Bankruptcy law and large complex financial organizations: a primer

Large complex financial organization (LCFOs) are exposed to multiple problems when they become insolvent. They operate in countries with different approaches to bankruptcy and, within the U.S., multiple insolvency administrators. The special financial instruments that comprise a substantial portion of LCFO assets are exempted from the usual "time out" that permits the orderly resolution of creditor claims. This situation is complicated by the opacity of LCFIs' positions, which may make them difficult to sell or unwind in times of financial crisis. This article discusses these issues and their origins.Bankruptcy ; Financial institutions

Market discipline and subordinated debt: a review of some salient issues

Requiring banks to issue subordinated debt is one proposal to bring market discipline to bear in aiding regulatory supervision. This article explores the frictions that produce a need for discipline (agency problems) and the mechanisms markets have evolved for dealing with these frictions. Following an examination of the rationales and assumptions underlying subordinated debt proposals, the article concludes that the case tying regulatory intervention to subordinated debt spreads is not clear-cut, and that use of all available information, including equity returns and debt yields, when available, is more likely to achieve regulatory goals.Debt ; Bank examination ; Bank supervision ; Debt

The pitfalls in inferring risk from financial market data

This paper examines two qualitative rules of thumb, frequently invoked in discussions of bank regulatory policy. The first, that equity holders prefer more risk to less, derives from a result in option pricing theory, that an option's value increases monotonically with the riskiness of the underlying asset. This result is shown to depend on very restrictive assumptions regarding the underlying assets return distribution and the type of option being considered. These restrictive assumptions do not generally obtain in practice. The second rule of thumb is that bondholders' and deposit insurers' interests are aligned. The paper shows that, in fact, their interests can diverge in the sense that bondholders and deposit insurers will not necessarily agree on the relative riskiness of different banks or bank portfolios. The conclusion of this paper is that rules of thumb can be misleading. Furthermore, the concept of risk is shown to be model and agent specific.Bonds ; Options (Finance) ; Stocks

U.S. corporate and bank insolvency regimes: an economic comparison and evaluation

In the U.S., the insolvency resolution of most corporations is governed by the federal bankruptcy code and is administered by special bankruptcy courts. Most large corporate bankruptcies are resolved under Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. However, commercial bank insolvencies are governed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and are administered by the FDIC. These two resolution processes--corporate bankruptcy and bank receiverships--differ in a number of significant ways, including the type of proceeding (judicial versus administrative); the rights of managers, stockholders and creditors in the proceedings; the explicit and implicit goals of the resolution; the prioritization of creditors--claims; the costs of administration; and the timeliness of creditor payments. These differences derive from perceptions that "banks are special." This paper elucidates these differences, explores the effectiveness of the procedural differences in achieving the stated goals, and considers the potential economic consequences of the different structures.Bank failures ; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Derivatives and systemic risk: netting, collateral, and closeout

In the U.S., as in most countries with well-developed securities markets, derivative securities enjoy special protections under insolvency resolution laws. Most creditors are “stayed” from enforcing their rights while a firm is in bankruptcy. However, many derivatives contracts are exempt from these stays. Furthermore, derivatives enjoy netting and close-out, or termination, privileges which are not always available to most other creditors. The primary argument used to motivate passage of legislation granting these extraordinary protections is that derivatives markets are a major source of systemic risk in financial markets and that netting and close- out reduce this risk. ; To date, these assertions have not been subjected to rigorous economic scrutiny. This paper critically reexamines this hypothesis. These relationships are more complex than often perceived. We conclude that it is not clear whether netting, collateral, and/or close-out lead to reduced systemic risk, once the impact of these protections on the size and structure of the derivatives market has been taken into account.Derivative securities ; Financial markets

Derivatives clearing and settlement: a comparison of central counterparties and alternative structures

Most exchange-traded and some over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives are cleared and settled through clearinghouses that function as central counterparties (CCPs). Most OTC derivatives are settled bilaterally. This article discusses how these alternative mechanisms affect the functioning of derivatives markets and describes some of the advantages and disadvantages of each.Banks and banking, Central ; Derivative securities ; Clearinghouses (Banking)

A comparison of U.S. corporate and bank insolvency resolution

In the U.S., the insolvency resolution of most corporations is governed by the federal bankruptcy code and is administered by special bankruptcy courts. Most large corporate bankruptcies are resolved under Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. However, commercial bank insolvencies are governed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act and are administered by the FDIC. These two resolution processes—corporate bankruptcy and bank receiverships—differ in a number of significant ways, including the type of proceeding (judicial versus administrative); the rights of managers, stockholders, and creditors in the proceedings; the explicit and implicit goals of the resolution; the prioritization of creditors’ claims; the costs of administration; and the timeliness of creditor payments. This article elucidates these differences and explores the effectiveness of the procedural differences in achieving the stated goals.Bankruptcy ; Bank failures

Recovering risk aversion from options

Cross-sections of option prices embed the risk-neutral probability densities functions (PDFs) for the future values of the underlying asset. Theory suggests that risk-neutral PDFs differ from market expectations due to risk premia. Using a utility function to adjust the risk-neutral PDF to produce subjective PDFs, we can obtain measures of the risk aversion implied in option prices. Using FTSE 100 and S&P 500 options, and both power and exponential utility functions, we show that subjective PDFs accurately forecast the distribution of realizations, while risk-neutral PDFs do not. The estimated coefficients of relative risk aversion are all reasonable. The relative risk aversion estimates are remarkably consistent across utility functions and across markets for given horizons. The degree of relative risk aversion declines with the forecast horizon and is lower during periods of high market volatility.Options (Finance) ; Prices

Bank procyclicality, credit crunches, and asymmetric monetary policy effects: a unifying model

Much concern has recently been expressed that both large, procyclical changes in bank assets and "credit crunches" caused by bank reluctance to expand loans during recessions contribute to economic instability. These effects are difficult to explain using the standard textbook model of deposit expansion in which deposits are constrained only by reserve requirements. However, these effects follow easily if the model is expanded to include a second, capital constraint.Bank assets ; Monetary policy

The stability of interest rate processes

This paper presents a careful reexamination of Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff, and Sanders (CKLS 1992). By redefining the possible regime shift period in line with evidence from known policy changes and past empirical research, we find evidence that contradicts the major results in their paper. The widely cited conclusion of their paper is that the elasticity of interest rate volatility is 1.5. CKLS also concluded that there was no structural shift in the interest rate process after October 1979. When the structural shift period is defined to be temporary and coincident with the Federal Reserve Experiment of October 1979 through September 1982, we find that there is strong evidence of a structural break. Furthermore, we find evidence that, contrary to CKLS's claim, a moderately elastic interest rate process can capture the dependence of volatility on the level of interest rates, while highly elastic models cannot. In particular, this study finds support for the square-root CIR process. These results are robust to changes in the short-rate data used and the treatment of outliers.Econometric models ; Interest rates ; Money