390 research outputs found
ProvablySecure Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
Abstract: Authenticated key exchange protocols allow two participants A and B, communicating over a public network and each holding an authentication means, to exchange a shared secret value. Methods designed to deal with this cryptographic problem ensure A (resp. B) that no other participants aside from B (resp. A) can learn any information about the agreed value, and often also ensure A and B that their respective partner has actually computed this value. A natural extension to this cryptographic method is to consider a pool of participants exchanging a shared secret value and to provide a formal treatment for it. Starting from the famous 2-party Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol, and from its authenticated variants, security experts have extended it to the multi-party setting for over a decade and completed a formal analysis in the framework of modern cryptography in the past few years. The present paper synthesizes this body of work on the provably-secure authenticated group DH key exchange. The present paper revisits and combines the full versions of the following four papers
Signing on a Postcard
We investigate the problem of signing short messages using a scheme that minimizes the total length of the original message and the appended signature. This line of research was motivated by several postal services interested by stamping machines capable of producing digital signatures. Although several message recovery schemes exist, their security is questionable. This paper proposes variants of DSA and ECDSA allowing partial recovery: the signature is appended to a truncated message and the discarded bytes are recovered by the verification algorithm
ROYALE: A Framework for Universally Composable Card Games with Financial Rewards and Penalties Enforcement
While many tailor made card game protocols are known, the vast majority of those suffer from three main issues: lack of mechanisms for distributing financial rewards and punishing cheaters, lack of composability guarantees and little flexibility, focusing on the specific game of poker. Even though folklore holds that poker protocols can be used to play any card game, this conjecture remains unproven and, in fact, does not hold for a number of protocols (including recent results). We both tackle the problem of constructing protocols for general card games and initiate a treatment of such protocols in the Universal Composability (UC) framework, introducing an ideal functionality that captures general card games constructed from a set of core card operations. Based on this formalism, we introduce Royale, the first UC-secure general card games which supports financial rewards/penalties enforcement. We remark that Royale also yields the first UC-secure poker protocol. Interestingly, Royale performs better than most previous works (that do not have composability guarantees), which we highlight through a detailed concrete complexity analysis and benchmarks from a prototype implementation
PRCash: Fast, Private and Regulated Transactions for Digital Currencies
Decentralized cryptocurrencies based on blockchains provide attractive features, including user privacy and system transparency, but lack active control of money supply and capabilities for regulatory oversight, both existing features of modern monetary systems. These limitations are critical, especially if the cryptocurrency is to replace, or complement, existing fiat currencies. Centralized cryptocurrencies, on the other hand, provide controlled supply of money, but lack transparency and transferability. Finally, they provide only limited privacy guarantees, as they do not offer recipient anonymity or payment value secrecy.
We propose a novel digital currency, called PRCash, where the control of money supply is centralized, money is represented as value-hiding transactions for transferability and improved privacy, and transactions are verified in a distributed manner and published to a public ledger for verifiability and transparency. Strong privacy and regulation are seemingly conflicting features, but we overcome this technical problem with a new regulation mechanism based on zero-knowledge proofs. Our implementation and evaluation shows that payments are fast and large-scale deployments practical. PRCash is the first digital currency to provide control of money supply, transparency, regulation, and privacy at the same time, and thus make its adoption as a fiat currency feasible
The One-More-RSA-Inversion Problems and the Security of Chaum\u27s Blind Signature Scheme
We introduce a new class of computational problems which we
call the ``one-more-RSA-inversion\u27\u27 problems. Our main result is that
two problems in this class, which we call the chosen-target and known-target
inversion problems respectively, have polynomially-equivalent computational
complexity. We show how this leads to a proof of security for Chaum\u27s RSA-based
blind signature scheme in the random oracle model based on the assumed hardness
of either of these problems. We define and prove analogous results for
``one-more-discrete-logarithm\u27\u27 problems. Since the appearence of the
preliminary version of this paper, the new problems we have introduced
have found other uses as well
Активные фильтры аналогового тракта построителя сейсмических разрезов
Secure, anonymous and unobservable communication is becoming increasingly important due to the gradual erosion of privacy in many aspects of everyday life. This prompts the need for various anonymity- and privacy-enhancing techniques, e.g., group signatures, anonymous e-cash and secret handshakes. In this paper, we investigate an interesting and practical cryptographic construct Oblivious Signature-Based Envelopes (OS-BEs) recently introduced in [15]. OSBEs are very useful in anonymous communication since they allow a sender to communicate information to a receiver such that the receiver s rights (or roles) are unknown to the sender. At the same time, a receiver can obtain the information only if it is authorized to access it. This makes OSBEs a natural fit for anonymity-oriented and privacy-preserving applications, such as Automated Trust Negotiation and Oblivious Subscriptions. Previous results yielded three OSBE constructs: one based on RSA and two based on Identity-Based Encryption (IBE). Our work focuses on the ElGamal signature family: we succeed in constructing practical and secure OSBE schemes for several well-known signature schemes, including: Schnorr, Nyberg-Rueppel, ElGamal and DSA. As experiments with the prototype implementation il-lustrate, our schemes are more efficient than previous techniques. Furthermore, we show that some OSBE schemes, despite offering affiliation privacy for the receiver, introduce no additional cost over schemes that do not offer this feature
Random Oracles in a Quantum World
The interest in post-quantum cryptography - classical systems that remain
secure in the presence of a quantum adversary - has generated elegant proposals
for new cryptosystems. Some of these systems are set in the random oracle model
and are proven secure relative to adversaries that have classical access to the
random oracle. We argue that to prove post-quantum security one needs to prove
security in the quantum-accessible random oracle model where the adversary can
query the random oracle with quantum states.
We begin by separating the classical and quantum-accessible random oracle
models by presenting a scheme that is secure when the adversary is given
classical access to the random oracle, but is insecure when the adversary can
make quantum oracle queries. We then set out to develop generic conditions
under which a classical random oracle proof implies security in the
quantum-accessible random oracle model. We introduce the concept of a
history-free reduction which is a category of classical random oracle
reductions that basically determine oracle answers independently of the history
of previous queries, and we prove that such reductions imply security in the
quantum model. We then show that certain post-quantum proposals, including ones
based on lattices, can be proven secure using history-free reductions and are
therefore post-quantum secure. We conclude with a rich set of open problems in
this area.Comment: 38 pages, v2: many substantial changes and extensions, merged with a
related paper by Boneh and Zhandr
Non-interactive classical verification of quantum computation
In a recent breakthrough, Mahadev constructed an interactive protocol that
enables a purely classical party to delegate any quantum computation to an
untrusted quantum prover. In this work, we show that this same task can in fact
be performed non-interactively and in zero-knowledge.
Our protocols result from a sequence of significant improvements to the
original four-message protocol of Mahadev. We begin by making the first message
instance-independent and moving it to an offline setup phase. We then establish
a parallel repetition theorem for the resulting three-message protocol, with an
asymptotically optimal rate. This, in turn, enables an application of the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic, eliminating the second message and giving a
non-interactive protocol. Finally, we employ classical non-interactive
zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments and classical fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE) to give a zero-knowledge variant of this construction. This yields the
first purely classical NIZK argument system for QMA, a quantum analogue of NP.
We establish the security of our protocols under standard assumptions in
quantum-secure cryptography. Specifically, our protocols are secure in the
Quantum Random Oracle Model, under the assumption that Learning with Errors is
quantumly hard. The NIZK construction also requires circuit-private FHE.Comment: 37 page
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