"Kiichiro Toyoda and the Birth of the Japanese Automobile Industry: Reconsideration of Toyoda-Platt Agreement"

In discussion of the birth of the Japanese automobile industry, most researchers and journalists obviously talk about the Toyota Motor Corporation and the Toyoda-Platt Agreement. It has been widely asserted that the one million yen that was received as a result of the Agreement provided Kiichiro Toyoda with the means to begin doing research on the automobile. But the historical evidence does not support this legendary story, and in many ways contradicts it. This paper aims to set the historical record straight.

Indigenous innovation and industrialization : foundations of Japanese development and advantage

Includes bibliographical references (leaves 19-21).William Lazonick and William Mass

The Value of Prominent Directors

Observers of modern transitional economies urge firms there to ignore stock markets. Stock markets simply will not work in such environments, they explain. Firms should instead rely on debt finance, particularly bank debt. Only then will they be able to keep principal-agent (i.e., investor-manager) slack to manageable levels. Turn-of-the-century Japanese firms faced problems that closely mirrored those in modern eastern Europe. Yet in Japan, the successful large firms did not rely on debt. Instead, they raised their funds through the stock market, and took a variety of steps to mitigate the principal-agent slack involved. As one of those steps, they recruited prominent investors to their boards. Using data on firms in the cotton-spinning industry (arguably the most important industrial sector in turn-of-the-century Japan), we explore why the firms recruited prominent directors. First, we note that firms with such directors had higher profits than others. In part, they probably had higher profits because such investors had an eye for firms that would likely succeed. In part too, however, they seem to have had higher profits because those investors brought basic management skills -- they knew how to monitor and when to intervene. Second, prominence held constant, we find that firms did not have higher profits by having directors affiliated with a bank or with other spinning firms. One might have thought directors with access to a bank or spinning technology would raise profits at a firm. In fact, they did not, for banks did not have the funds to lend, and the technolgy was freely available. Last, we explore whether the directors certified firm quality on behalf of other investors. Although firms with prominent directors apparently did have an advantage in the capital market, we conclude that quality certification was at most a by-product (if even that) of the monitoring and intervention these directors performed.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39663/3/wp279.pd

The Value of Prominent Directors

Observers of modern transitional economies urge firms there to ignore stock markets. Stock markets simply will not work in such environments, they explain. Firms should instead rely on debt finance, particularly bank debt. Only then will they be able to keep principal-agent (i.e., investor-manager) slack to manageable levels. Turn-of-the-century Japanese firms faced problems that closely mirrored those in modern eastern Europe. Yet in Japan, the successful large firms did not rely on debt. Instead, they raised their funds through the stock market, and took a variety of steps to mitigate the principal-agent slack involved. As one of those steps, they recruited prominent investors to their boards. Using data on firms in the cotton-spinning industry (arguably the most important industrial sector in turn-of-the-century Japan), we explore why the firms recruited prominent directors. First, we note that firms with such directors had higher profits than others. In part, they probably had higher profits because such investors had an eye for firms that would likely succeed. In part too, however, they seem to have had higher profits because those investors brought basic management skills -- they knew how to monitor and when to intervene. Second, prominence held constant, we find that firms did not have higher profits by having directors affiliated with a bank or with other spinning firms. One might have thought directors with access to a bank or spinning technology would raise profits at a firm. In fact, they did not, for banks did not have the funds to lend, and the technolgy was freely available. Last, we explore whether the directors certified firm quality on behalf of other investors. Although firms with prominent directors apparently did have an advantage in the capital market, we conclude that quality certification was at most a by-product (if even that) of the monitoring and intervention these directors performed.

The industrial machinery collection of the Alcoy City Council

S’hi presenta el catàleg d’una col·lecció de maquinària industrial que va tenir el seu origen en l’Escola Universitària d’Enginyeria Tècnica Industrial d’Alcoi, ampliada amb posterioritat per donacions d’empreses i particulars, i en l’actualitat custodiada per l’Ajuntament d’Alcoi. El conjunt supera el centenar d’artefactes representatius de l’activitat fabril alcoiana: tèxtil, paperera, metal·lúrgica, energètica, etc., dels segles XIX i XX. Paraules clau: Catalogació. Maquinària industrial. Processos industrials. Segles XIX i XX. Alcoi (Alacant).We present the catalogue of a collection of industrial machinery which originated at the School of Industrial Engineering of Alcoy, subsequently enlarged by donations from businesses and individuals. The collection is currently being held by the Alcoy City Council. The whole collection is made up of more than one hundred artifacts representative of the manufacturing activity in Alcoy: textile, papermarking, metallurgy, energy, etc., dating from the XIX and XX centuries. Key words: Cataloguing. Industrial machinery. Industrial processes. XIX and XX centuries. Alcoy (Alicante, Spain)., Spain).Se presenta el catálogo de una colección de maquinaria industrial que tuvo su origen en la Escuela Universitaria de Ingeniería Técnica Industrial de Alcoy, ampliada con posterioridad por donaciones de empresas y particulares, y en la actualidad custodiada por el Ayuntamiento de Alcoy. El conjunto supera el centenar de artefactos representativos de la actividad fabril alcoyana: textil, papelera, metalúrgica, energética, etc., de los siglos XIX y XX. Palabras clave: Catalogación. Maquinaria industrial. Procesos industriales. Siglos XIX y XX. Alcoy (Alicante)

"The Productivity Convergence Debate: A Theoretical and Methodological Reconsideration"

Two fundamental issues have been ignored in the convergence debate which are addressed in this paper. First, there has been little attention paid to the development of a general model able to explain convergence a divergence. Second, in the rush to put data to a convergence hypothesis, researchers have failed to consider certain methodological procedures with respect to the treatment of capital. To remedy this problem we use an input-output approach to measure catch-up. To address the theoretical lacunae we present case studies of Portugal and Japan, two countries which by 1959 had attained the threshold level of development required to join the “convergence- club”, but which, for various historical (path-dependent) reasons, have diverged rapidly from each other in the period since the late 1950’s.

La maquinaria textil en Cataluña: de la total dependencia exterior a la reducción de importaciones, 1870-1959*

Este artículo analiza la dinámica del proceso de sustitución de importaciones de maquinaria textil en Cataluña durante la Segunda Revolución Industrial y expone las razones que lo causaron. La investigación e sustenta en una sólida base documental, a partir de una muestra representativa de empresas textiles catalanas. Se ponen de relieve tres fases en la emergencia de la metalurgia textil catalana entre 1870 y 1959, que vienen limitadas por Primera Guerra Civil y la Guerra Civil. Partiendo de la dependencia absoluta de la maquinaria textil extranjera, desde la década de 1920 se introdujeron avances significativos en la metalurgia textil catalana, en un clima de invención e innovación en el sector. De 1939 a 1959, la consolidación de la industria de construcciones mecánicas autóctona, con escasa innovación tecnológica en un contexto de aislamiento exterior, coincidió con la erosión de la competitividad tecnológica de la industria textil.This article analyzes the dynamics of the process of imports substitution of textile machinery in Catalonia during the Second Industrial Revolution and explains the reasons behind such a process. The research is sustained in a solid documental basis from a representative sample of Catalan textile companies. From 1870 until 1959, three phases are set up in the emergency of the Catalan textile metallurgy which are limited by the First World War and the Spanish Civil War. Following the absolute dependence from the foreign textile machinery, since the twenties significant advances were introduced in the Catalan textile metallurgy, in a climate of invention and innovation of the sector. From 1939 to 1959, the consolidation of the autochthonous industry of mechanical constructions, forced by a context of outer isolation, coincided with the erosion of the technological competitiveness of the textile industry