zones. Frequent zone splitting involves recurring political debates as well as short- and long-run instabilities affecting the basis for financial contracts, for example. Importantly, the definition of stable prize zones is very challenging with increasing levels of distributed and renewable energy sources. The recommendation is the outcome of an intense debate about advantages and downsides of different policy alternatives. However, such a transition to locational, marginal prices is not without challenges, and it is a call to arms for the research community, policymakers, and practitioners to develop concepts on how to best facilitate the transition and ensure a reliable and efficient electricity market of the future

    Electricity Market Design 2030-2050: Shaping Future Electricity Markets for a Climate-Neutral Europe

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    Speeding up the energy transition in the European Union (EU) is a major task to quickly reduce harmful greenhouse gas emissions. Market design plays a crucial role in the decarbonization of the European energy system, driving the expansion of both Renewable Energy Sources (RES) and accompanying flexibility sources. In particular, demand flexibility by energy-intensive industrial companies can play a key role. By flexibilizing their production processes, industrial companies can contribute to an increased use of variable RES (in the following referred to as Variable Renewable Energy (VRE)) to lower the CO2 footprint of their products with positive effects on economic competitiveness. Together with other flexibility sources like electric vehicles, the EU can transition to a just, low-carbon society and economy with benefits for all. However, to actually realize these benefits, market design must account for the changing production and consumption characteristics, e.g., the intermittency of VRE. Starting with current challenges of the energy transition that need to be solved with a future market designin the EU, the whitepaper takes alternative market design options and recent technological developments into account, which are highly intertwined. The whitepaper elaborates on the role of, for instance, flexibility, digital technologies, market design with locational incentives, and possible transition pathways in a European context. The “Clean energy for all Europeans” package offers a new opportunity to deepen the integration of different national electricity systems, whereby Transmission System Operators (TSOs) are required to reserve at least 70% of transmission capacities for cross-border trades from 2025 onwards. The corresponding scarcity of transmission capacities on the national level, however, may aggravate congestion to a critical extent, calling for transformational changes in market design involving, e.g., a redefinition of bidding zones close to the network-node level. The present whitepaper can be seen as part of a series of whitepapers on electricity market design 2030 - 2050 [14, 15] and continues the analysis of regionally differentiated prices or Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) as a means to address congestion problems in future VRE-based electricity systems. Thereby, the whitepaper extends the findings of the previous two whitepapers (where in the latter whitepapers, e.g., a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of LMP can be found) and elaborates on the question how LMP could be implemented in one or several European countries and how possible implementation pathways may look like in a coupled European system. Moreover, the whitepaper describes preparatory steps that are necessary for the introduction of LMP, and – at the same time – create advantages for countries under both, a nodal and zonal market design. All in all, the results and outcomes of the whitepaper shall support the market design transition in Europe and, thus, the integration and activation of flexibility potentials to foster a fast reduction of CO2 emissions through a better use of VRE. Therefore, the whitepaper contributes with concrete policy measures to the overarching vision of a future European electricity market design that bases on low-carbon technologies and enhances welfare and fairness, while ensuring economic competitiveness of Europe. We would like to thank all the partners and are grateful for the financial support from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research as well as the Project Management Jülich. Martin Bichler, Hans Ulrich Buhl, and Martin Weibelzahl (SynErgie) Antonello Monti (OneNet

    CO2-Differenzverträge für innovative Klimalösungen in der Industrie

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    Die Klimaziele können nur mit einem Wechsel hin zu neuen Technologien und Praktiken für die Produktion und Nutzung von Grundstoffen, wie Zement, Stahl und Chemikalien, erreicht werden. Die Produktion solcher Grundstoffe macht nämlich rund 16 Prozent der europäischen und 25 Prozent der weltweiten Treibhausgasemissionen aus. Der moderate CO2-Preis im europäischen Emissionshandel (EU-ETS) und die unsichere Preisentwicklung bieten jedoch nicht genügend Anreize für Investitionen in und den Einsatz von innovativen klimafreundlichen Optionen. Hierfür sind neue Politikinstrumente notwendig. Projekt-basierte CO2-Differenzverträge sind, in Kombination mit einem Klimapfand, besonders geeignet: Sie senken die Finanzierungskosten von klimafreundlichen Investitionen, setzen die richtigen Anreize für Emissionsminderungen und wären ein klares Signal des Engagements der Regierungen für langfristige politische Ziele

    Industrial demand response: How network tariffs and regulation do (not) impact flexibility provision in electricity markets and reserves

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    Incentives for industrial loads to provide demand response on day-ahead and reserve markets are affected both by network tariffs, as well as regulations on the provision of flexibility in different markets. This paper uses a numerical model of the chlor-alkali process with a storable intermediate good to investigate how these factors affect the provision of demand response in these markets. We also model the effect of network tariffs and regulation on endogenous investment into process excess capacities, which are needed to provide load shifting. We find that fixed network tariffs based on peak-demand (demand charges) can be detrimental to the provision of demand response, especially to new investments in process capacity. For existing excess capacities, only high network tariffs inhibit demand response by limiting the optimal peak load below its physical limit. Marketing flexibility on the day-ahead market and in the reserves are substitutes for each other. The choice where to market flexibility is affected both by fixed peak-demand network tariffs and existing excess capacities. For endogenous investments, there are synergies between primary reserve participation and day-ahead flexibility provision, with the combination leading to increased capacity investments. In contrast, so-called interruptible load reserves, regular payments to industrial loads to be able to reduce electricity consumption at any point in time, incentivize a flat demand level. Consequently, such reserve markets reduce investments into additional flexibility capacities and often crowd out active participation in other markets

    Contracts for difference support the expansion of renewable energy sources while reducing electricity price risks

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    The German Federal Government passed the "Easter Package" in July 2022, which envisages a number of measures for the expansion of renewable energy sources. The package retains sliding market premiums as a remuneration mechanism, which protect electricity producers unilaterally, while contracts for difference (CfDs), which also protect electricity customers, are only used in the offshore wind sector. However, CfDs could lead to a reduction in financing costs and reduce electricity price risks for producers as well as households and companies. The decline in financing costs would strengthen the expansion of renewable energy sources. In this context, a simplified market value model and further developing the reference yield model could ensure a system-friendly expansion of renewable energy sources

    An auction story: How simple bids struggle with uncertainty

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    Short-term electricity markets are key to an efficient production by generation units. We develop a two-period model to assess different bidding formats to determine for each bidding format the optimal bidding strategy of competitive generators facing price-uncertainty. We compare the results for simple bidding, block bidding and multi-part bidding. We find that even under optimal simple and block bidding, generators face the risk of ex-post suboptimal solutions, whereas in multi-part bidding these do not occur. This points to efficiency gains of multi-part bidding in the presence of uncertainty in electricity markets

    Discriminatory auction design for renewable energy

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    We assess the incorporation of wind or solar resource quality into renewable auction design as a means to geographically diversify renewable energy production and to reduce costs to consumers by reducing scarcity rents at sites with high resource quality. With a stylized auction model, we model the trade-off between production costs and consumer costs. After exploring the influence of the heterogeneity of production costs, the auction volume, and the regulator's knowledge about cost structures, we show that an optimal level of differentiation exists. Through a numerical analysis of the German reference yield model, we estimate that at current auction levels resource differentiation through the reference yield model leads to a reduction of consumer costs of around 21 billion Euro or 11% between 2025 and 2030, even without considering additional savings from increased regional diversification to reduce grid costs.Updated Version: July 23, 202

    Reacting to changing paradigms: How and why to reform electricity markets

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    Renewable energy policy in the age of falling technology costs

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    Cost of renewable energies have dropped, approaching wholesale power price levels. As a result, the role of renewable energy policy design is shifting - from covering incremental costs towards facilitating risk-hedging. An analytical model of the financing structure of renewable investment projects is developed to assess this effect und used to compare different policy design choices: contracts for differences, sliding premia, fixed premia and a setting without dedicated remuneration mechanism. The expected benefit for electricity consumers from reduced risk and financing costs is approximated at the example of a 2030 scenario for Germany. Policies like sliding premia, previously evaluated as providing low-risk investment environments, provide for less risks hedging, when technology costs approach wholesale power prices. Contracts for differences provide in all scenarios the most effective hedge for investors against power prices uncertainty, enabling low-cost financing and reducing costs for consumers, while also hedging electricity consumers against high power prices
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