The Future of Confrontation

The Supreme Court seems to be setting the stage for a long-awaited examination of the confrontation clause. It has been ten years since the Court endeavored in Dutton v. Evans to reconcile the evidentiary rules of hearsay with the constitutional commands of confrontation. Dutton came at the tail end of a string of confrontation cases that the Court had resolved without apparent difficulty. Not surprisingly, the Court approached Dutton in the evident belief that it could resolve the constitutional problems of hearsay once and for all. Instead, after oral argument in 1969 and a rehearing in 1970, the Court found itself hopelessly divided, able to produce only an inconclusive plurality opinion. Since then, the Court has conspicuously avoided this central problem of the relationship between hearsay and confrontation

How Not to Argue That Reasonable Provocation is Not an Excuse

Reid Fontaine draws two conclusions regarding the partial defense to murder of reasonable provocation-one regarding its substantive content, the other regarding its formal classification…. I agree with both of Fontaine\u27s two conclusions, and, indeed, I have previously written to that effect. Unfortunately, while I agree with Fontaine\u27s conclusions, I do not think he adequately supports them

Compulsory Process, Right to

The first state to adopt a constitution following the Declaration of Independence (New Jersey, 1776) guaranteed all criminal defendants the same ‘‘privileges of witnesses’’ as their prosecutors. Fifteen years later, in enumerating the constitutional rights of accused persons, the framers of the federal Bill of Rights bifurcated what New Jersey called the ‘‘privileges of witnesses’’ into two distinct but related rights: the Sixth Amendment right of the accused ‘‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him,’’ and his companion Sixth Amendment right to ‘‘compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.’’ The distinction between witnesses ‘‘against’’ the accused and witnesses ‘‘in his favor’’ turns on which of the parties—the prosecution or the defense—offers the witness’s statements in evidence as a formal part of its case. The confrontation clause establishes the government’s obligations regarding the production and examination of witnesses whose statements the prosecution puts into evidence either in its case in chief or in rebuttal. The compulsory process clause establishes the government’s obligations regarding the production and examination of witnesses whose statements the defendant seeks to put into evidence in his respective case

Hearsay Rule

The hearsay rule is a non constitutional rule of evidence which obtains in one form or another in every jurisdiction in the country. The rule provides that in the absence of explicit exceptions to the contrary, hearsay evidence of a matter in dispute is inadmissible as proof of the matter. Although jurisdictions define hearsay in different ways, the various definitions reflect a common principle: evidence that derives its relevance in a case from the belief of a person who is not present in court—and thus not under oath and not subject to cross-examination regarding his credibility—is of questionable probative value

The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences

Every now and then a case ·comes along that tests the fundamental premises of a body of law. United States v. DiFrancesco presents such a test to the law of double jeopardy, raising the question whether the government may unilaterally appeal a defendant\u27s criminal sentence for the purpose of increasing the sentence. The question cannot be answered by facile reference to the text of the fifth amendment, because the terms of the double jeopardy clause are not self-defining. Nor can it be settled by reference to history, because the issue has not arisen with any frequency until now

Fraudulent Conveyances in the Conflict of Laws: Easy Cases May Make Bad Law

It has been said that hard cases often make bad law. The recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals in James v. Powell suggests that easy cases, too, may make bad law-especially where a scholarly judge ventures beyond the demands of the case before him

How to Think (Like a Lawyer) About Rape

From the American Law Institute to college campuses, there is a renewed interest in the law of rape. Law school faculty, however, may be reluctant to teach this deeply debated topic. This article begins from the premise that controversial and contested questions can be best resolved when participants understand the conceptual architecture that surrounds and delineates the normative questions. This allows participants to talk to one another instead of past each other. Accordingly, in this article, we begin by diffusing two non-debates: the apparent conflict created when we use “consent” to mean two different things and the question of whether rape law ought to be formulated in terms of consent or force. From here, we turn to the conceptual apparatuses that surround the normative questions of freedom from force, knowledge, and capacity. Here, we suggest how better understanding these concepts can frame the underlying discussions as to what sorts of coercion undermine consent, what kinds of deception invalidate consent, and when the victim is too incapacitated to consent. Finally, we turn to different formulations of consent, demonstrating that one conception better captures the harm of rape but that other formulations may better protect victims. We show how clarifying these questions allows discussants to see why different formulations are valuable and to debate the best all-things-considered formulation. Although this article is framed as a question of how (to teach students) to think like lawyers about rape, its ambition is to set forth a framework that is useful to reformers as well

Water motion and vegetation control the pH dynamics in seagrass-dominated bays

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishe

Preclinical evaluation of EpCAM-binding designed ankyrin repeat proteins (DARPins) as targeting moieties for bimodal near-infrared fluorescence and photoacoustic imaging of cancer

PURPOSE Fluorescence-guided surgery (FGS) can play a key role in improving radical resection rates by assisting surgeons to gain adequate visualization of malignant tissue intraoperatively. Designed ankyrin repeat proteins (DARPins) possess optimal pharmacokinetic and other properties for in vivo imaging. This study aims to evaluate the preclinical potential of epithelial cell adhesion molecule (EpCAM)-binding DARPins as targeting moieties for near-infrared fluorescence (NIRF) and photoacoustic (PA) imaging of cancer. METHODS EpCAM-binding DARPins Ac2, Ec4.1, and non-binding control DARPin Off7 were conjugated to IRDye 800CW and their binding efficacy was evaluated on EpCAM-positive HT-29 and EpCAM-negative COLO-320 human colon cancer cell lines. Thereafter, NIRF and PA imaging of all three conjugates were performed in HT-29_luc2 tumor-bearing mice. At 24 h post-injection, tumors and organs were resected and tracer biodistributions were analyzed. RESULTS Ac2-800CW and Ec4.1-800CW specifically bound to HT-29 cells, but not to COLO-320 cells. Next, 6 nmol and 24 h were established as the optimal in vivo dose and imaging time point for both DARPin tracers. At 24 h post-injection, mean tumor-to-background ratios of 2.60 ± 0.3 and 3.1 ± 0.3 were observed for Ac2-800CW and Ec4.1-800CW, respectively, allowing clear tumor delineation using the clinical Artemis NIRF imager. Biodistribution analyses in non-neoplastic tissue solely showed high fluorescence signal in the liver and kidney, which reflects the clearance of the DARPin tracers. CONCLUSION Our encouraging results show that EpCAM-binding DARPins are a promising class of targeting moieties for pan-carcinoma targeting, providing clear tumor delineation at 24 h post-injection. The work described provides the preclinical foundation for DARPin-based bimodal NIRF/PA imaging of cancer

The Future of Confrontation

The Supreme Court seems to be setting the stage for a long-awaited examination of the confrontation clause. It has been ten years since the Court endeavored in Dutton v. Evans to reconcile the evidentiary rules of hearsay with the constitutional commands of confrontation. Dutton came at the tail end of a string of confrontation cases that the Court had resolved without apparent difficulty. Not surprisingly, the Court approached Dutton in the evident belief that it could resolve the constitutional problems of hearsay once and for all. Instead, after oral argument in 1969 and a rehearing in 1970, the Court found itself hopelessly divided, able to produce only an inconclusive plurality opinion. Since then, the Court has conspicuously avoided this central problem of the relationship between hearsay and confrontation