16 research outputs found

    Quantum repeated games revisited

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    We present a scheme for playing quantum repeated 2x2 games based on the Marinatto and Weber's approach to quantum games. As a potential application, we study twice repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We show that results not available in classical game can be obtained when the game is played in the quantum way. Before we present our idea, we comment on the previous scheme of playing quantum repeated games

    The Ultimate Solution to the Quantum Battle of the Sexes game

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    We present the unique solution to the Quantum Battle of the Sexes game. We show the best result which can be reached when the game is played according to Marinatto and Weber's scheme. The result which we put forward does not surrender the criticism of previous works on the same topic.Comment: 8 page

    Kantian Equilibria in Classical and Quantum Symmetric Games

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    The aim of the paper is to examine the notion of simple Kantian equilibrium in 2×2 symmetric games and their quantum counterparts. We focus on finding the Kantian equilibrium strategies in the general form of the games. As a result, we derive a formula that determines the reasonable strategies for any payoffs in the bimatrix game. This allowed us to compare the payoff results for classical and quantum way of playing the game. We showed that a very large part of 2×2 symmetric games, in which the arithmetic mean of the off-diagonal payoffs is greater than the other payoffs, have more beneficial Kantian equilibria when they are played with the use of quantum strategies. In that case, both players always obtain higher payoffs than when they use the classical strategies

    Strong Isomorphism in Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein Type Quantum Games

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    The aim of this paper is to bring together the notions of quantum game and game isomorphism. The work is intended as an attempt to introduce a new criterion for quantum game schemes. The generally accepted requirement forces a quantum scheme to generate the classical game in a particular case. Now, given a quantum game scheme and two isomorphic classical games, we additionally require the resulting quantum games to be isomorphic as well. We are concerned with the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein quantum game scheme and the strong isomorphism between games in strategic form

    Quantum Games with Unawareness

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    Games with unawareness model strategic situations in which players’ perceptions about the game are limited. They take into account the fact that the players may be unaware of some of the strategies available to them or their opponents as well as the players may have a restricted view about the number of players participating in the game. The aim of the paper is to introduce this notion into theory of quantum games. We focus on games in strategic form and Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein type quantum games. It is shown that limiting a player’s perception in the game enriches the structure of the quantum game substantially and allows the players to obtain results that are unattainable when the game is played in a quantum way by means of previously used methods

    Quantum Games with Unawareness with Duopoly Problems in View

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    Playing the Cournot duopoly in the quantum domain can lead to the optimal strategy profile in the case of maximally correlated actions of the players. However, that result can be obtained if the fact that the players play the quantum game is common knowledge among the players. Our purpose is to determine reasonable game outcomes when players’ perceptions about what game is actually played are limited. To this end, we consider a collection consisting of the classical and quantum games that specifies how each player views the game and how each player views the other players’ perceptions of the game. We show that a slight change in how the players perceive the game may considerably affect the result of the game and, in the case of maximally correlated strategies, may vary from the inefficient Nash equilibrium outcome in the classical Cournot duopoly to the Pareto optimal outcome. We complete our work by investigating in the same way the Bertrand duopoly model

    Example of a Finite Game with No Berge Equilibria at All

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    The problem of the existence of Berge equilibria in the sense of Zhukovskii in normal-form finite games in pure and in mixed strategies is studied. The example of a three-player game that has Berge equilibrium neither in pure, nor in mixed strategies is given

    Nash Equilibria of Quantum Games in the Special Two-Parameter Strategy Space

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    The aim of the paper is to examine pure Nash equilibria in a quantum game that extends the classical bimatrix game of dimension 2. The strategies of quantum players are specific types of two-parameter unitary operations such that the resulting quantum game is invariant under isomorphic transformations of the input classical game. We formulate general statements for the existence and form of Nash equilibria and discuss their Pareto efficiency. We prove that, depending on the payoffs of a classical game, the corresponding quantum game may or may not have Nash equilibria in the set of unitary strategies under study. Some of the equilibria cease to be equilibria if the players’ strategy set is the three-parameter special unitary group

    Nash Equilibria of Quantum Games in the Special Two-Parameter Strategy Space

    No full text
    The aim of the paper is to examine pure Nash equilibria in a quantum game that extends the classical bimatrix game of dimension 2. The strategies of quantum players are specific types of two-parameter unitary operations such that the resulting quantum game is invariant under isomorphic transformations of the input classical game. We formulate general statements for the existence and form of Nash equilibria and discuss their Pareto efficiency. We prove that, depending on the payoffs of a classical game, the corresponding quantum game may or may not have Nash equilibria in the set of unitary strategies under study. Some of the equilibria cease to be equilibria if the players’ strategy set is the three-parameter special unitary group
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