Using Technology to Eliminate Traffic Congestion

Traffic congestion is a pervasive worldwide problem. We explain how to harness existing technologies together with new methods in time-and-location markets to eradicate traffic congestion along with its attendant social harms. Our market design for road use builds on congestion pricing and models of efficient pricing in the electricity sector. The market maximizes the value of a transport network through efficient scheduling, routing, and pricing of road use. Privacy and equity concerns are addressed. Transparent price information provides essential information for efficient long-term investment in transport

Single Motherhood and the Abolition of Coverture in the United States

Under the common-law system of coverture in the United States, a married woman relinquished control of property and wages to her husband. Many U.S. states passed acts between 1850 and 1920 that expanded a married woman’s right to keep her market earnings and to own separate property. The former were called married women’s earnings acts (MWEAs) and the latter married women’s property acts (MWPAs). Scholarly interest in the acts’ effects is growing. Researchers have examined how the acts affected outcomes such as women's wealth-holding and educational attainment. The acts' impact on women’s non-marital birth decisions remains unexamined, however. We postulate that the acts caused women to anticipate greater benefits from having children within rather than outside of marriage. We thus expect passage of MWPAs and MWEAs to reduce the likelihood that single women become mothers of young children. We use probit regression to analyze individual data from the U.S. Census for the years 1860 to 1920. We find that the property acts in fact reduced the likelihood that single women have young children. We also find that the “de-coverture” acts’ effects were stronger for literate women, U.S.-born women, in states with higher female labor-force participation, and in more rural states, consistent with predictions

The determinants of contractual choice for private involvement in infrastructure projects in the United States

Reliance on private partners to help provide infrastructure investment and service delivery is increasing in the United States. Numerous studies have examined the determinants of the degree of private participation in infrastructure projects as governed by contract type. We depart from this simple public/private dichotomy by examining a rich set of contractual arrangements. We utilize both municipal and state-level data on 472 projects of various types completed between 1985 and 2008. Our estimates indicate that infrastructure characteristics, particularly those that reflect stand alone versus network characteristics, are key factors influencing the extent of private participation. Fiscal variables, such as a jurisdiction’s relative debt level, and basic controls, such as population and locality of government, increase the degree of private participation, while a greater tax burden reduces private participation

Recovery Risk and Labor Costs in Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Choice in the US Water industry

We use an ordered logistic model to empirically examine the factors that explain varying degrees of private involvement in the U.S. water sector through public-private partnerships. Our estimates suggest that a variety of factors help explain greater private participation in this sector. We find that the risk to private participants regarding cost recovery is an important driver of private participation. The relative cost of labor is also a key factor in determining the degree of private involvement in the contract choice. When public wages are high relative to private wages, private participation is viewed as a source of cost savings. We thus find two main drivers of greater private involvement: one encouraging private participation by reducing risk, and another encouraging government to seek out private participation in lowering costs

Do public-private partnership enabling laws increase private investment in transportation infrastructure?

The use of public-private partnerships, or PPPs, is an important development in U.S. infrastructure delivery. PPPs are detailed contracts between a public-sector project sponsor and a private-sector provider that bundle together key delivery services. PPPs represent an important middle ground between pure-public project delivery and complete privatization. As of 2016, thirty-five U.S. states had enacted PPP enabling laws. Those laws define the broad institutional framework surrounding a PPP agreement. They address such questions as the mixing of public- and private-sector funds, the treatment of unsolicited PPP proposals, and the need for prior legislative approval of PPP contracts, among other issues. We provide the first comprehensive empirical assessment of the impact of those laws on a state's utilization of private investment. We analyze the overall effect of a state having a PPP enabling law while controlling for a variety of factors. A law's average impact represents an almost six-fold increase relative to the average percentage of PPP investment prior to enactment in treated states. We then assess the impact of PPP enabling-law provisions. We develop an expert-informed weighted index reflecting the degree to which a state's law is encouraging or discouraging of private investment. We find that PPP provisions that empower PPPs, such as exemptions from property taxes and from extant procurement laws, as well as confidentiality protections, successfully attract PPP investment

Strong versus Weak Vertical Integration: Contractual Choice and PPPs in the United States

Public-Private-Partnerships are long-term, relational contracts between a public-sector sponsor and a private partner to deliver infrastructure projects across a range of economic sectors. Efficiency gains may derive from risk transfer and bundling different tasks within a single contract. We study the factors explaining the scope of bundling. We focus on the choice between weak vertical integration, which includes operational tasks alone or construction tasks alone, versus strong vertical integration, which involves the combination of operational and construction tasks. We utilize a new data set that includes 553 PPPs concluded in the U.S. between 1985 and 2013

Do public-private partnership enabling laws increase private investment in infrastructure [WP]

Rising use of public-private partnerships, or PPPs, is an important development in U.S. infrastructure delivery. PPPs are detailed contracts between a public-sector infrastructure project sponsor and a private-sector provider that bundle delivery services. PPPs represent a middle ground between pure-public project delivery and complete privatization. As of 2016, thirty-five U.S. states had enacted PPP enabling laws. That legislation defines the broad institutional framework surrounding a PPP agreement. It addresses such questions as the mixing of public- and private-sector funds, the treatment of unsolicited PPP proposals, and need for prior legislative approval of PPP contracts, among other key issues. We provide the first thorough empirical assessment of the impact of PPP enabling laws on a state’s utilization of private investment. We analyze the overall effect of having a PPP enabling law while controlling for a variety of factors, including the state’s indebtedness, its broad political disposition, union membership, per-capita income, and other variables. We then assess the impact of thirteen individual PPP enabling-law provisions. We develop an expert-informed weighted index reflecting the degree to which a state’s law is encouraging or discouraging of private investment. We find that more favorable PPP enabling laws increase private investment: when our favorability index increases by one-tenth, the proportion of infrastructure investment delivered via PPP in a state increases by 0.5-0.6. We find that PPP enabling-law provisions allowing unsolicited proposals and the comingling of public and private funds are particularly important in attracting private investment

How Much Vertical Integration? Contractual Choice and Public-Private Partnerships in the United States

Efficiency gains in Public-Private Partnerships derive from risk transfer and the bundling of different tasks. We study the factors that explain bundling in single contracts. We focus on the choice between integrating operational tasks alone or construction tasks alone, versus vertically integrating both operational and construction tasks. We analyze a new data set that includes 553 PPPs that were concluded in the United States. We find evidence that some financial variables play a role in bundling decisions. In addition, market size and the type of economic sectors involved, are also important drivers of contract choice and bundling decisions

(Section A: Planning Strategies and Design Concepts)

Focusing on trends in population and the causes of overpopulation, we analyse the distributional characteristics of the population in cities around the world. We analyse the countermeasures in spatial planning of various urban areas, which lays the foundation for our case study of Beijing. Beijing, which has unique attributes as the capital of China, faces challenges regarding population control and realization of the Main Functional Area Planning. We focus on the question of how spatial planning can help control population and the realization of urban functions in metropolises such as Beijing. We find that main functional area planning played a role in achieving the main functions and controlling the population of Beijing. Also, controlling the industrial structure is effective in changing population structure for metropolises such as Beijing. In addition, using guidance from spatial planning, we suggest establishing new urban areas or constructing new cities to form a multi-centre structure, to plan for old town renovation, and to improve the construction of the road infrastructure system