Regionale Wachstumseffekte der GRW-Förderung?: Eine räumlich-ökonometrische Analyse auf Basis deutscher Arbeitsmarktregionen

This paper provides an analysis of the impact of the German “Joint Task for the Improve-ment of Regional Economic Structures” (GRW) on labour productivity growth of 225 German labour market regions for the period 1994 to 2006. The empirical regression approach builds on a “Barro-type” growth equation, where a special focus is given to the policy instrument as additional right hand side regressor. The results show that for different model specifications the direct effect of the regional policy instrument on labour productivity growth remains statistically significant and positive for almost two thirds of the supported labour markets. In order to check for the robustness of the results we also augment the standard regression approach to the field of spatial econometrics. Here the results for the Spatial Lag model show that we observe a strong positive spatial spillover effect for productivity growth among neighbouring regions. If we additionally include further spatial lags of the right hand side regressors in the growth equation, the estimated coefficients for the resulting Spatial Durbin and Spatial Durbin Error model indicate that there is a negative spillover effect from the GRW policy on neighbouring regions. This effect remains stable, if we add further spatial lags of other explanatory variables. The indirect distorting effect of the GRW programme yields to the result that only for about 45% of supported regions a positive overall effect was found (with an initial income level up to 73% of the non-funded West German labour markets)

Do higher corporate taxes reduce wages? : Micro evidence from Germany

Because of endogeneity problems very few studies have been able to identify the incidence of corporate taxes on wages. We circumvent these problems by using an 11-year panel of data on 11,441 German municipalities' tax rates, 8 percent of which change each year, linked to administrative matched employer-employee data. Consistent with our theoretical model, we find a negative effect of corporate taxation on wages: a 1 euro increase in tax liabilities yields a 77 cent decrease in the wage bill. The direct wage effect, arising in a collective bargaining context, dominates, while the conventional indirect wage effect through reduced investment is empirically small due to regional labor mobility. High and medium-skilled workers, who arguably extract higher rents in collective agreements, bear a larger share of the corporate tax burden