The Reference Autonomous Mobility Model a Framework for Predicting Autonomous Unmanned Ground Vehicle Performance

Mobility modeling is a critical step in the ground vehicle acquisition process for military vehicles. Mobility modeling tools, and in particular the NATO Reference Mobility Model (NRMM), have played a critical role in understanding the mission-level capabilities of ground vehicles. This understanding via modeling supports not only developers during early vehicle design but also decision makers in the field previewing the capabilities of ground vehicles in real-world deployments. Due to decades of field testing and operations, mobility modeling for traditional ground vehicles is well-understood; however, mobility modeling tools for evaluating autonomous mobility are sparse. Therefore, this dissertation proposes and derives a Reference Autonomous Mobility Model (RAMM). The RAMM leverages cutting-edge modeling and simulation tools to build a mobility model that serves as the mission-level mobility modeling tool currently lacking in the unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) community, thereby filling the current analysis gap in the autonomous vehicle acquisition cycle. The RAMM is built on (1) a thorough review of theories of verification and validation of simulations, (2) a novel framework for validating simulations of autonomous systems and (3) the mobility modeling framework already established by the NRMM. These building blocks brought to light the need for new, validated modeling and simulation (M&S) tools capable of simulating, at a highidelity, autonomous unmanned ground vehicle operations. This dissertation maps the derivation of the RAMM, starting with a history of verification of simulation models and a literature review of current autonomous mobility modeling methods. In light of these literature reviews, a new framework for V&V of simulations of autonomous systems is proposed, and the requirements for and derivation of the RAMM is presented. This dissertation concludes with an example application of the RAMM for route planning for autonomous UGVs. Once fully developed, the RAMM will serve as an integral part in the design, development, testing and evaluation, and ultimate fielding of autonomous UGVs for military applications

The Reference Autonomous Mobility Model: A framework for predicting autonomous unmanned ground vehicle performance

Mobility modeling is a critical step in the ground vehicle acquisition process for military vehicles. Mobility modeling tools, and in particular the NATO Reference Mobility Model (NRMM), have played a critical role in understanding the mission-level capabilities of ground vehicles. This understanding via modeling supports not only developers during early vehicle design but also decision makers in the field previewing the capabilities of ground vehicles in real-world deployments. Due to decades of field testing and operations, mobility modeling for traditional ground vehicles is well-understood; however, mobility modeling tools for evaluating autonomous mobility are sparse. Therefore, this dissertation proposes and derives a Reference Autonomous Mobility Model (RAMM). The RAMM leverages cutting-edge modeling and simulation tools to build a mobility model that serves as the mission-level mobility modeling tool currently lacking in the unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) community, thereby filling the current analysis gap in the autonomous vehicle acquisition cycle. The RAMM is built on (1) a thorough review of theories of verification and validation of simulations, (2) a novel framework for validating simulations of autonomous systems and (3) the mobility modeling framework already established by the NRMM. These building blocks brought to light the need for new, validated modeling and simulation (M&S) tools capable of simulating, at a highidelity, autonomous unmanned ground vehicle operations. This dissertation maps the derivation of the RAMM, starting with a history of verification of simulation models and a literature review of current autonomous mobility modeling methods. In light of these literature reviews, a new framework for V&V of simulations of autonomous systems is proposed, and the requirements for and derivation of the RAMM is presented. This dissertation concludes with an example application of the RAMM for route planning for autonomous UGVs. Once fully developed, the RAMM will serve as an integral part in the design, development, testing and evaluation, and ultimate fielding of autonomous UGVs for military applications

The Need for High-Fidelity Robotics Sensor Models

Simulations provide a safe, controlled setting for testing and are therefore ideal for rapidly developing and testing autonomous mobile robot behaviors. However, algorithms for mobile robots are notorious for transitioning poorly from simulations to fielded platforms. The difficulty can in part be attributed to the use of simplistic sensor models that do not recreate important phenomena that affect autonomous navigation. The differences between the output of simple sensor models and true sensors are highlighted using results from a field test exercise with the National Robotics Engineering Center's Crusher vehicle. The Crusher was manually driven through an area consisting of a mix of small vegetation, rocks, and hay bales. LIDAR sensor data was collected along the path traveled and used to construct a model of the area. LIDAR data were simulated using a simple point-intersection model for a second, independent path. Cost maps were generated by the Crusher autonomy system using both the real-world and simulated sensor data. The comparison of these cost maps shows consistencies on most solid, large geometry surfaces such as the ground, but discrepancies around vegetation indicate that higher fidelity models are required to truly capture the complex interactions of the sensors with complex objects

INSTITUTIONALIZING SAFEGUARDS-BY-DESIGN: HIGH-LEVEL FRAMEWORK

The application of a Safeguards-by-Design (SBD) process for new nuclear facilities can reduce proliferation risks. A multi-laboratory team was sponsored in Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 to define a SBD process and determine how it could be incorporated into existing facility design and construction processes. The possibility to significantly influence major design features, such as process selection and plant layout, largely ends with the conceptual design step. Therefore SBD’s principal focus must be on the early inclusion of safeguards requirements and the early identification of beneficial design features. The result could help form the basis for a new international norm for integrating safeguards into facility design. This is an interim report describing progress and project status as of the end of FY08. In this effort, SBD is defined as a structured approach to ensure the timely, efficient, and cost-effective integration of international and national safeguards, physical security, and other nonproliferation objectives into the overall design process for a nuclear facility. A key objective is to ensure that security and nonproliferation issues are considered when weighing facility design alternatives. Central to the work completed in FY08 was a study in which a SBD process was developed in the context of the current DOE facility acquisition process. The DOE study enabled the development of a “SBD design loop” that is suitable for use in any facility design process. It is a graded, iterative process that incorporates safeguards concerns throughout the conceptual, preliminary and final design processes. Additionally, a set of proposed design principles for SBD was developed. A “Generic SBD Process” was then developed. Key features of the process include the initiation of safeguards design activities in the pre-conceptual planning phase, early incorporation of safeguards requirements into the project requirements, early appointment of an SBD team, and participation in facility design options analysis in the conceptual design phase to enhance intrinsic features, among others. The SBD process is unlikely to be broadly applied in the absence of formal requirements to do so, or compelling evidence of its value. Neither exists today. A formal instrument to require the application of SBD is needed and would vary according to both the national and regulatory environment. Several possible approaches to implementation of the requirements within the DOE framework are explored in this report. Finally, there are numerous barriers to the implementation of SBD, including the lack of a strong safeguards culture, intellectual property concerns, the sensitive nature of safeguards information, and the potentially divergent or conflicting interests of participants in the process. In terms of SBD implementation in the United States, there are no commercial nuclear facilities that are under IAEA safeguards. Efforts to institutionalize SBD must address these issues. Specific work in FY09 could focus on the following: finalizing the proposed SBD process for use by DOE and performing a pilot application on a DOE project in the planning phase; developing regulatory options for mandating SBD; further development of safeguards-related design guidance, principles and requirements; development of a specific SBD process tailored to the NRC environment; and development of an engagement strategy for the IAEA and other international partners