University-industry technology transfer options: licensing or research joint venture?

In recent years there has been an increasing trend in various forms of collaboration and technology transfer between industry and universities, such as licensing, spin-offs and research joint ventures. In this paper, I provide an explanation for the choice of licensing versus research joint venture as technology transfer options by a firm.technology transfer, university-industry research joint venture, licensing

Research Joint Ventures and Optimal Emissions Taxation

This paper performs a comparison of two well known approaches for modelling R&D spillovers associated with investment in E-R&D, namely dAspremont-Jacquemin and Kamien-Muller-Zang. We show that there is little qualitative difference between the models in terms of total surplus delivered when selecting the optimal tax regime when there is precommitment under cooperative regimes in which firms coordinate expenditures to maximize joint profits. However, under non-cooperative regimes there is marked difference, with the model of Kamien- Muller-Zang leading to higher taxation rates when firms share information. Furthermore, we argue that the Kamien-Muller-Zang model is of questionable validity when modelling R&D on emissions reducing technology due to counter intuitive results showing a positive relationhip between R&D spillovers and emissions taxes.

Environmental impact of technology policy: R&D Subsidies versus R&D cooperation.

In this paper we study a neglected aspect ofteclmology policy, namely the adverse impact it might have on the envirol1Il1ent through increased production when R&D expenditure leads to cost reduction. Although teclmology policy measures that encourage finns to reduce their production costs would usually reduce energy inputs and therefore generate less pollution per unit of output production, we explore here the case where with reorganisation of production output gene rally increases. So even if per unit of production pollution is less, total pollution generated by the increased production induced by the innovative efforts of films increases. In this context it is therefore necessary to address the issue of tying-in teclmology and environmental policy, which is the issue we raise in this paper. We show that, irrespective of whether teclmology policy takes the fonn of R&D subsidies or R&D cooperation, R&D would gene rally lead to increased pollution and thus have a negative impact on the environment. Policies that might be optimal in the absence of concem for the enviroJUllent ceas e to be so. We claim that not only is a comparison between policy instruments more delicate but the optimal R&D subsidy might be negative. FinalIy, we propose and evaluate a speeific poliey in the form of a targeted subsidy tied-in to abatement activities and show that it is welfare improving.Technology policy; Process innovation; Pollution; R&D cooperation; R&D subsides;

R&D Productivity and Intellectual Property Rights Protection Regimes

We study firms' preferences towards intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes in a North-South context, using a simple duopoly model where a 'North' and a 'South' firm compete in a third market. Unlike other contributions in this field, we explicitly introduce the South's capability to undertake cost-reducing R&D, but maintain the South's inferiority in utilizing and managing its R&D. In contrast to traditional results, we show that the North may encourage lax IPR protection provided that its South rival's R&D productivity is sufficiently high, while the South may find it in its best interest to strictly enforce IPR protection if its R&D productivity is low. In this sense, our results do not support the idea of universal or uniform IPR protection regime. In addition, we find that if firms are allowed to agree on any level of information exchange when IPR protection is strictly enforced, such an exchange can always be established as long as each firm is ensured that what it gets to utilize in return is greater than a half of what it gives to its rival.intellectural property rights (IPRs), cost-reducing R&D, R&D productivity, information exchange.

Flexible vs Dedicated Technology Adoption in the Presence of a Public Firm

We study firms' adoption of flexible versus dedicated technologies in the context of a mixed versus a private duopoly with product differentiation. The flexible technology allows a firm to become multiproduct or multimarket without bearing additional costs. We find that a configuration where both firms adopt flexible technologies is more likely to arise in equilibrium in the private duopoly. A similar result occurs when both firms use a dedicated technology in the case of either almost independent products or products that are close substitutes. Privatization of the public firm is socially beneficial only in limited circumstances.Flexible Technology, Privatization, Public Firm, Mixed Duopoly.

R&D Productivity and Intellectual Property Rights Protection Regimes

We study fi…rms' preferences towards intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes in a North-South context, using a simple duopoly model where a 'North' and a 'South' firm compete in a third market. Unlike other contributions in this fi…eld, we explicitly introduce the South's capability to undertake cost-reducing R&D, but maintain the South's inferiority in utilizing and managing its R&D. In contrast to traditional results, we show that the North may encourage lax IPR protection provided that its South rival's R&D productivity is sufficiently high, while the South may fi…nd it in its best interest to strictly enforce IPR protection if its R&D productivity is low. In this sense, our results do not support the idea of universal or uniform IPR protection regime. In addition, we …find that if fi…rms are allowed to agree on any level of information exchange when IPR protection is strictly enforced, such an exchange can always be established as long as each fi…rm is ensured that what it gets to utilize in return is sufficiently more than what it gives to its rival.intellectual property rights (IPR), cost-reducing R&D, R&D productivity, information exchange

Environmental impact of technology policy: R&D Subsidies versus R&D cooperation

In this paper we study a neglected aspect ofteclmology policy, namely the adverse impact it might have on the envirol1Il1ent through increased production when R&D expenditure leads to cost reduction. Although teclmology policy measures that encourage finns to reduce their production costs would usually reduce energy inputs and therefore generate less pollution per unit of output production, we explore here the case where with reorganisation of production output gene rally increases. So even if per unit of production pollution is less, total pollution generated by the increased production induced by the innovative efforts of films increases. In this context it is therefore necessary to address the issue of tying-in teclmology and environmental policy, which is the issue we raise in this paper. We show that, irrespective of whether teclmology policy takes the fonn of R&D subsidies or R&D cooperation, R&D would gene rally lead to increased pollution and thus have a negative impact on the environment. Policies that might be optimal in the absence of concem for the enviroJUllent ceas e to be so. We claim that not only is a comparison between policy instruments more delicate but the optimal R&D subsidy might be negative. FinalIy, we propose and evaluate a speeific poliey in the form of a targeted subsidy tied-in to abatement activities and show that it is welfare improving

Coordination Costs: A Drawback for Research Joint Ventures?

We analyze a simple oligopoly model where firms can engage in cost-reducing R&D. We compare two R&D regimes, that is, R&D competition and R&D cooperation where firms can enter in a Research Joint Venture (RJV). We introduce coordination costs for the RJV and examine how these affect the equilibrium outcomes. Further, we examine the question of the equilibrium versus the optimal size of the RJV. For a given size of the RJV, its members decrease their own R&D as the anticipated coordination costs increase. This results in lower output and profits. On the contrary, the non-RJV firms increase their R&D investment in response to the fall in the RJV firms' R&D. We show that the performance of the RJV in terms of R&D investment, profit and welfare in relation to R&D competition is sensitive to the level of coordination costs. Furthermore, we show that, although the RJV as a whole may no longer conduct a unit of R&D at a lower cost compared to the independent firm under the non-cooperative R&D regime, its members can still make savings on their own R&D expense through information sharing. Finally, we find that not only the equilibrium size becomes smaller as coordination costs increase, but the discrepancy between the equilibrium and optimal sizes is widening. One important message from our analysis is that by ignoring the coordination costs of operating the RJV, the anticipated benefits or success of the cooperative project could have been grossly exaggerated.research joint venture, coordination costs, equilibrium size, optimal size

Public Policy towards R&D in a Mixed Duopoly with Spillovers

We investigate the use of subsidies to R&D, both in a mixed and a private duopoly market. We show that the socially optimal R&D subsidy is positive and increasing in the degree of spillovers both in the private and the mixed duopoly, although it is lower for the former than for the latter. We also find support for the empirical claim that privatization is followed by a scaling down of the R&D activity. A comparative static analysis of welfare levels suggests that privatization is welfare detrimental, which lends some support to the views against the widespread adoption of privatization programs.mixed duopoly, process innovation, R&D subsidies, privatisation, spillovers.

Horizontal agreements and R&D complementarities: merger versus RJV

We study the decision of two firms within an oligopoly concerning whether to enter into a horizontal agreement to exploit complementarities between their R&D activities and if so, whether to merge or form a research joint venture (RJV). In contrast to horizontal merger and motivated by real-world evidence, we incorporate a probability that an RJV contract will fail to enforce R&D sharing. We find that a horizontal agreement always arises in equilibrium, which is consistent with empirical findings that R&D complementarities between firms positively influence the formation of horizontal agreements. The insiders’ merger/RJV choice involves a trade-off: While merger offers certainty that R&D complementarities will be exploited, it leads to a profit-reducing reaction by outsiders on the product market, where competition is Cournot. Greater contract enforceability (quality) and R&D investment costs both favour RJV. Interestingly, the insiders may choose to merge even when RJV contracts are always enforceable, and they may opt to form an RJV even when the likelihood of enforceability is negligible. We also explore the welfare implications of the firms’ merger/RJV choice