328 research outputs found
Norming in Administrative Law
How do regulatory agencies decide how strictly to regulate an industry? They sometimes use cost-benefit analysis or claim to, but more often the standards they invoke are so vague as to be meaningless. This raises the question whether the agencies use an implicit standard or instead regulate in an ad hoc fashion. We argue that agencies frequently use an approach that we call “norming.” They survey the practices of firms in a regulated industry and choose a standard somewhere within the distribution of existing practices, often no higher than the median. Such a standard burdens only the firms whose practices lag the industry. We then evaluate this approach. While a case can be made that norming is appropriate when a regulatory agency operates in an environment of extreme uncertainty, we argue that on balance norming is an unwise form of regulation. Its major attraction for agencies is that it minimizes political opposition to regulation. Norming does not serve the public interest as well as a more robust standard like cost-benefit analysis
Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis
Regulatory agencies take account of the potential unemployment effects of proposed regulations in an ad hoc, theoretically incorrect way. Current practice is to conduct feasibility analysis, under which the agency predicts the unemployment effects of a proposed regulation, and then declines to regulate (or weakens the proposed regulation) if the unemployment effects exceed an unarticulated threshold, that is, seem “too high.” Agencies do not reveal the threshold, do not explain why certain unemployment effects are excessive, and do not explain how they compare unemployment effects and the net benefits of the regulation. Many agencies also predict unemployment effects incorrectly. The proper approach is for agencies to incorporate unemployment effects into cost-benefit analysis by predicting the amount of unemployment that a regulation will cause and monetizing that amount. Recent economic studies suggest that monetized cost of unemployment is significant, possibly more than $100,000 per worker. If agencies used this figure, there could be significant consequences for a wide variety of regulations
Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?
Politicians and commentators have from time to time proposed that regulations be suspended or delayed during recessions because of their adverse impact on employment. We evaluate this argument from within a macroeconomic framework. When the business cycle is taken into account, it is possible that regulations should be weakened during downturns and strengthened during upturns, along the lines of stimulus policy, which normally takes the form of countercyclical adjustments to taxes or the money supply. However, countercyclical regulation will normally be a less efficient means of stimulus. For that reason, it should be used in relative narrow conditions, and when the other stimulus instruments are either ineffective on their own terms or politically infeasible
Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role
The two most vilified cases in administrative law are Business Roundtable v Securities and Exchange Commission and Corrosion Proof Fittings v Environmental Protection Agency. In Business Roundtable, the DC Circuit struck down the SEC’s proxy access rule because the agency’s cost-benefit analysis of the regulation, in the court’s view, was defective. In Corrosion Proof Fittings, the Fifth Circuit struck down an EPA regulation of asbestos products on the same grounds. Nearly all scholars who have written about these cases have condemned them. We argue that the courts acted properly. The regulators’ cost-benefit analyses were defective, seriously so; and the courts were right to require the agencies to show that their regulations passed an adequate cost-benefit analysis. We further argue that the trajectory of law and policy is consistent with our view. Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable are harbingers rather than errors—harbingers of an era of enhanced judicial review of cost-benefit analysis
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Effects of Serotonin Transporter Gene Variation on Impulsivity Mediated by Default Mode Network: A Family Study of Depression
Serotonergic neurotransmission, potentially through effects on the brain’s default mode network (DMN), may regulate aspects of attention including impulse control. Indeed, genetic variants of the serotonin transporter (5-HTT) have been implicated in impulsivity and related psychopathology. Yet it remains unclear the mechanism by which the 5-HTT genetic variants contribute to individual variability in impulse control. Here, we tested whether DMN connectivity mediates an association between the 5-HTT genetic variants and impulsivity. Participants (N = 92) were from a family cohort study of depression in which we have previously shown a broad distribution of 5-HTT variants. We genotyped for 5-HTTLPR and rs25531 (stratified by transcriptional efficiency: 8 low/low, 53 low/high, and 31 high/high), estimated DMN structural connectivity using diffusion probabilistic tractography, and assessed behavioral measures of impulsivity (from 12 low/low, 48 low/high, and 31 high/high) using the Continuous Performance Task. We found that low transcriptional efficiency genotypes were associated with decreased connection strength between the posterior DMN and the superior frontal gyrus (SFG). Path modeling demonstrated that decreased DMN–SFG connectivity mediated the association between low-efficiency genotypes and increased impulsivity. Taken together, this study suggests a gene-brain-behavior pathway that perhaps underlies the role of the serotonergic neuromodulation in impulse control
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