Synthesising and utilising complex evidence to inform policy in education and health.

Oslo, Norway, May 19 to 21, 200

Integration and Continuity of Primary Care: Polyclinics and Alternatives, a Patient-Centred Analysis of How Organisation Constrains Care Coordination

Background An ageing population, increasingly specialised of clinical services and diverse healthcare provider ownership make the coordination and continuity of complex care increasingly problematic. The way in which the provision of complex healthcare is coordinated produces – or fails to – six forms of continuity of care (cross-sectional, longitudinal, flexible, access, informational, relational). Care coordination is accomplished by a combination of activities by: patients themselves; provider organisations; care networks coordinating the separate provider organisations; and overall health system governance. This research examines how far organisational integration might promote care coordination at the clinical level. Objectives To examine: 1. What differences the organisational integration of primary care makes, compared with network governance, to horizontal and vertical coordination of care. 2. What difference provider ownership (corporate, partnership, public) makes. 3. How much scope either structure allows for managerial discretion and ‘performance’. 4. Differences between networked and hierarchical governance regarding the continuity and integration of primary care. 5. The implications of the above for managerial practice in primary care. Methods Multiple-methods design combining: 1. Assembly of an analytic framework by non-systematic review. 2. Framework analysis of patients’ experiences of the continuities of care. 3. Systematic comparison of organisational case studies made in the same study sites. 4. A cross-country comparison of care coordination mechanisms found in our NHS study sites with those in publicly owned and managed Swedish polyclinics. 5. Analysis and synthesis of data using an ‘inside-out’ analytic strategy. Study sites included professional partnership, corporate and publicly owned and managed primary care providers, and different configurations of organisational integration or separation of community health services, mental health services, social services and acute in-patient care. Results Starting from data about patients' experiences of the coordination or under-coordination of care we identified: 1. Five care coordination mechanisms present in both the integrated organisations and the care networks. 2. Four main obstacles to care coordination within the integrated organisations, of which two were also present in the care networks. 3. Seven main obstacles to care coordination that were specific to the care networks. 4. Nine care coordination mechanisms present in the integrated organisations. Taking everything into consideration, integrated organisations appeared more favourable to producing continuities of care than were care networks. Network structures demonstrated more flexibility in adding services for small care groups temporarily, but the expansion of integrated organisations had advantages when adding new services on a longer term and larger scale. Ownership differences affected the range of services to which patients had direct access; primary care doctors’ managerial responsibilities (relevant to care coordination because of its impact on GP workload); and the scope for doctors to develop special interests. We found little difference between integrated organisations and care networks in terms of managerial discretion and performance. Conclusions On balance, an integrated organisation seems more likely to favour the development of care coordination, and therefore continuities of care, than a system of care networks. At least four different variants of ownership and management of organisationally integrated primary care providers are practicable in NHS-like settings

Has incentive payment improved venous thrombo-embolism risk assessment and treatment of hospital in-patients?

This paper focuses on financial incentives rewarding successful implementation of guidelines in the UK National Health Service (NHS). In particular, it assesses the implementation of National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) venous thrombo-embolism (VTE) guidance in 2010 on the risk assessment and secondary prevention of VTE in hospital in-patients and the financial incentives driving successful implementation introduced by the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation for Payment Framework (CQUIN) for 2010-2011. We systematically compared the implementation of evidence-based national guidance on VTE prevention across two specialities (general medicine and orthopaedics) in four hospital sites in the greater South West of England by auditing and evaluating VTE prevention activity for 2009 (i.e. before the 2010 NICE guideline) and late 2010 (almost a year after the guideline was published). Analysis of VTE prevention activity reported in 816 randomly selected orthopaedic and general medical in-patient medical records was complemented by a qualitative study into the practical responses to revised national guidance. This paper's contribution to knowledge is to suggest that by financially rewarding the implementation of national guidance on VTE prevention, paradoxes and contradictions have become apparent between the 'payment by volume system' of Healthcare Resource Groups and the 'payment by results' system of CQUIN

The practice of commissioning healthcare from a private provider: learning from an in-depth case study

Background: The direction of health service policy in England is for more diversification in the design, commissioning and provision of health care services. The case study which is the subject of this paper was selected specifically because of the partnering with a private sector organisation to manage whole system redesign of primary care and to support the commissioning of services for people with long term conditions at risk of unplanned hospital admissions and associated service provision activities. The case study forms part of a larger Department of Health funded project on the practice of commissioning which aims to find the best means of achieving a balance between monitoring and control on the one hand, and flexibility and innovation on the other, and to find out what modes of commissioning are most effective in different circumstances and for different services. Methods: A single case study method was adopted to explore multiple perspectives of the complexities and uniqueness of a public-private partnership referred to as the “Livewell project”. 10 single depth interviews were carried out with key informants across the GP practices, the PCT and the private provider involved in the initiative. Results: The main themes arising from single depth interviews with the case study participants include a particular understanding about the concept of commissioning in the context of primary care, ambitions for primary care redesign, the importance of key roles and strong relationships, issues around the adoption and spread of innovation, and the impact of the current changes to commissioning arrangements. The findings identified a close and high trust relationship between GPs (the commissioners) and the private commissioning support and provider firm. The antecedents to the contract for the project being signed indicated the importance of leveraging external contacts and influence (resource dependency theory). Conclusions: The study has surfaced issues around innovation adoption in the healthcare context. The case identifies ‘negotiated order’, managerial performance of providers and disciplinary control as three media of power used in combination by commissioners. The case lends support for stewardship and resource dependency governance theories as explanations of the underpinning conditions for effective commissioning in certain circumstances within a quasi marketised healthcare system

Why does the NHS struggle to adopt eHealth innovations? A review of macro, meso and micro factors

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