Income variance dynamics and heterogenity

Recent theoretical work has shown the importance of measuring microeconomic uncertainty for models of both general and partial equilibrium under imperfect insurance. In this paper the assumption of i.i.d. income innovations used in previous empirical studies is removed and the focus of the analysis placed on models for the conditional variance of income shocks, which is related to the measure of risk emphasized by the theory. We first discriminate amongst various models of earnings determination that separate income shocks into idiosyncratic transitory and permanent components. We allow for education- and time-specific differences in the stochastic process for earnings and for measurement error. The conditional variance of the income shocks is modelled as a parsimonious ARCH process with both observable and unobserved heterogeneity. The empirical analysis is conducted on data drawn from the 1967-1992 Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We find strong evidence of sizeable ARCH effects as well as evidence of unobserved heterogeneity in the variances

Imputing consumption in the PSID using food demand estimates from the CEX

In this paper we discuss an empirical strategy that allows researchers to impute consumptiondata from the CEX to the PSID. The strategy consists of inverting a demand for food equationestimated in the CEX. We discuss the conditions under which such procedure is successful inreplicating the trends of the first two moments of the consumption distribution. We argue thattwo factors appear to be empirically relevant: accounting for differences in the distribution offood expenditures in the two data sets, and accounting for the presence of measurement error inconsumption data in the CEX. In this paper we discuss an empirical strategy that allows researchers to impute consumptiondata from the CEX to the PSID. The strategy consists of inverting a demand for food equationestimated in the CEX. We discuss the conditions under which such procedure is successful inreplicating the trends of the first two moments of the consumption distribution. We argue thattwo factors appear to be empirically relevant: accounting for differences in the distribution offood expenditures in the two data sets, and accounting for the presence of measurement error inconsumption data in the CEX

Consumption inequality and partial insurance

This paper uses panel data on household consumption and income to evaluate the degree of insurance to income shocks. Our aim is to describe the transmission of income inequality into consumption inequality by contrasting shifts in the cross-sectional distribution of income growth with shifts in the cross-sectional distribution of consumption growth. We combine panel data on income from the PSID with consumption data from repeated CEX cross-sections. The results point to some partial insurance but reject the complete market restrictions. We find a greater degree of insurance for transitory shocks and differences in the degree of insurance over time and across demographic groups. We also document the importance of durables and of taxes and transfers as a means of insurance

Consumption inequality and partial insurance

This paper examines the transmission of income inequality into consumption inequality and in so doing investigates the degree of insurance to income shocks. Panel data on income from the PSID is combined with consumption data from repeated CEX cross-sections to identify the degree of insurance to permanent and transitory shocks. In the process we also present new evidence of the growth in the variance of permanent and transitory shocks in the US during the 1980s. We find some partial insurance of permanent income shocks with more insurance possibilities for the college educated and those nearing retirement. We find little evidence against full insurance for transitory income shocks except among low income households. Tax and welfare benefits are found to play an important role in insuring permanent shocks. Adding durable expenditures to the consumption measure suggests that durable replacement is an important insurance mechanism, especially for transitory income shocks

Partial insurance, information,and consumption dynamics

This paper uses panel data on household consumption and income to evaluate the degree ofinsurance to income shocks. Our aim is to describe the transmission of income inequality intoconsumption inequality. Our framework nests the special cases of self-insurance and the completemarkets assumption. We assess the degree of insurance over and above self-insurance throughsavings by contrasting shifts in the cross-sectional distribution of income growth with shifts in thecross-sectional distribution of consumption growth, and analyzing the way these two measures ofhousehold welfare correlate over time. We combine panel data on income from the PSID withconsumption data from repeated CEX cross-sections in a structural way, i.e. using conventionaldemand analysis rather than reduced form imputation procedures. Our results point to some partialinsurance but reject the complete markets restriction. We find a greater degree of insurance fortransitory shocks and differences in the degree of insurance over time and across education. Wealso document the importance of durables and of taxes and transfers as a means of insurance. This paper uses panel data on household consumption and income to evaluate the degree ofinsurance to income shocks. Our aim is to describe the transmission of income inequality intoconsumption inequality. Our framework nests the special cases of self-insurance and the completemarkets assumption. We assess the degree of insurance over and above self-insurance throughsavings by contrasting shifts in the cross-sectional distribution of income growth with shifts in thecross-sectional distribution of consumption growth, and analyzing the way these two measures ofhousehold welfare correlate over time. We combine panel data on income from the PSID withconsumption data from repeated CEX cross-sections in a structural way, i.e. using conventionaldemand analysis rather than reduced form imputation procedures. Our results point to some partialinsurance but reject the complete markets restriction. We find a greater degree of insurance fortransitory shocks and differences in the degree of insurance over time and across education. Wealso document the importance of durables and of taxes and transfers as a means of insurance

Disability Insurance and the Dynamics of the Incentive-Insurance Tradeoff

We provide a lifecycle framework for comparing the insurance value and the incentive cost of disability benefits. We estimate the risks that individuals face and the parameters governing the disability insurance program using longitudinal US data on consumption, health, disability insurance, and wages. We characterize the economic effects of disability insurance and study how policy reforms impact behavior and household welfare. Disability insurance is characterised by high rejections rates of disabled applicants; acceptances of healthy applicants is less widespread. Welfare increases as: (1) the program becomes less strict, reducing rejection rates among the disabled, despite the worsening of incentives; (2) generosity is reduced or reassessments increased because false applications decline; (3) the generosity of unconditional means-tested benefits is increased

Disability Insurance and the Dynamics of the Incentive-Insurance Tradeoff

We provide a lifecycle framework for comparing the insurance value and the incentive cost of disability benefits. We estimate the risks that individuals face and the parameters governing the disability insurance program using longitudinal US data on consumption, health, disability insurance, and wages. We characterize the economic effects of disability insurance and study how policy reforms impact behavior and household welfare. Disability insurance is characterised by high rejections rates of disabled applicants; acceptances of healthy applicants is less widespread. Welfare increases as: (1) the program becomes less strict, reducing rejection rates among the disabled, despite the worsening of incentives; (2) generosity is reduced or reassessments increased because false applications decline; (3) the generosity of unconditional means-tested benefits is increased

Marriage, Labor Supply and the Dynamics of the Social Safety Net

The 1996 PRWORA reform introduced time limits on the receipt of welfare in the United States. We use variation by state and across demographic groups to provide reduced form evidence showing that such limits led to a fall in welfare claims (partly due to \banking" benefits for future use), a rise in employment, and a decline in divorce rates. We then specify and estimate a life-cycle model of marriage, labor supply and divorce under limited commitment to better understand the mechanisms behind these behavioral responses, carry out counterfactual analysis with longer run impacts and evaluate the welfare effects of the program. Based on the model, which reproduces the reduced form estimates, we show that among low educated women, instead of relying on TANF, single mothers work more, more mothers remain married, some move to relying only on food stamps and, in ex-ante welfare terms, women are worse off

Cross Sectional Facts for Macroeconomists

This paper provides an introduction to the special issue of the Review of Economic Dynamics on "Cross Sectional Facts for Macroeconomists''. The issue documents, for nine countries, the level and the evolution, over time and over the life cycle, of several dimensions of economic inequality, including wages, labor earnings, income, consumption, and wealth. After describing the motivation and the common methodology underlying this empirical project, we discuss selected results, with an emphasis on cross-country comparisons. Most, but not all, countries experienced substantial increases in wages and earnings inequality, over the last three decades. While the trend in the skill premium differed widely across countries, the experience premium rose and the gender premium fell virtually everywhere. At a higher frequency, earnings inequality appears to be strongly counter-cyclical. In all countries, government redistribution through taxes and transfers reduced the level, the trend and the cyclical fluctuations in income inequality. The rise in income inequality was stronger at the bottom of the distribution. Consumption inequality increased less than disposable income inequality, and tracked the latter much more closely at the top than at the bottom of the distribution. Measuring the age-profile of inequality is challenging because of the interplay of time and cohort effects.