“The People Surrender Nothing”: Social Compact Theory, Republicanism, and the Modern Administrative State

The Article’s argument proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the scholarly arguments in defense of the nondelegation doctrine. It describes three arguments in favor of the nondelegation doctrine: the separation of powers, political accountability, and constitutional text. Part II argues that social compact theory – not separation of powers, accountability, or constitutional text – is the true foundation of the nondelegation principle. Part III connects the theory of the social compact to the basic principles of republican government, which require that legislative powers are exercised by the representatives of the people chosen through elections. Part IV concludes by tentatively discussing the implications of this argument for contemporary administrative government

Improving Volunteers\u27 Safety during the COVID-19 Pandemic

The onset of COVID-19 presented multiple challenges to both governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The selected study site is a nonprofit organization located in a major Southern US City. This organization shelters homeless men. The organization depended on volunteers\u27 assistance in offering short-term and long-term solutions to provide clothing, cleaning, and shelter for homeless men. The organization was facing new challenges due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this study, the complexities of the social, political, and economic challenges for volunteers during the pandemic were well explored. The nonprofit organization’s challenges were examined and recommendations to help the organization remain viable were provided. A qualitative research approach was used to gather nonnumerical data regarding long-term solutions for the nonprofit organization staff and volunteer program experiencing due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The thematic analysis technique was used to interpret data from focus group dialogues and interviews to understand the formulated research questions better. The return on engagement for the organization and the level of involvement of the volunteers were two key themes that emerged from this research on how the safety of volunteers might be improved. Providing critical health services that supported the government\u27s efforts to improve people\u27s economic mobility and stability was the purpose of the organizational needs assessment. The protection of its workers and volunteers was essential

News Article Reporting on the Actions of an Enslaved Person Named Judy and 8 Other Enslaved Persons

News article describing the plans that an enslaved woman named Judy carried out with an unnamed accomplice (presumed enslaved man) to remove 7 other enslaved persons named Thomas, Hannah, Caesar, London, Ishmael, Captain, and Anthony from Round O Plantationhttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/lanternproject/1088/thumbnail.jp

John Hampden Randolph, A Southern Planter

John Hampden Randolph, a native of Virginia born in 1813 came to Mississippi with his parents in 1819. He grew up on his father\u27s plantation in Wilkinson County and subsequently became a cotton farmer. This was his occupation in Mississippi until 1841 when he bought a plantation in Iberville Parish, Louisiana to which he moved in December of that year. For three years he raised cotton as a staple on his plantation. Forest Rome, but at the end of that time changed to sugar cane. In the period prior to the Civil War and in the years shortly after its close, Randolph built up a large estate and in the meantime became a very successful sugar planter. By 1871 his landed possessions in Iberville Parish amounted to over 7000 acres which, however, included more than 3000 acres of swamp land. He also owned lands in the states of Iowa, Minnesota, and Texas. In 1858 he built a beautiful mansion on his plantation fronting the Mississippi River and named it Nottoway, after the County in Virginia where his ancestors had lived. During the Civil War Randolph held on to his land in Louisiana and Texas, and about 1863 took his slaves and other valuable property to Texas, where he cultivated his land in that state. After the war he returned to Louisiana with a number of the Negroes, many of whom continued to work for him as freedmen. The estate diminished in size in the 1870\u27s and at the time of his death in 1883, Randolph owned only Nottoway plantation end his swamp land. His heirs disposed of these lands that remained

Learning Support English

This Grants Collection uses the grant-supported open textbook The Roadrunner\u27s Guide to English from Dalton State College: http://oer.galileo.usg.edu/english-textbooks/9 This Grants Collection for Learning Support English was created under a Round Three ALG Textbook Transformation Grant. Affordable Learning Georgia Grants Collections are intended to provide faculty with the frameworks to quickly implement or revise the same materials as a Textbook Transformation Grants team, along with the aims and lessons learned from project teams during the implementation process. Documents are in .pdf format, with a separate .docx (Word) version available for download. Each collection contains the following materials: Linked Syllabus Initial Proposal Final Reporthttps://oer.galileo.usg.edu/english-collections/1000/thumbnail.jp

Against the Chenery II Doctrine

The Supreme Court’s 1947 decision in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (“Chenery II”) is generally taken as blanket authorization for agencies to make law through either adjudication or rulemaking if their organic statutes permit both modes. We think this is an overreading of the doctrine. The decision in Chenery II need not be read so broadly, and there are good reasons to read it more narrowly. The most important reason is that agency lawmaking through adjudication presents serious constitutional concerns involving due process of law and subdelegation of legislative power, at least if the agency action deprives people of life, liberty, or property. The subdelegation concern is present even if, as we assume in this article, Congress has some authority to subdelegate a measure of legislative power. Congress can only subdelegate power that it possesses, and Congress possesses no power to deprive people of rights through adjudication, so agencies cannot receive such power from Congress. Nor do agencies have any inherent executive power to deprive people of rights through adjudication; that principle is the essence of due process of law. We treat these constitutional concerns as a reason to read statutory authorizations to federal agencies narrowly to create a presumption against, rather than for, agency power to make law through adjudication. We also take a close look at the Chenery II case, including close looks at the arguments of counsel and the correspondence of the Justices, to show how a narrower reading of Chenery II is both possible and desirable. Finally, we examine some of the consequences of a narrower reading of Chenery II. Those consequences are both modest and consistent with rule-of-law values

Why the Court Should Reexamine Administrative Law\u27s Chenery II Doctrine

Part I of this article begins by discussing some fundamental constitutional principles that were raised, sometimes implicitly and indirectly, in the Chenery cases. Those principles point to limits on administrative adjudication that go well beyond those recognized in current doctrine. We do not here seek to push those principles as far as they can go, though we offer no resistance to anyone who wants to trod that path. Instead, we identify and raise those principles to help understand the scope and limits of actual doctrine. Our modest claims here are that constitutional concerns about at least some classes of agency lawmaking in adjudication (1) are serious enough to warrant a close look at unqualified articulations of a Chenery II “doctrine” and (2) warrant at least a presumption against recognizing agency power to choose adjudication as a form of lawmaking. In other words, they form a lens through which one can take a fresh look at a now-canonical case. Part II then discusses the progress of the litigation and decisions in both Chenery I and Chenery II. As the correspondence among the justices and other circumstances of the cases reveal, the Court did not conclude in Chenery II that, as an absolute rule, “the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”6 While that language comes from the Court’s decision in Chenery II, the broader context of the case indicates that the Court qualified the scope and domain of this principle. Part III discusses the development of the law following the Chenery II case. The limits implicit in the Court’s 1947 decision have largely been lost in the ensuing three-quarters of a century. Nonetheless, in Part IV, we suggest that these later developments can be interpreted in two ways, both of which question the notion of a limitless Chenery II “doctrine.” Either agencies are interpreting and applying their governing statutes when issuing orders that are not pursuant to general rules, or they are establishing “embedded rules” that are contained in orders.7 If the former, then various doctrines governing agency legal interpretation, arbitrariness, and unfair surprise apply. If the latter, then doctrines addressing embedded rules should apply. Both paths suggest that it is incorrect simply to think of a Chenery II doctrine that enables agencies to act via rulemaking or adjudication at their discretion. Thus, we argue that the Court should overturn, clarify, or simply ignore unqualified recitations of a broad Chenery II principle in future cases, relying instead on alternative principles to address agencies’ choice between rulemaking and adjudication. Part V briefly suggests a few potential applications of this new approach to explain how the law might change in a post-Chenery II world. While we believe that a post-Chenery II legal regime would afford better protection for individual rights and due process of law, the roots of much of what we recommend can already be found in various administrative law sources and doctrines, none of which have proven to be fundamentally disruptive to the administrative state

African American Biographies : Bulloch County

A collection of biographies of African American citizens who have made major contributions to community life in Bulloch County. Included are the biographies of Julia Pearl Armstrong Bryant, George Franklin Campbell, R.W. Campbell, Eldridge Cone, Minnie Stewart Evans, Phoebe Ann Small Floyd, William James, Reverend Willie Daniel Kent, Willie Gordon Lovett, Laura Bell Hendly Martin, Luetta Leverette Moore, Beatrice Riggs, Amanda Love Smith, Willie Albert Smith, Sr., and Harvey Van Buren.https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/bchs-pubs/1005/thumbnail.jp