31 research outputs found

    Law and Innovation: Evidence from State Trade Secrets Laws

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    10.1162/REST_a_00532REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS991167-17

    Secrecy and Patents: Theory and Evidence from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act

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    10.1287/stsc.2017.0035Strategy Science23176-19

    Automation Enables Specialization: Field Evidence

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    10.1287/mnsc.2023.4760MANAGEMENT SCIENC

    WHY ARE SOME PRODUCTS BRANDED AND OTHERS NOT

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    Why do some consumers pay a premium for branded products? According to the consumer information theory, brands signal the quality of experience goods (products whose quality cannot be determined on inspection) to consumers for whom, personal search and testing is relatively costly. We find that the product and customer mix in a sample of branded and unbranded service stations is generally consistent with the theory. Branded dealers are more likely to carry products for which cheating on quality is an issue and to serve customers for whom personal search and testing is relatively costly

    BIM from Design Stage – Are Hong Kong Designers Ready?

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    CORRUPTIBLE LAW ENFORCERS - HOW SHOULD THEY BE COMPENSATED

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    We study the optimal compensation policy for a corruptible inspector, charged with monitoring pollution from a factory. Our utilitarian approach focuses on the trade-off among corruption, pollution, and enforcement effort. Owing to the strategic interaction between factory and inspector, changes in compensation policy have surprising effects, e.g., raising the penalty for corruption may cause pollution to increase. We find that bribery is an inefficient way of encouraging the inspector to monitor; society should wipe out corruption

    SERVICE TIME COMPETITION

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    How can two physically identical gasoline stations differentiate themselves? In this article we develop and test a model of service time competition: some stations set higher prices and thereby offer shorter queues, whereas other offer lower price and longer queues. We find that retail demand is sensitive to service time: customers are, on average, willing to pay about 1\% more for a 6\% reduction in congestion. Consistent with the service time hypothesis, prices are more dispersed at stations facing more direct competition

    Copyright law and the supply of creative work: Evidence from the movies

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    Comparative Law and Economics407-44
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