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Impaired recollection of visual scene details in adults with autism spectrum conditions.
Subtle memory deficits observed in autism spectrum conditions (ASC) have often been characterized as reflecting impaired recollection and it has been proposed that a relational binding deficit may underlie the recollection impairment. However, subjective recollection and relational binding have not been measured within the same task in ASC to date and it is unclear whether a relational binding deficit can provide a full account of recollection impairments in ASC. Relational memory has also not been compared with item memory when the demands of the 2 tasks are comparable. To assess recollection, relational memory, and item memory within a single task in ASC, 24 adults with ASC and 24 typically developed adults undertook a change detection memory task that assessed recollection of item-specific and spatial details. Participants studied rendered indoor and outdoor scenes and, in a subsequent recognition memory test, distinguished scenes that had not changed from those that had either undergone an item change (a different item exemplar) or a relational (spatial) change, which was followed by a subjective recollection judgment. The ASC group identified fewer item changes and spatial changes, to a similar degree, which was attributable to a specific reduction in recollection-based recognition relative to the control group. These findings provide evidence that recollection deficits in ASC may not be driven entirely by a relational binding deficit.This research was supported by a James S. McDonnell Scholar Award to J.S.S., an Economic and Social Research Council Award to R.A.C., and Leverhulme Trust Visiting Professorship and Parke Davis Exchange Fellowship Awards to C.R.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from he American Psychological Association via http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/abn000007
Reality Monitoring and Metamemory in Adults with Autism Spectrum Conditions.
Studies of reality monitoring (RM) often implicate medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in distinguishing internal and external information, a region linked to autism-related deficits in social and self-referential information processing, executive function, and memory. This study used two RM conditions (self-other; perceived-imagined) to investigate RM and metamemory in adults with autism. The autism group showed a deficit in RM, which did not differ across source conditions, and both groups exhibited a self-encoding benefit on recognition and source memory. Metamemory for perceived-imagined information, but not for self-other information, was significantly lower in the autism group. Therefore, reality monitoring and metamemory, sensitive to mPFC function, appear impaired in autism, highlighting a difficulty in remembering and monitoring internal and external details of past events.This research was supported by a James S. McDonnell Scholar Award to J.S.S., and an Economic and Social Research Council Award to R.A.C
Low-level, prediction-based sensory and motor processes are unimpaired in Autism.
A new promising account of human brain function suggests that sensory cortices try to optimise information processing via predictions that are based on prior experiences. The brain is thus likened to a probabilistic prediction machine. There has been a growing - though inconsistent - literature to suggest that features of autism spectrum conditions (ASCs) are associated with a deficit in modelling the world through such prediction-based inference. However empirical evidence for differences in low-level sensorimotor predictions in autism is still lacking. One approach to examining predictive processing in the sensorimotor domain is in the context of self-generated (predictable) as opposed to externally-generated (less predictable) effects. We employed two complementary tasks - forcematching and intentional binding - which examine self-versus externally-generated action effects in terms of sensory attenuation and intentional binding respectively in adults with and without autism. The results show that autism was associated with normal levels of sensory attenuation of internally-generated force and with unaltered temporal attraction of voluntary actions and their outcomes. Thus, our results do not support a general deficit in predictive processing in autism.Bernard Wolfe health Neuroscience Fun
What is social about social perception research?
A growing consensus in social cognitive neuroscience holds that large portions of the primate visual brain are dedicated to the processing of social information, i.e., to those aspects of stimuli that are usually encountered in social interactions such as others’ facial expressions, actions and symbols. Yet, studies of social perception have mostly employed simple pictorial representations of conspecifics. These stimuli are social only in the restricted sense that they physically resemble objects with which the observer would typically interact. In an equally important sense, however, these stimuli might be regarded as ‘non-social’: the observer knows that they are viewing pictures and might therefore not attribute current mental states to the stimuli or might do so in a qualitatively different way than in a real social interaction. Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of such higher-order conceptualisation of the stimulus for social perceptual processing. Here, we assess the similarity between the various types of stimuli used in the laboratory and object classes encountered in real social interactions. We distinguish two different levels at which experimental stimuli can match social stimuli as encountered in everyday social settings: (i) the extent to which a stimulus’ physical properties resemble those typically encountered in social interactions and (ii) the higher-level conceptualisation of the stimulus as indicating another person’s mental states. We illustrate the significance of this distinction for social perception research and report new empirical evidence further highlighting the importance of mental state attribution for perceptual processing. Finally, we discuss the potential of this approach to inform studies of clinical conditions such as autism
What is social about social perception research?
A growing consensus in social cognitive neuroscience holds that large portions of the primate visual brain are dedicated to the processing of social information, i.e., to those aspects of stimuli that are usually encountered in social interactions such as others' facial expressions, actions, and symbols. Yet, studies of social perception have mostly employed simple pictorial representations of conspecifics. These stimuli are social only in the restricted sense that they physically resemble objects with which the observer would typically interact. In an equally important sense, however, these stimuli might be regarded as “non-social”: the observer knows that they are viewing pictures and might therefore not attribute current mental states to the stimuli or might do so in a qualitatively different way than in a real social interaction. Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of such higher-order conceptualization of the stimulus for social perceptual processing. Here, we assess the similarity between the various types of stimuli used in the laboratory and object classes encountered in real social interactions. We distinguish two different levels at which experimental stimuli can match social stimuli as encountered in everyday social settings: (1) the extent to which a stimulus' physical properties resemble those typically encountered in social interactions and (2) the higher-level conceptualization of the stimulus as indicating another person's mental states. We illustrate the significance of this distinction for social perception research and report new empirical evidence further highlighting the importance of mental state attribution for perceptual processing. Finally, we discuss the potential of this approach to inform studies of clinical conditions such as autism