The interface between attachment and intersubjectivity: Perspective from the longitudinal study of disorganized attachment

This article considers the interface between the concepts of attachment and intersubjectivity in light of accumulated research on infant development. Both Tomasello (1999) and Hobson (2002) have argued persuasively that the flexible human capability for sharing mental states with others reframes and revolutionizes our older, more highly channeled primate biological heritage. In contrast to this emphasis on discontinuity from primate to humanevolution, attachment theorists have stressed the continuities between human attachment and attachment in other primates. The implication of new work on infant intersubjectivity for reframing aspects of attachment theory is first explored. By the same token, however, the extent to which the infantcaregiver attachment relationship functions to maintain positive engagement and regulate the infant's fearful arousal will have escalating consequences over development for the organization of intersubjectivity. Therefore, attachment research has much to offer in understanding the development of joint attention and the sharing of mental states under conditions of increased emotional arousal. The potential contributions of attachment research for understanding the development of intersubjectivity are discussed in light of recent work from the author's lab on forms of young adult symptomatology associated -595 -with deviance in the early intersubjective dialogue between mother and infant. The clinical implication emerging from all these diverse areas of research is that fostering more collaborative forms of communication may lie at the heart of evolutionary change, developmental change, and changes resulting from psychodynamic psychotherapy. Rethinking Mechanisms of Attachment during the First Year: Evolution and Intersubjective Awareness Alot has been Written Recently about a Shift in the Basis of evolutionary change from biologic to what I will call dialogic mechanisms, or from -genes to memes.‖ For example, Tomasello (1999) has pointed out that with the relatively recent emergence of Homo sapiens as a species, more complex cultural innovations have been introduced in the last 200,000 years than were introduced in the previous 6 million years. He theorizes that a biological change occurred that shifted the basis for evolutionary change from the biological evolutionary mechanisms that had governed change for 6 million years to cultural evolutionary mechanisms that are many orders of magnitude faster than those of biologic evolution. He, as well as Hobson This capacity for social engagement is manifest first at the level of affective sharing and later at the level of explicit teaching and learning. In -596 -contrast to other primates, the human infant does not have to acquire first hand all the knowledge and experiences necessary to survival. Instead, the infant needs to develop the skills for sharing affective evaluations and intentional states with others. This allows the infant to participate in the cultural learning processes of humansociety. In contrast to the emphasis on discontinuity in evolutionary processes that is highlighted by Tomasello, Hobson, and others, attachment theorists have stressed thecontinuities between human attachment and attachment in other primates. As is well-known, John Bowlby thoroughly documented th