Building Capabilities for Alliance Portfolios

This article analyses how firms build their capabilities for alliance portfolios. We investigate different solutions that are adopted across portfolio sizes, and whether the adoption of these solutions explains alliance portfolio performance. Our findings illustrate which solutions practitioners should consider implementing when expanding their alliance portfolio, and which can help enhance their portfolio performance. Our conclusions are based on a sample of 192 firms managing over 3,400 strategic alliances and seven expert interviews. We analyse the adoption of 14 distinct alliance practices in four solution categories. Our results reveal whether and when functional and staffing (e.g. alliance manager, alliance department), tool-based (e.g. intranet, codification of best practices), training (e.g. in-house, external training) and third party (e.g. consultant, mediators) solutions help firms transition successfully between small, medium, and large alliance portfolios, and to what extent they are associated with alliance success. Rules of engagement for successful alliance portfolio management are discussed. © 2008 Elsevier Ltd

Board involvement in International Joint Ventures

The last two decades have witnessed substantial scholarly interest in corporate boards, yet little research has been devoted to boards of international joint ventures (IJVs). We combine the corporate governance and alliance governance literatures in order to study this important ex post governance mechanism for IJVs. We identify a fundamental tension inherent in IJVs, which arises from the unique features of this organizational form and influences the level of involvement by their boards. International joint ventures are hybrid organizational forms that can require administrative control to facilitate monitoring and coordinated adaptation in the presence of exchange hazards. At the same time, the fact that IJVs operate in different host countries can make it efficient to delegate authority to local management for certain collaborations. In investigating the determinants of IJV board involvement, we therefore examine characteristics of IJVs that reflect this underlying tension. We conclude that board involvement reflects efficiency considerations in individual ventures, and the administrative control provided by boards is an important dimension of IJV governance

Combinations of partners’ joint venture formation motives

Purpose – Prior research on joint venture (JV) formation often examines a single focal firm and assumes it has a single motive for collaboration. This study seeks to investigate how formation motives of partner firms are symmetrically coupled. It considers motives in the context of different European Economic Interest Groupings (EEIGs) characteristics and partner firm characteristics. Design/methodology/approach – Selfadministered surveys were employed and a total sample of 104 partners cooperating in 47 different JVs (EEIGs) was used for data analysis. Findings – The paper observes the coupling of different formation motives and finds that different rationales to establish international JVs are held simultaneously by partners. Furthermore, it finds that the number of partners increase when partners hold motives primarily to develop knowledge. Research limitations/implications – Current theorising might focus too narrowly on particular motives or at best on combinations of motives within a specific theoretical approach. Such a single approach might be rather simplistic due to the multiple rationales to enact EEIGs by partners. Future studies that accommodate multiple perspectives simultaneously in a single paper would significantly advance the field and hold more explanatory power. Practical implications – The paper finds that in general partner motives are symmetric, but some motives are more natural candidates for partners to couple together. Furthermore, smaller firms can also benefit by forming more complex collaborations and hold multiple motives simultaneously. Originality/value – The paper reinvigorates theoretical development by showing the amalgamation of different motives and theories for JV establishment. It also provides new guidelines to practitioners and scholars alike by examining various combinations of collaborative motives and how they are coupled across partners in alliance dyads. © 2010, Emerald Group Publishing Limite

When collaborative strategy turns into acquisition: Distinguishing and explaining partner acquisition versus joint venture buyout

In this chapter, we define the concepts of joint venture buyout and partner acquisition; explain the differences between the two; discuss their respective motivations and antecedents; and elaborate implications of this distinction for research and practice. Extract: "What comes after an alliance between two firms? The alliance may be dissolved and its activities stopped, effectively ending the relationship between the parent firms; another alliance may be formed to replace it; or the activities of the ex-alliance may continue but under the ownership and control of a single parent. Intriguingly, in the case of JVs this latter outcome may result from two developments. The first, which we refer to as a joint venture buyout (JVB), occurs when one parent firm takes over the shares that the other parent owned in their JV (Meschi, 2005; Zollo & Reuer, 2010). The second, which we refer to as a partner acquisition (PA), occurs when one partner acquires the other parent firm (Folta & Miller, 2002; Zaheer, Hernandez, & Banerjee, 2010).The two developments differ in what equity is being transacted. A JVB involves a change in ownership of one parent’s share of the JV’s equity, but does not affect either parents’ own equity. A PA involves acquisition of one parent by the other, so what is being transacted is one parent’s own equity. However, following a PA the acquiring parent also becomes sole owner of the alliance (Hagedoorn & Sadowski, 1999; Porrini, 2004)." (80