Climate Change Justice

Greenhouse gas reductions would cost some nations much more than others and benefit some nations far less than others. Significant reductions would impose especially large costs on the United States, and recent projections suggest that the United States has relatively less to lose from climate change. In these circumstances, what does justice require the United States to do? Many people believe that the United States is required to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions beyond the point that is justified by its own self-interest, simply because the United States is wealthy, and because the nations most at risk from climate change are poor. This argument from distributive justice is complemented by an argument from corrective justice: The existing 'stock' of greenhouse gas emissions owes a great deal to the past actions of the United States, and many people think that the United States should do a great deal to reduce a problem for which it is largely responsible. But there are serious difficulties with both of these arguments. Redistribution from the United States to poor people in poor nations might well be desirable, but if so, expenditures on greenhouse gas reductions are a crude means of producing that redistribution: It would be much better to give cash payments directly to people who are now poor. The argument from corrective justice runs into the standard problems that arise when collectivities, such as nations, are treated as moral agents: Many people who have not acted wrongfully end up being forced to provide a remedy to many people who have not been victimized. The conclusion is that while a suitably designed climate change agreement is in the interest of the world, a widely held view is wrong: Arguments from distributive and corrective justice fail to provide strong justifications for imposing special obligations for greenhouse gas reductions on the United States. These arguments have general implications for thinking about both distributive justice and corrective justice arguments in the context of international law and international agreements.Environment

The Law of Other States

The question whether courts should consult the laws of "other states" has produced intense controversy. But in some ways, this practice is entirely routine; within the United States, state courts regularly consult the decisions of other state courts in deciding on the common law, the interpretation of statutory law, and even on the meaning of state constitutions. A formal argument in defense of such consultation stems from the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which says that under certain conditions, a widespread belief, accepted by a number of independent actors, is highly likely to be correct. It follows that if a large majority of states make a certain decision based on a certain shared belief, and the states are well motivated, there is good reason to believe that the decision is correct. For the Jury Theorem to apply, however, three conditions must be met: states must be making judgments based on private information; states must be relevantly similar; and states must be making decisions independently, rather than mimicking one another. An understanding of these conditions offers qualified support for the domestic practice of referring to the laws of other states, while also raising some questions about the Supreme Court's reference to the laws of other nations. It is possible, however, to set out the ingredients of an approach that high courts might follow, at least if we make certain assumptions about the legitimate sources of interpretation. Existing practice, at the domestic and international levels, suggests that many courts are now following an implicit Condorcetian logic.

Dollars and Death

Administrative regulations and tort law both impose controls on activities that cause mortality risks, but they do so in puzzlingly different ways. Under a relatively new and still-controversial procedure, administrative regulations rely on a fixed value of a statistical life representing the hedonic loss from death. Under much older law, tort law in most states excludes hedonic loss from the calculation of damages, and instead focuses on loss of income, which regulatory policy ignores. Regulatory policy also disregards losses to dependents; tort law usually allows dependents to recover for loss of support. Regulatory policy generally treats the loss of the life of a child as equivalent to the loss of the life of an adult; tort law usually treats the loss of the life of a child as less valuable. Regulatory policy implicitly values foreigners as equal to Americans; tort law does not. We argue that both areas of law make serious mistakes in valuing life and that each should learn from the other. Regulatory policy properly focuses on hedonic loss from death, and tort law should adopt this approach. But regulatory policy should imitate tort law's individualized approach to valuing the loss from death, including its inclusion of losses to dependents. If these changes were made, tort awards would be more uniform and predictable, and regulations would be less uniform and more stringent. In addition, average tort damages for wrongful death would be at least twice as high as they are today. With respect to dollar judgments for mortality risks, a pervasive issue is how to combine accuracy with administrability and predictability; both bodies of law could do far better on this score.

A note on the wideband Gaussian broadcast channel

It is well known that for the Gaussian broadcast channel, timeshared coding is not as efficient as more sophisticated broadcast coding strategies. However, the relative advantage of broadcast coding over timeshared coding is shown to be small if the signal-to-noise ratios of both receivers are small. One surprising consequence of this is that for the wideband Gaussian broadcast channel, which is defined, broadcast coding offers no advantage over timeshared coding at all, and so timeshared coding is optimal

A simple model for DSS-14 outage times

A model is proposed to describe DSS-14 outage times. Discrepancy Reporting System outage data for the period from January 1986 through September 1988 are used to estimate the parameters of the model. The model provides a probability distribution for the duration of outages, which agrees well with observed data. The model depends only on a small number of parameters, and has some heuristic justification. This shows that the Discrepancy Reporting System in the Deep Space Network (DSN) can be used to estimate the probability of extended outages in spite of the discrepancy reports ending when the pass ends. The probability of an outage extending beyond the end of a pass is estimated as around 5 percent

Single-channel digital command-detection system

System, fabricated of highly-reliable digital logic elements, operates on binary pulse-code-modulated signals and derives internal synchronization from data signal. All-digital implementation of detector develops synchronization from data signal by computer cross-correlation of command modulation signal with its expected forms in sequence and adjusts detector phases in accordance with correlation peaks

Method and apparatus for a single channel digital communications system

A method and apparatus are described for synchronizing a received PCM communications signal without requiring a separate synchronizing channel. The technique provides digital correlation of the received signal with a reference signal, first with its unmodulated subcarrier and then with a bit sync code modulated subcarrier, where the code sequence length is equal in duration to each data bit