2,992 research outputs found
Facial Discrimination: Darlene Jespersen’s Fight Against the Barbie-fication of Bartenders
Lambda Legal took up Darlene Jespersen\u27s case because restrictive, genderbased rules about personal appearance and deportment can pose particular burdens for anyone whose gender identity or expression varies from conventional stereotypes; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender ( LGBT ) people are disproportionately burdened by such rules.7 Many LGBT people cannot readily conform to conventional gender stereotypes. 8 For others, simply the process of coming out as LGBT or queer gives rise to a deep critique of the artificially restrictive gender stereotypes that pervade our modern lives and shape corporate marketing campaigns
The Case for Intensity Targets
While the rest of the world has pursued absolute emissions limits for greenhouse gases, the Bush administration has proposed an alternative policy formulation based, among other things, on reducing emissions intensity—that is, emissions per dollar of real gross domestic product. Critics of this formulation have denounced the general idea of an intensity-based emissions target, along with its voluntary nature and weak targets. This raises the question of whether intensity-based emissions limits, distinct from the other features of the Bush initiative, offer a useful alternative to absolute emissions limits. This paper makes the case that they do, based on how emissions targets are framed. The argument draws on four key observations: greenhouse gas emissions will continue to rise over the near term, absolute targets emphasize zero or declining emissions growth while intensity targets do not, developing countries’ economic development is integrally tied to emissions growth for the foreseeable future, and intensity targets need not be any more complicated to administer than absolute targets.carbon, climate, policy, intensity, global warming
Climate Change Catastrophes
Most studies that compare price and quantity controls for greenhouse gas emissions under uncertainty find that price mechanisms perform substantially better. In these studies, the benefits from reducing emissions are proportional to the level of reductions, and such linear benefits strongly favor price policies (Weitzman 1974). Catastrophic damages, however, challenge that intuition as consequences become highly nonlinear. Catastrophe avoidance offers huge benefits, and incremental adjustments on either side of the associated threshold are relatively unimportant, suggesting a strong preference for quantity controls. This paper shows that with catastrophic damages, both price and quantity mechanisms offer large gains over the business-as-usual alternative, and the difference between policies is never more than 10%. Catastrophe avoidance is much more important than efficient catastrophe avoidance. Although previous studies favoring price policies in the presence of uncertainty have worried that catastrophes would reverse their results, this analysis indicates that such concerns are not borne out.climate change, global warming, prices versus quantities, stock externalities, integrated assessment, uncertainty
Climate Policy Design Under Uncertainty
The uncertainty surrounding both costs and benefits associated with global climate change mitigation creates enormous hurdles for scientists, stakeholders, and decisionmakers. A key issue is how policy choices balance uncertainty about costs and benefits. This balance arises in terms of the time path of mitigation efforts as well as whether those efforts, by design, focus on effort or outcome. This paper considers two choices—price versus quantity controls and absolute versus relative/intensity emissions limits—demonstrating that price controls and intensity emissions limits favor certainty about cost over climate benefits and future emissions reductions. The paper then argues that in the near term, this favoritism is desired.carbon, climate, policy, intensity, global warming, uncertainty, price, quantity
A U.S. Perspective on Future Climate Regimes
Momentum may be building for federal climate change policy in the United States. Assuming this leads to mandatory greenhouse gas regulations, the door will be open for the United States to constructively re-engage other countries concerning an international climate regime. Such a regime will need to recognize that binding international limits are unlikely to attract U.S. participation and, therefore, will require a different approach than the Kyoto Protocol. In particular, a future regime will need to accommodate and encourage, rather than force or constrain, domestic actions to focus more narrowly on major economies and emitting nations, to balance mitigation and technology objectives, and to engage developing countries on as many levels as possible. In place of a heavy emphasis on negotiating commitments in advance, there likely will need to be greater emphasis on evaluating actions in retrospect. Such an approach not only matches recent trends in the United States but arguably follows from broader experience over the decade since the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol.climate change, international treaty, Kyoto, emissions trading
The Evolution of a Global Climate Change Agreement
This paper argues that while a long-term solution to climate change may require the global market-based solution envisioned in the Kyoto Protocol, a more flexible near-term approach is necessary. First, a broad range of domestic policies need to be embraced and encouraged by an international agreement, not constrained or discouraged by it. Second, developing countries need to be an increased focus of engagement, with expansion and reform of project-based crediting. Finally, a global agreement needs to recognize both technology and mitigation policies and to develop ways to evaluate efforts along each of these dimensions. Over the longer term, such an agreement should evolve toward greater reliance on global market-based solutions, and therefore near-term steps should be viewed both in terms of their immediate practicality and their potential to be refined over time.climate change, international treaty, Kyoto, emissions trading
Economics versus Climate Change
This paper argues against the common-sense conclusion that climate change demands a global market-based solution, such as international emissions trading. First, current experience suggests global cooperation is not necessary for initial mandatory actions. Second, when domestic targets vary across nations, there are a variety of reasons why international emissions trading, even though it creates aggregate economic gains for all nations, may not be desirable. These reasons include concerns over legitimizing target variations for future negotiations, real and perceived consequences of capital flows across nations, and distributional impacts within nations. Finally, the underlying need for global technology solutions suggests domestic mitigation policies that balance clear emissions price signals, incentives for technology development and deployment, and mechanisms to finance deployment to developing countries. International efforts, in turn, might focus on encouraging these domestic actions, facilitating the developing country investment mechanisms, and providing credible reviews of national action.climate, change, international, treaty, Kyoto, emissions trading
Climate Policy in the United States and Japan: Prospects in 2005 and Beyond, Workshop Summary
Resources for the Future and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies convened a one and one-half day workshop on domestic and international climate policy May 11–12, 2005, in Tokyo, Japan. The first day included 49 participants hearing presentations from 13 speakers and discussing domestic activities, economics, and politics. The second day included a smaller group of participants listening to a panel of four experts and discussing opportunities for future international climate regimes. Participants included government officials from the Japanese Ministry of the Environment; the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; the U.S. Department of State; and the Massachussetts Department of Commonwealth Development; representatives from business and environmental groups; and academic experts. Over the course of both days, it was clear that great opportunities exist for regularly informing experts from both countries on recent policy developments, economic analyses, and political nuances in the other country. For example, U.S. participants had an opportunity to learn the process through which Japanese technology standards are set and implemented, the subtle evolution of mandatory policy discussions, and details of current policies on voluntary trading and an emission registry. Japanese participants benefited from a frank discussion with U.S. experts of how and why it would be difficult to link different domestic emissions trading markets, the current process to establish a regional emissions trading program, and the evolving dynamics in the U.S. Senate. Looking forward, important lessons may be taken from past negotiating experiences. A small group of national leaders, including large emitters of greenhouse gases and major economies, addressing not only climate change but also developmental issues, could be a useful vehicle for meaningful international efforts. Such a small-group process should be carried out in parallel with the multilateral United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process. In addition, policies in both the United States and Japan reflect a strong emphasis on technology development and commercialization; this may be an area where bilateral cooperation could be particularly beneficial.climate change, global warming, United States, Japan, Kyoto
Climate Policy in the United States and Japan: A Workshop Summary
Resources for the Future and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (Japan) convened a one-and-one-half day workshop on domestic and international climate policy on February 12–13, 2004 in Washington, D.C. On the first day, 55 participants heard presentations from 14 speakers and discussed domestic activities, economics, and politics. The second day featured a smaller group of 27 participants hearing six informal sets of comments and discussing opportunities for international collaboration. Participants included government officials from the Japanese Ministry of the Environment, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and other U.S. administration and congressional staff; representatives from business and environmental groups; and academic experts. Over the course of both days, it was clear that great opportunities exist for informing participants from both countries on recent developments, economic analyses, and political nuances in the other country. For example, American participants were unaware of the Keidanren’s success at exceeding required efficiency standards. Japanese participants were unaware of U.S. treaty tradition, by which ratification cannot occur until implementing legislation is in place—a fact that makes the Kyoto Protocol virtually unratifiable. Participants on both sides benefited from a frank discussion of how and why it may be unwise for the international community to attempt to re-engage the United States in international climate policy until the United States settles on its own course of meaningful domestic action. Looking forward, an important lesson may be taken from U.S. experience with early environmental regulation, where state action provided experience and impetus for federal action. As an alternative to the Kyoto model, distinct national actions may provide experience and impetus for international action. In addition, policies in both the United States and Japan reflect a strong emphasis on technology development and commercialization; this may be an area where bilateral cooperation could be particularly beneficial.climate change, global warming, United States, Japan, Kyoto
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