Optimal Incentive Contracts for Experts

This paper analyzes optimal incentive contracts for information acquisition and revelation. A decision maker faces the problem to design a contract that provides an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in general not optimal to reward the expert if his recommendation is confirmed. The common observation that experts are paid when their recommendation is confirmed can be explained by incomplete information about the expert's cost to increase the precision of his information. We extend the model to analyze contracting with multiple experts, the timing of expertise, and the provision of incentives when the realized state is not verifiableExpertise, Forecasting, Incentives, Information Acquisition

Initial electron-transfer in the reaction center from Rhodobacter sphaeroides.

The initial electron transfer steps in the photosynthetic reaction center of the purple bacterium Rhodobacter sphaeroides have been investigated by femtosecond time-resolved spectroscopy. The experimental data taken at various wavelengths demonstrate the existence of at least four intermediate states within the first nanosecond. The difference spectra of the intermediates and transient photodichroism data are fully consistent with a sequential four-step model of the primary electron transfer: Light absorption by the special pair P leads to the state P*. From the excited primary donor P*, the electron is transferred within 3.5 +/- 0.4 ps to the accessory bacteriochlorophyll B. State P+B- decays with a time constant of 0.9 +/- 0.3 ps passing the electron to the bacteriopheophytin H. Finally, the electron is transferred from H- to the quinone QA within 220 +/- 40 ps