Intimidation or Impatience? Jump Bidding in On-line Ascending Automobile Auctions

We run a large field experiment with an online company specializing in selling used automobiles via ascending auctions. We manipulate experimentally the maximum amount which bidders can bid above the current standing price, thus affecting the ease with which bidders can engage in jump bidding. We test between the intimidation vs. costly bidding hypotheses of jump bidding by looking at the effect of these jump-bidding restrictions on average seller revenue. We find evidence consistent with costly bidding in one market (Texas), but intimidation in the other market (New York). This difference in findings between the two markets appears partly attributable to the more prominent presence of sellers who are car dealers in the Texas market.

London, British Library, Royal 7 D. xxiv: Guitmundus of Aversa, "De corpore et sanguine Domini"; Aldhelm, "De laudibus virginitatis" "Epistola ad Heahfridum'' [Ker 259, Gneuss 473]

293. London, British Library, Royal 7 D. xxiv Guitmundus of Aversa, "De corpore et sanguine Domini"; Aldhelm, "De laudibus virginitatis" "Epistola ad Heahfridum'' [Ker 259, Gneuss 473] HISTORY: A composite manuscript comprising a 12c copy of a tract on the eucharist, "De corporis et sanguinis Domini veritate:' by Guitmundus, bishop of Aversa (Campania, r. 1088-91) and a copy of Aldhelm's prose "De laudibus virginitatis" and "Epistola ad Heahfridum:' An early modern transcript of the "Epistola" is bound with part 2. Consensus dates the text of the Aldhelmian part to the early 10c (s. x214 according to Ker, Cat., probably the 930s, according to Gwara [2001: 1.122*, 130*], "x1 " according to Gneuss' Handlist). Gwara (2001: 1.125*-30*) sees the "Yale Fragment"(= Ker 12 [330]), the oldest extant copy of the prose "De laud. virg:', as the "irrefutable progenitor" of this relatively early copy. The Royal glosses are dated to mid-lOc (Gneuss, Handlist; Gwara 2001: 1.132 ff.). Gwara distinguishes nine glossing hands in various strata (2001: 1.132*-36*). The manuscript is perhaps to be associated with Winchester, though both origin and provenance are a matter of debate. Later provenance was almost certainly Canterbury (Gwara 2001: 1.140*-46*). An origin at Glastonbury in the time of the Reformers Dunstan and Æthelwold seems probable to several scholars (Dumville 1987: 177; Gretsch 1999: 362; Gwara 2001: 1.130*). Gretsch ( 1999: 362-67) associates the manuscript with Æthelwold and believes its scholia influenced subsequent Aldhelm studies at the Winchester school (1999: 362). The small size and multiple layers of glossing indicate a personal copy, and in Gwara's view (2001: 1. 123*, 140*), the manuscript plausibly belonged to Dunstan and traveled to Canterbury with him when he became archbishop. Rusche (2005: 445-46) sees the manuscript originating in Canterbury and remaining there. Royal 7 D. xxiv strongly influenced later Aldhelmian studies, its glossing and interpolated text being copied into several manuscripts at Canterbury (Gwara 2001: 1.132*, also Rusche 2005). It is this role as exemplar that proves Canterbury provenance by the later 10c. The copy of the "Epistola ad Heahfridum" is the best extant version of that text (Gretsch 1999: 363). The already-combined manuscript belonged at one time to John Lumley (1534?-1609). Rebound 1983

Group Prediction in Information Markets With and Without Trading Information and Price Manipulation Incentives

The ability of individuals and groups to forecast a future event, with incomplete information, by using the trading history of an asset market is analyzed in the laboratory. The results show: (1) when forecasters observe the summary of markettransacted prices, they do not perform as well as when they are provided with a complete real-time sequence of bids, asks and contract prices; (2) groups do not outperform individuals in forecasting, and when the market does not have price manipulation incentives, individual prediction is better than the group prediction; (3) in markets with manipulators, where only a summary of contract prices is provided, both groups and individuals are unable to predict better than flipping a coin. This inability to aggregate information is remedied when forecasters see the complete evolution of market bids, asks and contracts.

Implementing lean: UK culture and systems change

For the IGLC 12 Conference the authors reported the results of implementing Last PlannerTM methods with a large UK contracting company. The projects studied demonstrated some success but also some cultural, organizational and systemic barriers to its effective implementation. Alarcon and Conte’s White Paper for the IGLC11 conference discussed these issues and invited researchers to consider them. In response, the authors have reflected upon and critically re-analysed the research as a means to refocus their future work in implementing Lean Construction methods in UK construction. Based on a review of the literature on construction culture we have identified theoretical factors that, together with Alarcon and Conte's list of critical organizational elements, provide a framework against which the results of the research have been considered. We conclude that the implementation of Last Planner was hindered by not fully considering cultural, organizational and systemic problems and by failing to recognize how deepseated these problems could be. We intend, in future projects, to take a more considered, and wider approach to Lean Construction (possibly using the LCI’s Lean Project Delivery System) and to focus our attention upon construction ventures where efforts at culture change have already started - in particular, where strategic partnering arrangements are in place

EQUAL PAY – THE TIME-BOMB UNDER PAY STRUCTURES IN ROMANIA

One of the major consequences of Romania joining the European Union is its obligation to implement European Directives with regard to employment protection. One aspect of that is likely to have major social and cost implications is the legislation regarding equal pay for men and women. The dimension of equal pay for work that is the same or broadly similar is relatively straightforward. The more complicated and more far reaching requirement is for equal pay for men and women for work of equal value. In determining whether jobs are of equal value regard has to had in particular to effort, skill and decision making. Comparisons are valid with other jobs in the same organisation but not between organisations. In addition comparisons are only legally valid if they are on the basis that a person of the opposite sex is being paid more for work of equivalent value. Such comparisons are subjective and often very complicated. Job evaluation schemes can help in creating a framework for comparison but being inherently subjective are open to challenge. The situation is further complicated by the fact that comparisons can also be made on any one element of the remuneration package. Experience in the U.K. and other member EU countries is that equal pay claims are very much on the rise, can take years to resolve and can be hugely expensive. Although legal costs can be significant the main costs are in settling group claims and the ‘knock-on’ effect on the rest of an organisation’s pay structure. Whilst it may take time for this development to gather pace in Romania now is the time for organisations to review their pay structures and take preventative action to try and reduce the conflict that will inevitably occur.employment protection, equal pay, equal pay for work of equal value, pay structures

The Effect of Reliability, Content and Timing of Public Announcements on Asset Trading Behavior

Financial markets are overwhelmed by daily announcements. We use experimental asset markets to assess the impact of releasing public messages with different levels of reliability on asset prices. Subjects receive qualitative announcements in predetermined trading periods that are either preset by the experimenter, randomly selected, or determined by past asset market prices. We find that messages can play a significant role in bubble abatement, or rekindling. The preset message, “The price is too high,” decreases the amplitude and duration of bubbles for inexperienced subjects. Announcements that depend on the actual level of mispricing reduce bubble magnitude. Meanwhile, a preset or random message, “The price is too low,” prevents experienced subjects from abating bubbles. We account for the effect of public messages by showing that they significantly reduce inconsistent (“irrational”) trading behavior.experimental asset markets, bubbles, market communications, bounded rationality

Affecting Policy by Manipulating Prediction Markets: Experimental Evidence

Documented results indicate prediction markets effectively aggregate information and form accurate predictions. This has led to a proliferation of markets predicting everything from the results of elections to a company’s sales to movie box office receipts. Recent research suggests prediction markets are robust to manipulation attacks and resulting market outcomes improve forecast accuracy. However, we present evidence from the lab indicating that well funded, single minded manipulators can in fact destroy a prediction market’s ability to aggregate information. Our results clearly indicate that the usefulness of prediction markets as inputs to decision making may be limited.Information Aggregation, Prediction Markets, Manipulation

The effect of reliability, content and timing of public announcements on asset trading behavior

Financial markets are overwhelmed by daily announcements. We use experimental asset markets to assess the impact of releasing public messages with different levels of reliability on asset prices. Subjects receive qualitative announcements in predetermined trading periods that are either preset by the experimenter, randomly selected, or determined by past asset market prices. We find that messages can play a significant role in bubble abatement, or rekindling. The preset message, “The price is too high,” decreases the amplitude and duration of bubbles for inexperienced subjects. Announcements that depend on the actual level of mispricing reduce bubble magnitude. Meanwhile, a preset or random message, “The price is too low,” prevents experienced subjects from abating bubbles. We account for the effect of public messages by showing that they significantly reduce inconsistent (“irrational”) trading behavior.Experimental asset markets, Bubbles, Market communications, Bounded rationality

Reaction to public information in asset markets: does ambiguity matter?

We report experiments that examine trader reaction to ambiguity when dividend information is revealed sequentially. We find that experienced traders are better at internalizing ambiguity than inexperienced subjects. No significant differences are observed in the ambiguity versus control treatments regarding prices, price volatility and volumes for experienced subjects. However, relative to the control, prices are higher, volatility greater and trading unsophisticated for inexperienced subjects in the ambiguity treatment. Price changes are consistent with news revelation regardless of subject experience and the degree of ambiguity. Further, we do not find under or over price reactions to news. Regardless of experience, market reaction to news moves in line with fundamentals.Experimental asset markets, Ambiguity, Market communications, Bounded rationality