Traffic lights for crop-based biofuels

This editorial was written while the author was a Raymond and Beverly Sackler research fellow at Churchill College, Cambridge, working on research funded by the Isaac Newton Trust and the RSPB. He assumes all responsibility for the opinions expressed. No writing assistance was utilized in the production of this manuscript.This is the submitted version of the article. The final version is available at http://www.future-science.com/doi/abs/10.4155/bfs.10.83

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES - RIGHT OF CREDITOR WHOSE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED AFTER THE DEBTOR\u27S VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE

On the morning following the accident in which plaintiff\u27s husband was struck and fatally injured by an auto owned and driven by defendant John Manning, the latter conveyed to his sister, Anna, his undivided one-half interest in certain realty, thereby making himself insolvent. About two and one-half weeks later, plaintiff\u27s husband died as a result of the accident, and plaintiff brought suit on behalf of herself and her daughter to recover damages for the wrongful death of her husband. Plaintiff recovered judgment, and then filed the present action to set aside the conveyance. The court so decreed, and defendants John and Anna appealed. One of their contentions was that, although after the collision there was a cause of action in the injured party which upon his death could have been prosecuted by the plaintiff as administratrix, her cause of action on her own behalf to recover for wrongful death did not accrue until the death, which was after the alleged fraudulent conveyance. Held, although the cause of action did not accrue until after the conveyance, plaintiff was entitled to have the fraudulent conveyance set aside. Edwards v. Manning, 137 Ohio St. 268, 28 N. E. (2d) 627 (1940)

TRUSTS - HONORARY TRUST - AUTHORITY OF A SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE

Paragraph 24 of testatrix\u27 will gave to the executor and trustee, appointed under the will, $10,000 \u27\u27to be used by him to place a memorial window, or some other memorials, to cost any sum in his discretion up to the sum of One thousand Dollars, in Christ Church Cathedral, at St. Louis, Mo., and to place monuments and markers in my family subdivision of the Clark and Glasgow plot in the Bellefontaine Cemetery, at St. Louis, Mo. Soon after testatrix\u27 death the trustee died. A successor trustee was appointed and by special order of the court was authorized to administer the trust created by paragraph 24. He spent$1000 for a church memorial window and $1732.60 for monuments. From the income of the remainder he paid premiums for insurance on a statue in the above named plot and made certain other expenditures. The successor trustee having died, residuary legatees now object to certain of the expenditures from the income, claiming that while the successor trustee could properly administer the trust, it terminated after he had selected and purchased the monuments. Held, a successor trustee could not be empowered by a court to make the expenditures designated by paragraph 24. Since no complaint was made to the expenditures for the memorial window and monuments but only to expenditures of income of the balance on hand, certain of those expenditures were surcharged against the account of the deceased successor trustee, including the amount for the insurance premiums on the statue. Estate of Julia Voorhis, (N. Y. Surr. Ct. 1941) 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 818

TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES - UNFAIR COMPETITION - RESTRICTIONS ON USE OF PERSONAL NAME

For many years plaintiff and its predecessors used the name Dougherty\u27s in marketing straight whiskey throughout the United States. In 1939 defendant, Edwin L. Dougherty, began selling blended whiskey in Pennsylvania, likewise using the name Dougherty\u27s, to dominate his labels, and in 1940, pursuant to a previously formed intention, plaintiff began selling blended whiskey under the same name. Plaintiff brought an action to enjoin defendant\u27s use of the name Dougherty\u27s. Held, through plaintiff\u27s prior use, the name Dougherty\u27s had come to be associated by the purchasing public with plaintiff\u27s whiskey; therefore defendant\u27s use of the same name to dominate his labels tended to confuse the public, and although defendant did not intend the confusion, he should be enjoined from using his name in a dominating position on his labels. However, he might announce himself on the label as the distributor with the words blended and bottled for Edwin L. Dougherty in small type. J. A. Dougherty\u27s Sons v. Dougherty, (D. C. Pa. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 149

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - USE OF INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES

The practice of wringing confessions from the lips of persons accused of crime forms a substantial blot on the history of the medieval administration of criminal law. Never legalized in England, the practice early earned the condemnation of writers and criticism of courts. From a recognition of human rights and a perception of the unreliability of statements extorted by violence, evolved the general rule, now long recognized in England and the United States, that the accused\u27s involuntary confession is inadmissible in evidence against him. Recently this rule of evidence has been implemented by the recognition of the United States Supreme Court that in the light of the requirement of due process of law embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, a conviction based solely on use in evidence of the accused\u27s involuntary confession is void. This recognition of the application of the due process clause to involuntary confessions first appeared in Brown v. Mississippi, and was recently followed in Chambers v. Florida. The basis of these holdings seems to be that since an involuntary confession is unreliable evidence, a conviction resting solely on its use in a state criminal trial deprives an accused of life or liberty without the hearing guaranteed to him by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES - UNAUTHORIZED USE OF REGISTERED VESSELS - SEARCH WARRANT

A number of milk bottles bearing registered marks of various dairies were seized from the possession of plaintiff dairyman by defendant deputy sheriff, under a search warrant issued by defendant district judge, upon affidavit and showing by defendant deputy commissioner of agriculture that the bottles were being unlawfully used. Notice was given of a hearing to be held before the judge to determine the persons entitled to possession of the seized property. Plaintiff brought this action for an original writ of prohibition to restrain further proceedings, charging that the search warrant section of the statute under which the proceedings were authorized was unconstitutional. Held, the search warrant section of the statute violated the state constitutional provisions against unreasonable searches and seizures and against class legislation. Allen v. Trueman, (Utah, 1941) 110 P. (2d) 355

LABOR LAW - FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT - TIPS NOT CONSIDERED WAGES IN COMPUTING STATUTORY MINIMUM

After the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act, defendant terminal company adopted the so-called make up plan towards its redcap station porters. Under the plan, tips received by redcaps could, as formerly, be retained by them; in addition the redcap would report to the defendant the amounts received in tips, and the defendant would make up the deficiency if the tips did not aggregate the minimum legal wage. After the plan had been in operation for a time, plaintiff, agent and representative of the redcaps, brought suit for the difference between the amounts paid by the defendant and the required minimum wage, on the theory that the tips received should not have been included in determining the weekly wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Held, that since the definition of wages in the Fair Labor Standards Act did not include tips either expressly or constructively an employer was not permitted to deduct tips from the minimum wages he was bound to pay. Pickett v. Union Terminal Co., (D. C. Tex. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 244