26 research outputs found
Influenza vaccine supply, 2005–2006: did we come up short?
<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Although total influenza vaccine doses available in the 2005/2006 influenza season were over 80 million, CDC received many reports of delayed and diminished vaccine shipments in October to November of 2005. To better understand the supply problems, CDC and partners surveyed several health care professional groups.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Surveys were sent to representative samples of influenza vaccine providers including pediatricians, internists, federally qualified health centers, visiting nurse organizations, and all 64 state and other health departments receiving federal immunization funds directly. In November and December, 2005, providers were asked questions about their experience in ordering influenza vaccine, sources where orders were placed, proportion of orders received, and referral of patients to other vaccination sites.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>The number of providers surveyed (median: 154; range: 64 – 308) and response rates (median: 62%; range: 51% – 77%) varied among groups. Less than half of the providers in most groups placed a single order that was accepted (median: 31%; range: 8% – 53%), and most placed multiple orders. Only 57% of federally qualified health centers and 60% of internists reported they received at least 40% of their orders by the middle of December; the other provider groups received a greater proportion of their orders. Most internists (80%) and federally qualified health centers (54%) reported that they had referred priority group patients to other locations to receive the influenza vaccine due to inadequate supplies. Vaccine providers who ordered only from Chiron received a lower proportion of their orders than providers that ordered from another source or ordered from multiple sources.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Most of the providers surveyed received only part of their orders by the middle of December. Disruptions in receipt of influenza vaccine during the fall of 2005 were due primarily to shortfalls in vaccine from Chiron and also due to delays and partial shipments from other distributors.</p
Preparing for pandemic influenza: the need for enhanced surveillance.
Link_to_subscribed_fulltex
Recommended adult immunization schedule, United States, 2020
In October 2019, the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP) voted to approve the Recommended
Adult Immunization Schedule for Ages 19
Years or Older, United States, 2020. The 2020 adult immunization
schedule, available at www.cdc.gov/vaccines
/schedules/hcp/imz/adult.html, summarizes ACIP recommendations
in 2 tables and accompanying notes (Figure).
The full ACIP recommendations for each vaccine are available
at www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/index.html.
The 2020 schedule has also been approved by the director
of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) and by the American College of Physicians (www
.acponline.org), American Academy of Family Physicians
(www.aafp.org), American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (www.acog.org), and American College of
Nurse-Midwives (www.midwife.org)
Prevention and control of influenza: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).
This report updates 1999 recommendations by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) on the use of influenza vaccine and antiviral agents (MMWR 1999;48[No. RR-4]: 1-29). These recommendations include five principal changes: a) the age for universal vaccination has been lowered to 50 years from 65 years; b) scheduling of large, organized vaccination campaigns after mid-October may be considered because the availability of vaccine in any location cannot be assured consistently in the early fall; c) 2000-2001 trivalent vaccine virus strains are A/Moscow/10/99 (H3N2)-like, A/New Caledonia/20/99 (H1N1)-like, and B/Beijing/184/93-like strains; d) information on neuraminidase-inhibitor antiviral drugs has been added; and e) a list of other influenza-related infection control documents for special populations has been added. This report and other information on influenza can be accessed at the website for the Influenza Branch, Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National Center for Infectious Diseases, CDC at .Link_to_subscribed_fulltex
Immunoglobulin M capture immunoassay in investigation of coxsackie B5 and B6 outbreaks in South Australia
Copyright © 1995, American Society for MicrobiologyAn immunoglobulin M (IgM) capture enzyme immunoassay was used to detect major overlapping outbreaks of disease in South Australia caused by coxsackieviruses B5 (CBV-5) and B6 (CBV-6). CBV-5-specific IgM was detected in patients presenting in spring 1992 with acute febrile illnesses, rash, severe acute respiratory disease, meningitis, myocarditis and/or pericarditis, while tests for other viruses were negative. CBV-5 was isolated from an early case. In December 1992 it was noted that CBV-6 had replaced CBV-5 as the major cause of disease. The CBV-6 epidemic continued until April 1993. Serum samples from 495 patients (276 inpatients) were submitted for testing. CBV-6 infection was associated with lower respiratory tract infection and persistent cough. This study demonstrated success of the IgM enzyme immunoassay and the need for diagnostic virology laboratories to look for CBV-6 infection in addition to the other five CBVs
Recommended from our members
Immunogenicity of a Meningococcal B Vaccine during a University Outbreak
BACKGROUND: In December 2013, a multicomponent meningococcal serogroup B (4CMenB) vaccine was used before licensure on the basis of special consideration by the Food and Drug Administration to respond to an outbreak of Neisseria meningitidis B at a U.S. university. Data suggested that vaccination would control the outbreak because isolates expressed antigens that were closely related to the vaccine antigens (factor H–binding protein [fHbp] and neisserial heparin-binding antigen). We quantified the immune responses induced by 4CMenB during the outbreak. METHODS: We conducted a seroprevalence survey among students to assess vaccination status and collect serum specimens to quantify titers of serum bactericidal antibodies (SBA) with an assay that included human complement (hSBA). We compared the proportion of vaccinated and unvaccinated participants who were seropositive for the outbreak strain and for one closely related reference strain (44/76-SL, which included fHbp) and one mismatched reference strain (5/99, which included neis-serial adhesin A), both of which were used in vaccine development. Seropositivity was defined as an hSBA titer of 4 or higher. RESULTS: Among the 499 participants who received two doses of the 4CMenB vaccine 10 weeks apart, 66.1% (95% confidence interval [CI], 61.8 to 70.3) were seropositive for the outbreak strain, although the geometric mean titer was low at 7.6 (95% CI, 6.7 to 8.5). Among a random subgroup of 61 vaccinees who also received two doses but did not have a detectable protective response to the outbreak strain, 86.9% (95% CI, 75.8 to 94.2) were seropositive for the 44/76-SL strain, for which there was a geometric mean titer of 17.4 (95% CI, 13.0 to 23.2), whereas 100% of these vaccinees (95% CI, 94.1 to 100) were seropositive for the 5/99 strain and had a higher geometric mean titer (256.3; 95% CI, 187.3 to 350.7). The response to the outbreak strain was moderately correlated with the response to the 44/76-SL strain (Pearson's correlation, 0.64; P<0.001) but not with the response to the 5/99 strain (Pearson's correlation, −0.06; P = 0.43). CONCLUSIONS: Eight weeks after the second dose of the 4CMenB vaccine was administered, there was no evidence of an hSBA response against the outbreak strain in 33.9% of vaccinees, although no cases of meningococcal disease caused by N. meningitidis B were reported among vaccinated students. (Funded by Princeton University and others.