Trust and Governance in the Philippines and Singapore: A comparative Analysis

According to the 2007 World Bank governance indicators, the total percentile rank for Singapore is 514.8 while that for the Philippines is 216.3. Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index for 180 countries shows that  Singapore’s rank of 4th position and score of 9.2 is much higher than the Philippines’ rank of 141st position and score of 2.3. Similarly, the level of public trust in politicians’ honesty is higher in Singapore than the Philippines according to the Global Competitiveness Reports, which indicated that Singapore was ranked first from 1999 to 2003-2004 and the Philippines was ranked 49th among 59 countries in 1999 and 94th among 102 countries in 2003-2004. Similarly, in 2007-2008, Singapore was ranked first and the Philippines was ranked 119th among the 131 countries surveyed. The purpose of this article is to explain why the level of trust and governance in Singapore is higher than that in the Philippines. These two countries are selected for analysis because of the availability of comparative data. Apart from examining the differences in levels of governmental effectiveness, political stability, and the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies, this article also analyzes the significant differences in policy context between the two countries. The article concludes that Singapore’s higher level of trust and governance can be attributed to its effective political leadership which has delivered the goods and succeeded in curbing corruption during its 50 years in power and its favorable policy context. Conversely, the lower level of trust and governance in the Philippines is the result of political instability, the failure of the political leaders to deliver the goods and combat corruption effectively, and its unfavorable policy context

Anti-Corruption Agencies in Four Asian Countries: A Comparative Analysis

To be effective, anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) must satisfy these six preconditions: (1) they must be incorruptible; (2) they must be independent from the police and from political control; (3) there must be comprehensive anti-corruption legislation; (4) they must be adequately staffed and funded; (5) they must enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially; and (6) their governments must be committed to curbing corruption in their countries. This article assesses the effectiveness of the ACAs in Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand and South Korea in terms of these preconditions. It concludes that the ACAs in Hong Kong and Singapore are more effective than their counterparts in South Korea and Thailand because of the political will of their governments, which is reflected in the provision of adequate staff and budget to Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption and Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, and the impartial enforcement of the comprehensive anti-corruption laws in both city-states

Hunting the Corrupt “Tigers” and “Flies” in China: An Evaluation of XI Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign (November 2012 to March 2015)

After becoming the General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) at the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, Xi launched an anti-corruption campaign to eliminate the “tigers and flies” who had become rich through bribery and patronage. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of 2012, China was ranked 80th among 176 countries with a score of 39/100. China’s performance did not improve significantly in 2013 and dropped significantly from 80th to 100th position in 2014 with a decrease in its score from 40 to 36. Is China’s significant decline in its CPI ranking and score from 2012 to 2014 a reflection that Xi’s anticorruption campaign is ineffective and not reaping the expected results? This monograph addresses this question by evaluating the effectiveness of Xi’s campaign during its first 28 months from my perspective as a public administration scholar who has studied anti-corruption strategies in many Asian countries for 38 years. My evaluation identifies the strengths and weaknesses in Xi’s campaign and makes policy recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of China’s anti-corruption strategy