Antitrust and Regulation

Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have operated as competing mechanisms to control competition. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and favors to special interests, but specified prices and rules of mandatory dealing. Antitrust promoted competition without favoring special interests, but couldn't formulate rules for particular industries. The deregulation movement reflected the relative competencies of antitrust and regulation. Antitrust and regulation can also be viewed as complements in which regulation and antitrust assign control of competition to courts and regulatory agencies based on their relative strengths. Antitrust also can act as a constraint on what regulators can do. This paper uses the game-theoretic framework of political bargaining and the historical record of antitrust and regulation to establish and illustrate these points.

Precision measurement of the neutron β-decay asymmetry

A new measurement of the neutron β-decay asymmetry A_0 has been carried out by the UCNA Collaboration using polarized ultracold neutrons (UCNs) from the solid deuterium UCN source at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center. Improvements in the experiment have led to reductions in both statistical and systematic uncertainties leading to A_0=−0.11954(55)_(stat)(98)_(syst), corresponding to the ratio of axial-vector to vector coupling λ ≡ g_A/g_V = −1.2756(30)