The Economics of Privacy

In this chapter, we review economic analyses of privacy. We begin by scrutinizing the "free market" argument against privacy regulation, and highlight why it may not work well for personal information because welfare may be non-monotone in the quantity of information, there may be excessive incentives to collect information that has no social value, and cross-market externalities may arise from the exploitation of information. We then discuss research on property rights and suggest some challenges in determining their optimal allocation. We conclude by summarizing the insights provided by recent empirical research and highlighting directions for future research in the economics of privacy.

The Value of Online Information Privacy: An Empirical Investigation

Concern over online information privacy is widespread and rising. However, prior research is silent about the value of information privacy in the presence of potential benefits from sharing personally identifiable information. Analyzing individuals' trade-offs between the benefits and costs of providing personal information to websites revealed that benefits, monetary reward and future convenience, significantly affect individuals' preferences over websites with differing privacy policies. Quantifying the value of website privacy protection revealed that among U.S. subjects, protection against errors, improper access, and secondary use of personal information is worth US $30.49 - 44.62. Finally, three distinct segments of Internet consumers were determined: privacy guardians, information sellers and convenience seekers.

Sunk Cost Fallacy in Driving the World's Costliest Cars

We develop a behavioral model of durable good usage with mental accounting for sunk costs. It predicts higher-than-rational usage that attenuates at a rate that increases with sunk costs. Singapore government policy varied the sunk cost of buying a new car. Using Singapore data, we estimate the elasticity of driving with respect to sunk costs to be 0.048, which implies that government policy between 2009 and 2013 was associated with 86 kilometers per month, or 5.6%, more driving. The results are robust to specifying sunk costs as relative to buyer income and estimation with Hong Kong data. We believe this to be the first field evidence of the sunk cost fallacy in usage of a major durable good

Sunk Cost Fallacy in Driving the World's Costliest Cars

We develop a behavioral model of durable good usage with mental accounting for sunk costs. It predicts higher-than-rational usage that attenuates at a rate that increases with sunk costs. Singapore government policy varied the sunk cost of buying a new car. Using Singapore data, we estimate the elasticity of driving with respect to sunk costs to be 0.048, which implies that government policy between 2009 and 2013 was associated with 86 kilometers per month, or 5.6%, more driving. The results are robust to specifying sunk costs as relative to buyer income and estimation with Hong Kong data. We believe this to be the first field evidence of the sunk cost fallacy in usage of a major durable good