Learning and Hysteresis in a Dynamic Coordination Game

This paper introduces a dynamic coordination game with incomplete information defined by a state variable that evolves stochastically. Incomplete information enables us to use iterated dominance argument in order to resolve the indeterminacy issues. The key endogenous variable is the belief that each agent holds about the state of the world. We show that as agents update their heterogeneous beliefs through learning sequentially, they adjust their beliefs to justify the status quo. This effect induces equilibrium actions that support the status quo, a property we call hysteresis.dynamic coordination game, hysteresis, global games

Risk sharing versus financial contagion in Asia: An asset price perspective

AbstractThis paper assesses financial integration in Asia in terms of risk-sharing benefit versus financial contagion cost. We construct a new measure of risk sharing based on a term structure model, which allows identification of realized stochastic discount factors. Risk sharing is low in Asia, and varies across time and countries, whereas contagion risks are more significant intra-regionally, and relatively stable over the past decade. An overall tradeoff exists between risk sharing and contagion, but the terms of tradeoffs vary across countries, depending on relative economic fluctuations and inflation differentials. Asia therefore can potentially enhance risk sharing without raising contagion risk

Marrying Monetary Policy with Macroprudential Regulation: Exploration of Issues

Since the eruption of the global financial crisis in 2008, macroprudential regulation has become a mantra in the regulatory world. The soon-to-be-widespread adoption of macroprudential tools will inevitably affect the dynamics of the economy and consequently have a direct bearing on the conduct of monetary policy. This paper explores theoretically several issues surrounding the interplay between macroprudential regulation and monetary policy. Among the key issues examined are the economic stabilization role of rule-based macroprudential policy, the implications of a countercyclical capital requirement on the monetary transmission mechanism, and the optimal policy combination.

Coordination failure cycle

This paper proposes a theory of endogenous fluctuations, grounded on a repeated game with strategic complementarity under incomplete information. The equilibrium is characterized by a persistent regime of high activity, where aggregate output tends to expand, followed by a persistent contractionary phase in a recurring cycle. The regime persistence is driven by belief hysteresis, where learning in active regime fuels optimism, propelling an expansion. After an inevitable regime switch, rational persistent pessimism ensues, leading to a prolonged contraction. The equilibrium cycle is unique, stochastic, and converges to a stationary distribution, which characterizes the nature of fluctuations in equilibrium

Learning and Hysteresis in a Dynamic Coordination Game

This paper introduces a dynamic coordination game with incomplete information defined by a state variable that evolves stochastically. Incomplete information enables us to use iterated dominance argument in order to resolve the indeterminacy issues. The key endogenous variable is the belief that each agent holds about the state of the world. We show that as agents update their heterogeneous beliefs through learning sequentially, they adjust their beliefs to justify the status quo. This effect induces equilibrium actions that support the status quo, a property we call hysteresis

Coordination failure cycle

This paper proposes a theory of endogenous fluctuations, grounded on a repeated game with strategic complementarity under incomplete information. The equilibrium is characterized by a persistent regime of high activity, where aggregate output tends to expand, followed by a persistent contractionary phase in a recurring cycle. The regime persistence is driven by belief hysteresis, where learning in active regime fuels optimism, propelling an expansion. After an inevitable regime switch, rational persistent pessimism ensues, leading to a prolonged contraction. The equilibrium cycle is unique, stochastic, and converges to a stationary distribution, which characterizes the nature of fluctuations in equilibrium

Learning and Hysteresis in a Dynamic Coordination Game

This paper introduces a dynamic coordination game with incomplete information defined by a state variable that evolves stochastically. Incomplete information enables us to use iterated dominance argument in order to resolve the indeterminacy issues. The key endogenous variable is the belief that each agent holds about the state of the world. We show that as agents update their heterogeneous beliefs through learning sequentially, they adjust their beliefs to justify the status quo. This effect induces equilibrium actions that support the status quo, a property we call hysteresis

The reaction function channel of monetary policy and the financial cycle

This paper examines whether monetary policy reaction function matters for financial stability. We measure how responsive the Federal Reserve’s policy appears to be to imbalances in the equity, housing and credit markets. We find that changes in these policy sensitivities predict the later development of financial imbalances. When monetary policy appears to respond more countercyclically to market overheating, imbalances tend to decline over time. This effect is distinct from that of current and anticipated interest rate levels – the risk-taking channel. The evidence highlights the importance of a “policy reaction function” channel of monetary policy in shaping the financial cycle

Complementaries and fluctuations

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How Does International Capital Flow?

Understanding gross capital flows is increasingly viewed as crucial for both macroeconomic and financial stability policies, but theory is lagging behind many key policy debates. We fill this gap by developing a two-country DSGE model that tracks domestic and cross-border gross positions between banks and households, with explicit settlement of all transactions through banks. We formalise the conceptual distinction between cross-border saving and financing, which often move in opposite directions in response to shocks. This matters for at least four policy debates. First, current accounts are poor indicators of financial vulnerability, because in a crisis, creditors stop financing debt rather than current accounts, and because following a crisis, current accounts are not the primary channel through which balance sheets adjust. Second, we reinterpret the global saving glut hypothesis by arguing that US households do not finance current account deficits with foreigners' physical saving, but with digital purchasing power, created by banks that are more likely to be domestic than foreign. Third, Triffin's current account dilemma is not in fact a dilemma, because the creation of additional US dollars requires dollar credit creation by US and non-US banks rather than US current account deficits. Finally, we demonstrate that the observed high correlation of gross capital inflows and outflows is overwhelmingly an automatic consequence of double entry bookkeeping, rather than the result of two separate sets of economic decisions