The Impact of Structural Funds Policy on European Regions' Growth : A Theoretical and Empirical Approach

In this paper, I try to estimate the impact of Structural Funds on the growth rates of Objective 1 European regions during the two first programming periods (1989-2000). I develop a "hybrid" model of economic growth that partially endogenizes the rate of technical progress and I test its main implications following a panel data approach. The results suggest that Structural Funds have positively influenced the growth process of Objective 1 regions, although their impact has been stronger during the first programming period than the second. The same quantitative difference between the two programming periods appears in the estimated rates of beta-convergence and the catching-up effect.Growth; Convergence; Catch-up; Structural Funds

Reconstrucing Richard Epstein

Presented at the 2005 Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference

The Deflationary Bias of the ZLB and the FED’s Strategic Response

The paper shows, in a simple analytical framework, the existence of a deflationary bias in an economy with a low natural rate of interest, a Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) constraint on nominal interest rates and a discretionary Central Bank with an inflation mandate. The presence of the ZLB prevents the central bank from offsetting negative shocks to inflation whereas it can offset positive shocks. This asymmetry pushes average inflation below the target which in turn drags down inflation expectations and reinforces the likelihood of hitting the ZLB. We show that this deflationary bias is particularly relevant for a Central Bank with a symmetric dual mandate (i.e. minimizing deviations from inflation and employment), especially when facing demand shocks. But a strict inflation targeter cannot escape the suboptimal deflationary equilibrium either. The deflationary bias can be mitigated by targeting “shortfalls” instead of “deviations” from maximum employment and/or using flexible average inflation targeting. However, changing monetary policy strategy risks inflation expectations becoming entrenched above the target if the natural interest rate increases

The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance

Health insurance mandates have been a component of many recent health care reform proposals. Because a federal requirement that individuals transfer money to a private party is unprecedented, a number of legal issues must be examined. This paper analyzes whether Congress can legislate a health insurance mandate and the potential legal challenges that might arise, given such a mandate. The analysis of legal challenges to health insurance mandates applies to federal individual mandates, but can also apply to a federal mandate requiring employers to purchase health insurance for their employees. There are no Constitutional barriers for Congress to legislate a health insurance mandate as long as the mandate is properly designed and executed, as discussed below. This paper also considers the likelihood of any change in the current judicial approach to these legal questions