28 research outputs found

    Parallels between Pathogens and Gluten Peptides in Celiac Sprue

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    Pathogens are exogenous agents capable of causing disease in susceptible organisms. In celiac sprue, a disease triggered by partially hydrolyzed gluten peptides in the small intestine, the offending immunotoxins cannot replicate, but otherwise have many hallmarks of classical pathogens. First, dietary gluten and its peptide metabolites are ubiquitous components of the modern diet, yet only a small, genetically susceptible fraction of the human population contracts celiac sprue. Second, immunotoxic gluten peptides have certain unusual structural features that allow them to survive the harsh proteolytic conditions of the gastrointestinal tract and thereby interact extensively with the mucosal lining of the small intestine. Third, they invade across epithelial barriers intact to access the underlying gut-associated lymphoid tissue. Fourth, they possess recognition sequences for selective modification by an endogenous enzyme, transglutaminase 2, allowing for in situ activation to a more immunotoxic form via host subversion. Fifth, they precipitate a T cell–mediated immune reaction comprising both innate and adaptive responses that causes chronic inflammation of the small intestine. Sixth, complete elimination of immunotoxic gluten peptides from the celiac diet results in remission, whereas reintroduction of gluten in the diet causes relapse. Therefore, in analogy with antibiotics, orally administered proteases that reduce the host's exposure to the immunotoxin by accelerating gluten peptide destruction have considerable therapeutic potential. Last but not least, notwithstanding the power of in vitro methods to reconstitute the essence of the immune response to gluten in a celiac patient, animal models for the disease, while elusive, are likely to yield fundamentally new systems-level insights

    Competition or Cooperation? Promoting Supplier Performance with Incentives Under Varying Conditions of Dependence

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    In this study, we use the lens of social exchange theory to investigate the influence of incentives on supplier performance under various conditions of buyer–supplier dependence. We propose that incentives generally fall into two main categories: competitive, market-based incentives that reward suppliers based on how well they perform relative to other suppliers, and cooperative incentives, where both buyer and supplier share benefits based on their joint performance. Using empirical data collected from 230 buyers in a sample of U.S. industrial firms, we measure the effects of these two types of incentives on various measures of performance, as well as the moderating effects of buyer–supplier dependence. Our results suggest that competitive incentives can be an effective approach to improving delivery, quality, innovation and flexibility, for purchases where the buyer–supplier relationship is characterized by balanced and moderate amounts of mutual dependence. However, competitive incentives are ineffective at generating improved cost performance. Cooperation appears to be the only way to improve cost but is only fruitful under conditions of high mutual dependence. In general, we find that high mutual dependence provides a good basis for cooperative incentives to successfully improve each of the types of performance included in our study. Finally, we find evidence that cooperation and competition can coexist without significant risk of decreased performance

    Managing Buyer-Supplier Relationships: Empirical Patterns of Strategy Formulation in Industrial Purchasing

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    In this paper, we investigate how industrial buyers align their relationships with suppliers to the contextual characteristics of the purchase. We propose that patterns of purchasing strategy are evidenced, in part, by the alignment of three fundamental domains: the firm\u27s strategic intent for a given purchase, the environment in which a purchase is made, and the type of relationship adopted by industrial buying firms with their selected suppliers. Using a cluster analysis on data collected from 226 buyers in a sample of U.S. industrial firms, we identified four primary types of purchases. Our results provide a partial empirical validation of the purchasing types presented in purchasing portfolio models. However, we identify a fourth type, the adversarial purchase, which cannot be mapped to existing portfolio models. We also found evidence that the dimensions of portfolio models may not be as independent as commonly assumed. We discuss the implications of our findings for practitioners and for research
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