The roots of terrorism: A reassessment after September 11th

The brutal terrorist attacks of September 11th, the anthrax attacks that followed and growing knowledge of al Qaeda's pursuit of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons have not only intensified concerns about terrorism but also created doubts about our understanding of terrorism. These attacks were in many ways unprecedented, and ultimately raise the question of the roots or causes of terrorism. Historically and today, there have been divergent views on this question, which reflect philosophical, religious, political and other differences. These differences are not merely academic, as they can affect our understanding of both the threat and of responses to terrorism in the aftermath of September 1 1 th. Terrorism is too complex and diverse a phenomenon to speak easily of causes. But we may be able to discern the causes of specific acts. Our response to 9/11 and other acts of terrorism will be affected by our understanding of their causes, as well as by possible political requirements to address widespread perceptions of causes. If 9/11 was caused by Islamic radicalism, the near-term response must be to ensure the terrorists are defeated and pose no fiuther danger. In the longer term, education is critical. If the attacks were caused by US Middle East policies, the response should involve a review of those policies. This may or may not result in changes to policy, public diplomacy, etc. If the attacks were a backlash against globalization, the response must address the realities underlying anti-globalization sentiments. Addressing causes (real and perceived) will not in any case end terrorism, and addressing the wrong causes can be counterproductive. Actions to reduce those conditions that create support for terrorism and aid its recruitment effort are critical to any counterterrorism strategy. For this reason alone, we must do everything possible to understand the reasons terrorism may be undertaken, including the attacks of September 1 1 th. This paper will look at the question of the roots of terrorism and then look to the specific case of 9/11 and its aftermath, with a special view to the impact of globalization

Beyond integrated safeguards: performance-based assessments for future nuclear controls.

In the future, iE the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control agendas are to advance, they will likely become increasingly seen as parallel undertakings with the objective of comprehensive cradle-to-grave controls over nuclear materials and possibly even warheads removed from defense programs along with materials in civilian use. This 'back to the future' prospect was envisioned in the Acheson-Lillienthal Report and the Baruch Plan, and more modestly in the Atoms-for-Peace Proposal. Unlike the grand plans of the early nuclear years, today's and tomorrow's undertakings will more likely consist of a series of incremental steps with the goal of expanding nuclear controls. These steps will be undertaken at a time of fundamental change in the IAEA safeguards system, and they will be influenced by those changes in profound ways. This prospective influence needs to be taken into account as the IAEA develops and implements integrated safeguards, including its efforts to establish new safeguards criteria, undertake technological and administrative improvements in safeguards, implement credible capabilities for the detection of undeclared nuclear facilities and activities and, perhaps, provide for a more intensive involvement in applying safeguards in new roles such as the verification of a fissile materials cutoff treaty. Performance-based criteria offer one promising way to address the effectiveness of integrated safeguards and to provide a common means of assessing the other key areas of a comprehensive approach to nuclear controls as these develop independently and to the extent that they are coordinated in the future

Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament, and Extended Deterrence in the New Security Environment; Strategic Insights, v. 8, issue 4 (September 2009)

This article appeared in Strategic Insights, v.8, issue 4(September 2009)Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Dissuasion of Terrorists and Other Non-State Actors Strategic Insights, v. 3, issue 10 (October 2004)

This article appeared in Strategic Insights, v.3 issue 10 (October 2004)Strategic Insights, is a monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.Dissuasionâ€â€as put forward in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and other recent U.S. strategy documentsâ€â€is targeted at states. Although there are questions about the potential role and efficacy of dissuasion with respect to states, there is an even more difficult question: Can it apply at all to terrorists and other non-state actors?Naval Postgraduate School ; National Security Affairs ; Center on Contemporary Conflic

Roots of terrorism: a reassessment after September 11th

The brutal terrorist attacks of September 11th, the anthrax attacks that followed and growing knowledge of al Qaeda's pursuit of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons have not only intensified concerns about terrorism but also created doubts about our understanding of terrorism. These attacks were in many ways unprecedented, and ultimately raise the question of the roots or causes of terrorism. Historically and today, there have been divergent views on this question, which reflect philosophical, religious, political, sociological and other differences. These differences are not merely academic, as they can affect our understanding of both the threat and of responses to terrorism in the aftermath of September 11th, Terrorism is too complex and diverse a phenomenon to speak easily of causes. But we may be able to discern the causes of specific acts. Our response to 9/11 and other acts of terrorism will be affected by our understanding of their causes. If 9/11 was caused by US Middle East policies, the response must involve a review of these policies. If it is a backlash against globalization, the response must address the realities underlying anti-globalization sentiments. Addressing causes will not in any case end terrorism, and addressing the wrong causes will be counterproductive. Actions to reduce those conditions that create support for terrorism and aid its recruitment, which need to be clearly identified, are critical in any counterterrorism strategy. So we must understand the reasons for terrorism and, in particular, for the attacks of September 11th.T his paper will look at the question of the roots of terrorism and then look to the specific case of 911 and its aftermath, with a special view to the impact of globalization

Expert elicitation and the problem of detecting undeclared activities

Measures applicable to the detection of undeclared activities are not well established, and their effectiveness is uncertain. To detect clandestine paths, the IAEA is still developing processes and procedures. As the Agency gains experience with new measures and with integrated safeguards, dealing with such problems may become more experience-based and perhaps more closely parallel the process with current safeguards where detection probabilities for the measures to be utilized on declared paths are well characterized. Whether or not this point will be reached for undeclared and mixed paths, the only tool that appears suitable at present for the purpose of generating a reasonable detection probability that can over time be tested against reality and, if necessary, adjusted is formal expert judgment, or expert elicitation. Formal expert elicitation is a structured process that makes use of people knowledgeable in certain areas to make assessments. To provide a 'proof of principle' of this methodology for presentation to the Agency, experts in nuclear technology, nonproliferation, safeguards and open source information, as well as in formal expert elicitation processes, engaged in three illustrative expert elicitations on assessing information analysis as a means to detect undeclared activities. These elicitations were successful. This paper will discuss the process of and issues raised by the elicitations