Oligopolistic manipulation of spot markets and the timing of futures market speculation

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020

The Akzo decision : a case of predatory pricing?

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020

Exchange rates and oligopoly

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020

How much to collude without being detected

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020

POTs: Protective Optimization Technologies

Algorithmic fairness aims to address the economic, moral, social, and political impact that digital systems have on populations through solutions that can be applied by service providers. Fairness frameworks do so, in part, by mapping these problems to a narrow definition and assuming the service providers can be trusted to deploy countermeasures. Not surprisingly, these decisions limit fairness frameworks' ability to capture a variety of harms caused by systems. We characterize fairness limitations using concepts from requirements engineering and from social sciences. We show that the focus on algorithms' inputs and outputs misses harms that arise from systems interacting with the world; that the focus on bias and discrimination omits broader harms on populations and their environments; and that relying on service providers excludes scenarios where they are not cooperative or intentionally adversarial. We propose Protective Optimization Technologies (POTs). POTs provide means for affected parties to address the negative impacts of systems in the environment, expanding avenues for political contestation. POTs intervene from outside the system, do not require service providers to cooperate, and can serve to correct, shift, or expose harms that systems impose on populations and their environments. We illustrate the potential and limitations of POTs in two case studies: countering road congestion caused by traffic-beating applications, and recalibrating credit scoring for loan applicants.Comment: Appears in Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT* 2020). Bogdan Kulynych and Rebekah Overdorf contributed equally to this work. Version v1/v2 by Seda G\"urses, Rebekah Overdorf, and Ero Balsa was presented at HotPETS 2018 and at PiMLAI 201

Oligopolistic pricing of crude-oil futures

First published: December 1992This paper applies a game-theoretic model of oligopolistic pricing to the crude oil futures contracts traded on the Brent 15-Day market and the London International Petroleum Exchange (IPE). Particular attention is given to the organizational features of the Brent 15-Day market and to the successive changes in the IPE contract

Intertemporal Price-discrimination and Sticky Prices

It is shown that potential entry leads to a marginal-revenue-below-marginal-cost rule, while the possibility of building up inventories (voluntarily!) leads to the intertemporal price discrimination rule, which provides a formal rationalization for normal costing. Equilibrium conditions for a group of firms are derived, using the intertemporal discrimination rule. These conditions can be written as linear estimating equations, with regression coefficients explicitly linked with parameters representing market structure. They imply that, in more concentrated industries, cost increases are less fully transmitted and changes in demand are more fully transmitted into prices than in less concentrated industries

Parallélisme de comportements et pratiques concertées

Phlips Louis. Parallélisme de comportements et pratiques concertées. In: Revue d'économie industrielle, vol. 63, 1er trimestre 1993. Politique de la concurrence. pp. 25-44

Basic point pricing, competition and market integration

Digitised version produced by the EUI Library and made available online in 2020