Modality and constitution in distinctively mathematical explanations

Lange argues that some natural phenomena can be explained by appeal to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In these “distinctively mathematical” explanations, the core explanatory facts are either modally stronger than facts about ordinary causal law or understood to be constitutive of the physical task or arrangement at issue. Craver and Povich argue that Lange’s account of DME fails to exclude certain “reversals”. Lange has replied that his account can avoid these directionality charges. Specifically, Lange argues that in legitimate DMEs, but not in their “reversals,” the empirical fact appealed to in the explanation is “understood to be constitutive of the physical task or arrangement at issue” in the explanandum. I argue that Lange’s reply is unsatisfactory because it leaves the crucial notion of being “understood to be constitutive of the physical task or arrangement” obscure in ways that fail to block “reversals” except by an apparent ad hoc stipulation or by abandoning the reliance on understanding and instead accepting a strong realism about essence

Strengthening State Policies: The Process for Change

Provides an overview of key steps to effecting policy change and describes direct actions the project's nonprofit partners have taken to raise awareness among policy makers of the issues low-income working families face and of proposed policy options

Promoting Student Success in Community Colleges by Increasing Support Services

Recommends state policies to improve community college students' retention and completion rates through enhanced tutoring, counseling, and other supports, as well as alternative instructional models that allow working adults to learn in flexible formats

The directionality of distinctively mathematical explanations

In “What Makes a Scientific Explanation Distinctively Mathematical?” (2013b), Lange uses several compelling examples to argue that certain explanations for natural phenomena appeal primarily to mathematical, rather than natural, facts. In such explanations, the core explanatory facts are modally stronger than facts about causation, regularity, and other natural relations. We show that Lange's account of distinctively mathematical explanation is flawed in that it fails to account for the implicit directionality in each of his examples. This inadequacy is remediable in each case by appeal to ontic facts that account for why the explanation is acceptable in one direction and unacceptable in the other direction. The mathematics involved in these examples cannot play this crucial normative role. While Lange's examples fail to demonstrate the existence of distinctively mathematical explanations, they help to emphasize that many superficially natural scientific explanations rely for their explanatory force on relations of stronger-than-natural necessity. These are not opposing kinds of scientific explanations; they are different aspects of scientific explanation

Mechanistic Levels, Reduction, and Emergence

We sketch the mechanistic approach to levels, contrast it with other senses of “level,” and explore some of its metaphysical implications. This perspective allows us to articulate what it means for things to be at different levels, to distinguish mechanistic levels from realization relations, and to describe the structure of multilevel explanations, the evidence by which they are evaluated, and the scientific unity that results from them. This approach is not intended to solve all metaphysical problems surrounding physicalism. Yet it provides a framework for thinking about how the macroscopic phenomena of our world are or might be related to its most fundamental entities and activities

Promoting Economic Self-Sufficiency as a State TANF Outcome

Urges states to set participants' economic self-sufficiency as a goal for TANF (Temporary Aid to Needy Families) and other workforce development programs, with clear measures, time spans, and benchmarks. Includes four states' TANF reporting requirements

Overlooked and Underpaid: Number of Low-Income Working Families Increases to 10.2 Million

Highlights 2007-10 trends in the number and percentage of working families with incomes below 200 percent of the poverty line by state and race/ethnicity, as well as the number of children affected. Examines income inequality by quintile and implications

Great Recession Hit Hard at America's Working Poor: Nearly 1 in 3 Working Families in United States Are Low-Income

Highlights findings on the 2009 increase in the number of low-income working families and their children, proportion of low-income working families by parents' race/ethnicity, and the growth of income inequality. Discusses policy implications