7 research outputs found
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Reactor Technology Options Study for Near-Term Deployment of GNEP Grid-Appropriate Reactors
World energy demand is projected to significantly increase over the coming decades. The International Energy Agency projects that electricity demand will increase 50% by 2015 and double by 2030, with most of the increase coming in developing countries as they experience double-digit rates of economic growth and seek to improve their standards of living. Energy is the necessary driver for human development, and the demand for energy in these countries will be met using whatever production technologies are available. Recognizing this inevitable energy demand and its implications for the United States, the U.S. National Security Strategy has proposed the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) to work with other nations to develop and deploy advanced nuclear recycling and reactor technologies. This initiative will help provide reliable, emission-free energy with less of the waste burden of older technologies and without making available separated plutonium that could be used by rogue states or terrorists for nuclear weapons. These new technologies will make possible a dramatic expansion of safe, clean nuclear energy to help meet the growing global energy demand. In other words, GNEP seeks to create an international regime to support large-scale growth in the worldwide use of nuclear energy without increasing the risk of nuclear weapon proliferation. This global expansion of nuclear power is strategically important to the United States for several reasons, including the following: (1) National security, by reducing the competition and potential for conflict over increasingly scarce fossil energy resources; (2) Economic security, by helping maintain stable prices for nonrenewable resources such as oil, gas, and coal; (3) Environmental security, by replacing or off-setting large-scale burning of greenhouse gas-emitting fuels for electricity production; and (4) Regaining technical leadership, through deployment of innovative U.S. technology-based reactors. Fully meeting the GNEP vision may require the deployment of thousands of reactors during the next century in dozens of countries, many of which are in the developing world where nuclear energy is not used currently. Such a large-scale deployment will have significant implications related to both fuel supply and spent fuel/waste management, both domestically and worldwide. Consequently, GNEP must address the development and demonstration of proliferation-resistant technologies to ensure both a safe and sustainable nuclear fuel cycle, and reactor designs that are appropriate for the range of needs across the global community. The focus of this report is the latter need, that is, the development and demonstration of proliferation-resistant reactors that are well matched to the needs and capabilities of developing countries
Diversity Strategies for Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems
This report presents the technical basis for establishing acceptable mitigating strategies that resolve diversity and defense-in-depth (D3) assessment findings and conform to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. The research approach employed to establish appropriate diversity strategies involves investigation of available documentation on D3 methods and experience from nuclear power and nonnuclear industries, capture of expert knowledge and lessons learned, determination of best practices, and assessment of the nature of common-cause failures (CCFs) and compensating diversity attributes. The research described in this report does not provide guidance on how to determine the need for diversity in a safety system to mitigate the consequences of potential CCFs. Rather, the scope of this report provides guidance to the staff and nuclear industry after a licensee or applicant has performed a D3 assessment per NUREG/CR-6303 and determined that diversity in a safety system is needed for mitigating the consequences of potential CCFs identified in the evaluation of the safety system design features. Succinctly, the purpose of the research described in this report was to answer the question, 'If diversity is required in a safety system to mitigate the consequences of potential CCFs, how much diversity is enough?' The principal results of this research effort have identified and developed diversity strategies, which consist of combinations of diversity attributes and their associated criteria. Technology, which corresponds to design diversity, is chosen as the principal system characteristic by which diversity criteria are grouped to form strategies. The rationale for this classification framework involves consideration of the profound impact that technology-focused design diversity provides. Consequently, the diversity usage classification scheme involves three families of strategies: (1) different technologies, (2) different approaches within the same technology, and (3) different architectures within the same technology. Using this convention, the first diversity usage family, designated Strategy A, is characterized by fundamentally diverse technologies. Strategy A at the system or platform level is illustrated by the example of analog and digital implementations. The second diversity usage family, designated Strategy B, is achieved through the use of distinctly different technologies. Strategy B can be described in terms of different digital technologies, such as the distinct approaches represented by general-purpose microprocessors and field-programmable gate arrays. The third diversity usage family, designated Strategy C, involves the use of variations within a technology. An example of Strategy C involves different digital architectures within the same technology, such as that provided by different microprocessors (e.g., Pentium and Power PC). The grouping of diversity criteria combinations according to Strategies A, B, and C establishes baseline diversity usage and facilitates a systematic organization of strategic approaches for coping with CCF vulnerabilities. Effectively, these baseline sets of diversity criteria constitute appropriate CCF mitigating strategies for digital safety systems. The strategies represent guidance on acceptable diversity usage and can be applied directly to ensure that CCF vulnerabilities identified through a D3 assessment have been adequately resolved. Additionally, a framework has been generated for capturing practices regarding diversity usage and a tool has been developed for the systematic assessment of the comparative effect of proposed diversity strategies (see Appendix A)
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Evaluation of Suitability of Selected Set of Department of Defense Military Bases and Department of Energy Facilities for Siting a Small Modular Reactor
This report summarizes the approach that ORNL developed for screening a sample set of US Department of Defense (DOD) military base sites and DOE sites for possible powering with an SMR; the methodology employed, including spatial modeling; and initial results for several sample sites. The objective in conducting this type of siting evaluation is demonstrate the capability to characterize specific DOD and DOE sites to identify any particular issues associated with powering the sites with an SMR using OR-SAGE; it is not intended to be a definitive assessment per se as to the absolute suitability of any particular site
Evaluation of Suitability of Selected Set of Department of Defense Military Bases and Department of Energy Facilities for Siting a Small Modular Reactor
This report summarizes the approach that ORNL developed for screening a sample set of US Department of Defense (DOD) military base sites and DOE sites for possible powering with an SMR; the methodology employed, including spatial modeling; and initial results for several sample sites. The objective in conducting this type of siting evaluation is demonstrate the capability to characterize specific DOD and DOE sites to identify any particular issues associated with powering the sites with an SMR using OR-SAGE; it is not intended to be a definitive assessment per se as to the absolute suitability of any particular site
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Updated Application of Spatial Data Modeling and Geographical Information Systems (GIS) for Identification of Potential Siting Options for Small Modular Reactors
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Evaluation of Suitability of Selected Set of Coal Plant Sites for Repowering with Small Modular Reactors
This report summarizes the approach that ORNL developed for screening a sample set of small coal stations for possible repowering with SMRs; the methodology employed, including spatial modeling; and initial results for these sample plants. The objective in conducting this type of siting evaluation is to demonstrate the capability to characterize specific sample coal plant sites to identify any particular issues associated with repowering existing coal stations with SMRs using OR-SAGE; it is not intended to be a definitive assessment per se as to the absolute suitability of any particular site
Recommended from our members
Diversity Strategies for Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems
This report presents the technical basis for establishing acceptable mitigating strategies that resolve diversity and defense-in-depth (D3) assessment findings and conform to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements. The research approach employed to establish appropriate diversity strategies involves investigation of available documentation on D3 methods and experience from nuclear power and nonnuclear industries, capture of expert knowledge and lessons learned, determination of best practices, and assessment of the nature of common-cause failures (CCFs) and compensating diversity attributes. The research described in this report does not provide guidance on how to determine the need for diversity in a safety system to mitigate the consequences of potential CCFs. Rather, the scope of this report provides guidance to the staff and nuclear industry after a licensee or applicant has performed a D3 assessment per NUREG/CR-6303 and determined that diversity in a safety system is needed for mitigating the consequences of potential CCFs identified in the evaluation of the safety system design features. Succinctly, the purpose of the research described in this report was to answer the question, 'If diversity is required in a safety system to mitigate the consequences of potential CCFs, how much diversity is enough?' The principal results of this research effort have identified and developed diversity strategies, which consist of combinations of diversity attributes and their associated criteria. Technology, which corresponds to design diversity, is chosen as the principal system characteristic by which diversity criteria are grouped to form strategies. The rationale for this classification framework involves consideration of the profound impact that technology-focused design diversity provides. Consequently, the diversity usage classification scheme involves three families of strategies: (1) different technologies, (2) different approaches within the same technology, and (3) different architectures within the same technology. Using this convention, the first diversity usage family, designated Strategy A, is characterized by fundamentally diverse technologies. Strategy A at the system or platform level is illustrated by the example of analog and digital implementations. The second diversity usage family, designated Strategy B, is achieved through the use of distinctly different technologies. Strategy B can be described in terms of different digital technologies, such as the distinct approaches represented by general-purpose microprocessors and field-programmable gate arrays. The third diversity usage family, designated Strategy C, involves the use of variations within a technology. An example of Strategy C involves different digital architectures within the same technology, such as that provided by different microprocessors (e.g., Pentium and Power PC). The grouping of diversity criteria combinations according to Strategies A, B, and C establishes baseline diversity usage and facilitates a systematic organization of strategic approaches for coping with CCF vulnerabilities. Effectively, these baseline sets of diversity criteria constitute appropriate CCF mitigating strategies for digital safety systems. The strategies represent guidance on acceptable diversity usage and can be applied directly to ensure that CCF vulnerabilities identified through a D3 assessment have been adequately resolved. Additionally, a framework has been generated for capturing practices regarding diversity usage and a tool has been developed for the systematic assessment of the comparative effect of proposed diversity strategies (see Appendix A)