3,503 research outputs found
Architecture
This is the first dictionary dedicated to the work of Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007). It explains and contextualises more than a hundred key concepts, terms, influences and topics within his thought. An essential reference for students and scholars of Baudrillard, it also serves as an authoritative overview of how his ideas have shaped a broad range of disciplines, from art, architecture, film and photography to sociology, philosophy, human geography, media studies and cultural studies. The entries are written by thirty-five leading Baudrillard specialists from around the world, including Rex Butler, Mike Gane, Gary Genosko, Victoria Grace, Diane Rubenstein and Andrew Wernic
Fatal objects: Lacan in Baudrillard vol 2 (3rd simulation stage: postmodernity)
Jean Baudrillard's 3rd simulation stage reinterpreted through the theory of architecture (Linear perpstive), Marxism (commodity festishism) and Jaques Lacan (Mirror stage
The Invention of History: Baudrillard in Lacan vol 1 (1st simulation stage: the classic age)
Jean Baudrillard's first simulation stage re-interpreted in the light of architectural theory (linear perspetive) and psychoanalysis (Jaques Lacan's mirror stage
False Consensus in Economic Agents
In an incentivized experiment we identify a powerful and ubiquitous bias: individuals regard their own characteristics and choices as more common than is the case. We establish this \false consensus" bias in terms of happiness, political stance, mobile phone brand and on the attitude to deference in a hypothetical restaurant choice, and show that it is not limited to the distribution of hard to observe characteristics and choices but also to weight and height. We also show that the bias is not driven by the fact that the tallest, happiest, most left/right-wing, etc. are more salient.false consensus; saliency; biased beliefs; happiness; politics; height; weight.
Growth expectations and banking system fragility in developing economies
The likelihood of a banking crisis appears to be higher in fast-developing countries. An explanation is provided in a Diamond and Dybvig framework, where banks are vehicles of consumption-smoothing, offering insurance against shocks to the consumption path of consumers. The theoretical model shows that the higher consumer growth expectations, the higher the optimal level of illiquidity insurance — even if it implies higher exposure bank runs. Empirical evidence supports this result and suggests that the effect of deposit interest rates on the probability of crisis is stronger after a period of high, uniterrupted growth. Policies of providing bail-outs or deposit insurance are demonstrated to be efficient even when they increase the fragility of the banking system.
Self-centred beliefs : an empirical approach
We perform an experiment designed to assess the accuracy of beliefs about distributions.
The beliefs relate to behavior (mobile phone purchasing decisions, hypothetical
restaurant choices), attitudes (happiness, politics) and observable characteristics
(height, weight) and are typically formed through real world experiences.
We find a powerful and ubiquitous bias in perceptions that is "self-centered" in
the sense that an individual's beliefs about the population distribution changes
with their own position in the distribution. In particular, those at extremes tend
to perceive themselves as closer to the middle of the distribution than is the case.
We discuss possible explanations for this bias
Life satisfaction, household income and personality traits
We show that personality traits mediate the effect of income on Life
Satisfaction. The effect is strong in the case of Neuroticism, which measures the
sensitivity to threat and punishment, in both the British Household Panel Survey
and the German Socioeconomic Panel. Neuroticism increases the usually observed
concavity of the relationship: Individuals with higher Neuroticism score enjoy income
more than those with lower score if they are poorer and enjoy income less if they are
richer. When the interaction between income and neuroticism is introduced, income
does not have significant effect on his own.
To interpret the results, we present a simple model where we assume that (i) Life
Satisfaction is dependent from the gap between aspired and realized income, and this
is modulated by Neuroticism and (ii) income increases in aspirations with a slope
less than unity, so that the gap between aspired and realized income increase with
aspirations. From the estimation of this model we argue that poorer tend to overshoot
in their aspiration, while rich tend to under-shoot. The estimation of the model
also shows substantial effect of traits on income
Why did (not) the East Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Intra-Elite Conflict and Risk Sharing
The process of enfranchisement is studied in a model of intra-elite conflict over the sharing of social surplus. The relative bargaining power of each elite, function of the surplus each elite is able to appropriate if the bargaining breaks down, is uncertain ex-ante. Accordingly, two competing elites can decide to enfranchise a weak but numerically large non-elite group in order to insure against future imbalances in relative bargaining power. The enfranchisement decision requires the non-elite group to be relatively weak and imperfectly informed about intra-elite bargaining power. Our results are robust to public good provision following enfranchisement when there is preference heterogeneity over the location of the public good across the different elites. A comparative analysis of the Indian Democracy is provided.
Democracy, Collective Action and Intra-Elite Conflict
This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democ- racy. There are two risk averse elites competing for the appropriation of a unit of so- cial surplus, with an ex-ante uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power, and a large non-elite class unable to act collectively. We characterize a democracy as consistng of both franchise extension to, and lowering the cost of collective political activity for, individuals in the non-elite. In the absence of democracy, the stronger elite is always able to appropriate the entire surplus. We show that in a democ- racy, the newly enfranchised non-elite organize and always prefer to form a coalition with weaker elite against the stronger resulting in a more balanced surplus allocation between the two elites. Accordingly, the elites choose to democratize if they are sufficiently risk averse. Our formal analysis can account for stylized facts that emerge from a comparative analysis of Indian and Western European democracies.
Self-Centered Beliefs : An Empirical Approach
We perform an experiment designed to assess the accuracy of beliefs about distributions. The beliefs relate to behavior (mobile phone purchasing decisions, hypothetical restaurant choices), attitudes (happiness, politics) and observable characteristics (height, weight) and are typically formed through real world experiences. We nd a powerful and ubiquitous bias in perceptions that is \self-centered" in the sense that an individual's beliefs about the population distribution changes with their own position in the distribution. In particular, those at extremes tend to perceive themselves as closer to the middle of the distribution than is the case. We discuss possible explanations for this bias. Key words: subjective beliefs ; attitudes ; observable characteristics ; self-centered bias JEL classification: D03 ; C83 ; D84
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