Semantic inferentialism as (a form of) active externalism

Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers (Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about these dividing lines. With reference to Brandom’s (1994, 2000, Inquiry 47:236–253, 2008) broad semantic inferentialism, we show that a theory of meaning can be at the same time a variety of active externalism. While we grant that supporters of other varieties of content externalism (e.g., Putnam 1975 and Burge (Philosophical Review 95:3–45, 1986) can deny active externalism, this is not an option for semantic inferentialists: On this latter view, the role of the environment (both in its social and natural form) is not ‘passive’ in the sense assumed by the alternative approaches to content externalism

Education as initiation into the space of reasons

A long tradition in the philosophy of education identifies education’s most fundamental aim and ideal as that of the fostering or cultivation of rationality. In this article I relate this tradition in philosophy of education to recent work inspired by Wilfred Sellars on ‘the space of reasons’. I first offer a very brief overview of the tradition just mentioned, after which I briefly lay out Sellars’ notion and discuss its place in the work of some of those influenced by Sellars, especially John McDowell. I next address recent work in philosophy of education that suggests that there is a tension between Sellars’ notion and the traditional educational ideal as I have developed and defended it in my own work, or that the Sellarsian view as developed by McDowell resolves outstanding difficulties with my version of the traditional view. I will argue that there is less tension than there appears to some of my critics to be and that the Sellarsian notion is in fact compatible with the traditional view as thus developed, but that it leaves out an important aspect of that view that should not be lost