Basel II and fostering the disclosure of banks\' internal credit ratings

ISSN:1566-7529ISSN:1741-620

Genetic Diversity and Linkage Disequilibrium in Chinese Bread Wheat (Triticum aestivum L.) Revealed by SSR Markers

Two hundred and fifty bread wheat lines, mainly Chinese mini core accessions, were assayed for polymorphism and linkage disequilibrium (LD) based on 512 whole-genome microsatellite loci representing a mean marker density of 5.1 cM. A total of 6,724 alleles ranging from 1 to 49 per locus were identified in all collections. The mean PIC value was 0.650, ranging from 0 to 0.965. Population structure and principal coordinate analysis revealed that landraces and modern varieties were two relatively independent genetic sub-groups. Landraces had a higher allelic diversity than modern varieties with respect to both genomes and chromosomes in terms of total number of alleles and allelic richness. 3,833 (57.0%) and 2,788 (41.5%) rare alleles with frequencies of <5% were found in the landrace and modern variety gene pools, respectively, indicating greater numbers of rare variants, or likely new alleles, in landraces. Analysis of molecular variance (AMOVA) showed that A genome had the largest genetic differentiation and D genome the lowest. In contrast to genetic diversity, modern varieties displayed a wider average LD decay across the whole genome for locus pairs with r2>0.05 (P<0.001) than the landraces. Mean LD decay distance for the landraces at the whole genome level was <5 cM, while a higher LD decay distance of 5–10 cM in modern varieties. LD decay distances were also somewhat different for each of the 21 chromosomes, being higher for most of the chromosomes in modern varieties (<5∼25 cM) compared to landraces (<5∼15 cM), presumably indicating the influences of domestication and breeding. This study facilitates predicting the marker density required to effectively associate genotypes with traits in Chinese wheat genetic resources

What is corporate law?

This article is the first chapter of the second edition of The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, by Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda and Edward Rock (Oxford University Press, 2009). The book as a whole provides a functional analysis of corporate (or company) law in Europe, the U.S., and Japan. Its organization reflects the structure of corporate law across all jurisdictions, while individual chapters explore the diversity of jurisdictional approaches to the common problems of corporate law. In its second edition, the book has been significantly revised and expanded. As the book's introductory chapter, this article describes the functions and boundaries of corporate law. We first detail the economic importance of the corporate form's hallmark features: legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management, and investor ownership. We then identify the major agency problems that attend the corporate form, and that, therefore, corporate law must address: conflicts between managers and shareholders, between controlling and minority shareholders, and between shareholders as a class and non-shareholder constituencies of the firm such as creditors and employees. In our view, corporate law serves in part to accommodate contract and property law to the corporate form and, in substantial part, to address the agency problems that are associated with this form. We next consider the role of law in structuring corporate affairs so as to achieve these goals: whether, and to what extent standard forms - as opposed, on the one hand, to private contract, and on the other, to mandatory rules - are needed, and the role of regulatory competition. Whilst the ‘core’ features of corporate law are present in all - or almost all - legal systems, different systems have made different choices regarding the form and content of many other aspects of their corporate laws. To assist in explaining these, we review a range of forces that shape the development of corporate law, including domestic share ownership patterns. These forces operate differently across countries, implying that in some cases, complementary differences in corporate laws are functional. However, other such differences may be better explained as a response to purely distributional concerns. In addition to Chapter 1, Chapter 2 of the Anatomy of Corporate Law (2nd ed.), Agency problems, Legal Strategies, and Enforcement is also available (full text) on SSRN at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436555

What is corporate law?

This article is the first chapter of the second edition of The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, by Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda and Edward Rock (Oxford University Press, 2009). The book as a whole provides a functional analysis of corporate (or company) law in Europe, the U.S., and Japan. Its organization reflects the structure of corporate law across all jurisdictions, while individual chapters explore the diversity of jurisdictional approaches to the common problems of corporate law. In its second edition, the book has been significantly revised and expanded. As the book's introductory chapter, this article describes the functions and boundaries of corporate law. We first detail the economic importance of the corporate form's hallmark features: legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management, and investor ownership. We then identify the major agency problems that attend the corporate form, and that, therefore, corporate law must address: conflicts between managers and shareholders, between controlling and minority shareholders, and between shareholders as a class and non-shareholder constituencies of the firm such as creditors and employees. In our view, corporate law serves in part to accommodate contract and property law to the corporate form and, in substantial part, to address the agency problems that are associated with this form. We next consider the role of law in structuring corporate affairs so as to achieve these goals: whether, and to what extent standard forms - as opposed, on the one hand, to private contract, and on the other, to mandatory rules - are needed, and the role of regulatory competition. Whilst the ‘core’ features of corporate law are present in all - or almost all - legal systems, different systems have made different choices regarding the form and content of many other aspects of their corporate laws. To assist in explaining these, we review a range of forces that shape the development of corporate law, including domestic share ownership patterns. These forces operate differently across countries, implying that in some cases, complementary differences in corporate laws are functional. However, other such differences may be better explained as a response to purely distributional concerns. In addition to Chapter 1, Chapter 2 of the Anatomy of Corporate Law (2nd ed.), Agency problems, Legal Strategies, and Enforcement is also available (full text) on SSRN at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436555

Corporate Criminal Liability

This entry reviews the literature on corporate criminal liability. It first describes the different forms of corporate liability and then discusses the optimal structure of corporate sanctions to deter crimes. The distinction between civil and criminal corporate liability is addressed, and a brief discussion of the corporate criminal enforcement in the United States and Europe is presented