4,886 research outputs found
Foreign Aid – A Fillip for Development or a Fuel for Corruption?
We present an analysis of the effects of foreign aid on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds which are otherwise used to provide productive public goods and services. Our main results may be summarized as follows: (1) corruption impedes economic development and compromises the effectiveness of aid programmers; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development process and the donation of aid; (3) foreign aid is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad (perhaps very bad) for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption; Development; Foreign aid
Structure and evolution of a European Parliament via a network and correlation analysis
We present a study of the network of relationships among elected members of
the Finnish parliament, based on a quantitative analysis of initiative
co-signatures, and its evolution over 16 years. To understand the structure of
the parliament, we constructed a statistically validated network of members,
based on the similarity between the patterns of initiatives they signed. We
looked for communities within the network and characterized them in terms of
members' attributes, such as electoral district and party. To gain insight on
the nested structure of communities, we constructed a hierarchical tree of
members from the correlation matrix. Afterwards, we studied parliament dynamics
yearly, with a focus on correlations within and between parties, by also
distinguishing between government and opposition. Finally, we investigated the
role played by specific individuals, at a local level. In particular, whether
they act as proponents who gather consensus, or as signers. Our results provide
a quantitative background to current theories in political science. From a
methodological point of view, our network approach has proven able to highlight
both local and global features of a complex social system.Comment: 15 pages, 10 figure
Distribution and Development in a Model of Misgovernance
This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development. --Corruption,inequality,development.
Financial Liberalisation, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic
We study the effect of international financial integration on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government- appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds, an opportunity that is made more attractive by financial liberalisation which, at the same time, raises efficiency in capital production. Our main results may be summarised as follows: (1) corruption is always bad for economic development, but its effect is worse if the economy is open than if it is closed; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development and openness of the economy; (3) financial liberalisation is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption,development,financial liberalisation
Foreign Aid - a Fillip for Development or a Fuel for Corruption?
We present an analysis of the effects of foreign aid on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds which are otherwise used to provide productive public goods and services. Our main results may be summarised as follows: (1) corruption impedes economic development and compromises the effectiveness of aid programmes; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development process and the donation of aid; (3) foreign aid is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad (perhaps very bad) for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption, development, foreign aid.
Financial Liberalisation, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development
We study the effect of international financial integration on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds, an opportunity that is made more attractive by financial liberalisation which, at the same time, raises efficiency in capital production. Our main results may be summarised as follows: (1) corruption is always bad for economic development, but its effect is worse if the economy is open than if it is closed; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development and openness of the economy; (3) financial liberalisation is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption, development, financial liberalisation
Design, Analysis And Implementation Of Orthogonal Frequency Coding In Saw Devices Used For Spread Spectrum Tags And Sensors
SAW based sensors can offer wireless, passive operation in numerous environments and various device embodiments are employed for retrieval of the sensed data information. Single sensor systems can typically use a single carrier frequency and a simple device embodiment, since tagging is not required. In a multi-sensor environment, it is necessary to both identify the sensor and retrieve the sensed information. This dissertation presents the concept of orthogonal frequency coding (OFC) for applications to SAW sensor technology. OFC offers all advantages inherent to spread spectrum communications including enhanced processing gain and lower interrogation power spectral density (PSD). It is shown that the time ambiguity in the OFC compressed pulse is significantly reduced as compared with a single frequency tag having the same code length and additional coding can be added using a pseudo-noise (PN) sequence. The OFC approach is general and should be applicable to many differing SAW sensors for temperature, pressure, liquid, gases, etc. Device embodiments are shown and a potential transceiver is described. Measured device results are presented and compared with COM model predictions to demonstrate performance. Devices are then used in computer simulations of the proposed transceiver design and the results of an OFC sensor system are discussed
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