The role of transmission investment in the coordination between generation and transmission in the liberalized power systems

This paper examines how transmission coordinates with generation to the long term in a liberalized power system. We rely on a modular analysis to separate the mechanisms of coordination between generation and transmission of electricity into distinct modules. The governance structure of transmission completes this analysis framework. We then show that in a logic of complementarity, this governance structure influences the options that TSO implements to manage effectively power flows. Although locational signals are necessary to guide the installation of new power plants, the governance structure explains that investment in network may be the only effective method of longterm coordination between generation and transmission.The diversity of design of TSOs

The role of transmission investment in the coordination between generation and transmission in the liberalized power systems

This paper examines how transmission coordinates with generation to the long term in a liberalized power system. We rely on a modular analysis to separate the mechanisms of coordination between generation and transmission of electricity into distinct modules. The governance structure of transmission completes this analysis framework. We then show that in a logic of complementarity, this governance structure influences the options that TSO implements to manage effectively power flows. Although locational signals are necessary to guide the installation of new power plants, the governance structure explains that investment in network may be the only effective method of longterm coordination between generation and transmission.

Anticipation for Efficient Electricity Transmission Network Investments

This paper proposes a model and preliminary results to evaluate the efficiency of anticipating the connection of power plants with shorter construction duration than the time needed to obtain the right to upgrade the network and finally to do this reinforcement. This evaluation is made in presence of a cost of anticipation related to the study of the project of network investment and to the administrative procedures needed to obtain the building agreement. This model compares a proactive TSO that anticipates the connection of new generators and then the required network reinforcement, with a reactive one that does not make any anticipation but that may then face greater congestion while the network is being reinforced. The efficiency of these behaviors is measured in terms of social cost. We find out that there exists a limit of probability for the connection of generators beyond which a proactive TSO is more efficient than a reactive one. Evaluated on a realistic case of connection, this limit of probability is found quite low, which indicates that the proactive behavior for a TSO shall generally be the optimal one.

The role of transmission investment in the coordination between generation and transmission in the liberalized power systems

This paper examines how transmission coordinates with generation to the long term in a liberalized power system. We rely on a modular analysis to separate the mechanisms of coordination between generation and transmission of electricity into distinct modules. The governance structure of transmission completes this analysis framework. We then show that in a logic of complementarity, this governance structure influences the options that TSO implements to manage effectively power flows. Although locational signals are necessary to guide the installation of new power plants, the governance structure explains that investment in network may be the only effective method of longterm coordination between generation and transmission.

The diversity of design of TSOs

It is puzzling today to explain diversity and imperfection of actual transmission monopoly designs in competitive electricity markets. We argue that transmission monopoly in competitive electricity markets has to be analysed within a Wilson (2002) modular framework. Applied to the management of electricity flows, at least three modules make the core of transmission design: 1° the short run management of network externalities; 2° the long run management of network investment; and 3° the coordination of neighboring Transmission System Operators for cross border trade. In order to tackle this diversity of designs of TSOs, we show that for each of these modules, three different basic ways of managing them are possible. Among the identified twenty seven options of organisation, we define an Ideal TSO. Second, we demonstrate that 1°monopoly design differs from this Ideal TSO and cannot handle these three modules irrespective of the “institutional” definition and allocation of property rights on transmission; while 2°definition and allocation of property rights on transmission cannot ignore the existing electrical industry and transmission network structure: they have to complement each other to be efficient. Some conclusions for regulatory issues of transmission systems operators are derived from this analysis of network monopoly organisation.design of TSOs; management of power flows; governance structure of transmission

L'insuffisance des signaux de localisation pour la coordination entre la production et le transport d'électricité dans les systèmes électriques libéralisés

International audienceThis paper analyses how the long run coordination between generation and transmission is organized in a liberalized power system. We rely on a modular analysis framework in order to split in disctinct modules the coordination mechanisms between generation and transmission of electricity. The governance structure of the power transmission grid completes this analysis framework. Then, we show that, in a logic of institutionnal complementarity, this governance structure influences the power flow management schemes that are effectively implemented by the power Transmission and System Operators. Although the locational signals are necessary to guide the location of new power plants, the locational constraints of generators and the governance structure of the network then explain that these signals are insufficient to coordinate generation and transmission to the long term.Cet article analyse comment s'organise la coordination à long terme entre la production et le transport dans un système électrique libéralisé. Nous nous appuyons sur un cadre d'analyse modulaire afin de séparer les mécanismes de coordination entre la production et le transport d'électricité en modules distincts. La structure de gouvernance du réseau de transport complète ce cadre d'analyse. Nous montrons alors que, dans une logique de complémentarité institutionnelle, cette structure de gouvernance influence les options de gestion des flux effectivement mises en oeuvre par les Gestionnaires de Réseaux Transport d'électricité. Bien que les signaux de localisation soient nécessaires afin de guider l'installation de nouveaux moyens de production, les contraintes de localisation des moyens de production et la structure de gouvernance du réseau expliquent alors que ces signaux sont insuffisants pour coordonner à long terme production et transport

Cutting Forces Modeling in Finish Turning of Inconel 718 Alloy with Round Inserts

In turning, the applied forces have to be known as accurately as possible, especially in the case of difficult-to-cut materials for aircraft workpieces finishing operations. Traditionally, edge discretisation methodology based on local cutting laws is used to determine the cutting forces and results are usually considered suitable. Nevertheless, only the rake face is considered in most of studies and the cutting relations are determined by direct identification with a straight edge. This study deals with finishing operations of Inconel 718 alloy with one type of round insert. The main objective is to formulate a novel cutting forces model, taking into account the clearance face. First, a generic model based on a geometrical description using homogeneous matrix transformation is presented. Then, cutting coefficients are identified by inverse identification from experimental measurements distributed with an orthogonal design experiment including tool wear. Finally, modeling and experimental values of the cutting forces are compared and the identified model is analysed

L'insuffisance des signaux de localisation pour la coordination entre la production et le transport d'électricité dans les systèmes électriques libéralisés

Cet article analyse comment s'organise la coordination à long terme entre la production et le transport dans un système électrique libéralisé. Nous nous appuyons sur un cadre d'analyse modulaire afin de séparer les mécanismes de coordination entre la production et le transport d'électricité en modules distincts. La structure de gouvernance du réseau de transport complète ce cadre d'analyse. Nous montrons alors que, dans une logique de complémentarité institutionnelle, cette structure de gouvernance influence les options de gestion des flux effectivement mises en oeuvre par les Gestionnaires de Réseaux Transport d'électricité. Bien que les signaux de localisation soient nécessaires afin de guider l'installation de nouveaux moyens de production, les contraintes de localisation des moyens de production et la structure de gouvernance du réseau expliquent alors que ces signaux sont insuffisants pour coordonner à long terme production et transport.