A comparison of screening mechanisms for identifying potentially anticompetitive accountable care organizations

The FTC and DOJ’s Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program explains how the antitrust agencies will screen accountable care organizations (ACOs) to identify ones that are potentially anticompetitive and therefore require further review. In contrast to the antitrust screens the agencies have set forth in earlier Statements or Guidelines which are based on market shares in relevant markets, the Proposed Statement introduces a screen based on market shares in Primary Service Areas (PSAs). By examining several numerical examples, the proposed ACO screen is compared to some alternatives, including the review thresholds set forth in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The results indicate that the proposed ACO screen produces results qualitatively similar to other screens in some instances, but can be more stringent or more lax in others. It is therefore at best premature to conclude that PSAs are a useful tool for screening out potentially anticompetitive ACOs.accountable care organizations; antitrust; primary service area

Antitrust Analysis of Sports Leagues

I present an overview of the antitrust literature on sports leagues, with particular emphasis on the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the National Football League, Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League, as well as on sanctioning organizations such as NASCAR. I review the major antitrust court decisions, the commentaries of the leading antitrust experts on these decisions, and the extensive sports economics literature touching on issues raised in these cases, particularly empirical studies assessing the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of various league rules and policies. I also review the broader industrial organization literature on issues such as factors affecting the stability of joint ventures. I conclude with a summary of proposals for addressing the monopoly power of sports leagues.antitrust; sports leagues

Competition and Cooperation between Professional Sports Franchises: The Impact on Ticket Prices

An important issue in many antitrust lawsuits involving professional sports leagues and their member teams is the extent to which franchises within the same, and across different, professional sports leagues compete with one another for fans and advertisers. Complicating the issue is the fact that some sports franchises also cooperate with other franchises in the same or different leagues by, for example, participating in a joint venture to build and operate the stadium in which they will play their games or a regional sports network joint venture to televise their games. An extreme form of cooperation is common ownership: some franchises in different sports leagues have common ownership. This study investigates the impact of competition and cooperation among the franchises of the four major professional sports leagues (i.e., the National Football League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and Major League Baseball) on ticket prices for the 2008 season. The regression results suggest that the existence of one or more rival sports franchises in the same metropolitan area does not have a statistically significant impact on ticket prices. On the other hand, there is at best weak evidence that cooperation between sports franchises impacts ticket prices. These findings are consistent with a number of alternative hypotheses

A comparison of screening mechanisms for identifying potentially anticompetitive accountable care organizations

The FTC and DOJ’s Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program explains how the antitrust agencies will screen accountable care organizations (ACOs) to identify ones that are potentially anticompetitive and therefore require further review. In contrast to the antitrust screens the agencies have set forth in earlier Statements or Guidelines which are based on market shares in relevant markets, the Proposed Statement introduces a screen based on market shares in Primary Service Areas (PSAs). By examining several numerical examples, the proposed ACO screen is compared to some alternatives, including the review thresholds set forth in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The results indicate that the proposed ACO screen produces results qualitatively similar to other screens in some instances, but can be more stringent or more lax in others. It is therefore at best premature to conclude that PSAs are a useful tool for screening out potentially anticompetitive ACOs

Antitrust Analysis of Sports Leagues

I present an overview of the antitrust literature on sports leagues, with particular emphasis on the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the National Football League, Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey League, as well as on sanctioning organizations such as NASCAR. I review the major antitrust court decisions, the commentaries of the leading antitrust experts on these decisions, and the extensive sports economics literature touching on issues raised in these cases, particularly empirical studies assessing the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of various league rules and policies. I also review the broader industrial organization literature on issues such as factors affecting the stability of joint ventures. I conclude with a summary of proposals for addressing the monopoly power of sports leagues

A comparison of screening mechanisms for identifying potentially anticompetitive accountable care organizations

The FTC and DOJ’s Proposed Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program explains how the antitrust agencies will screen accountable care organizations (ACOs) to identify ones that are potentially anticompetitive and therefore require further review. In contrast to the antitrust screens the agencies have set forth in earlier Statements or Guidelines which are based on market shares in relevant markets, the Proposed Statement introduces a screen based on market shares in Primary Service Areas (PSAs). By examining several numerical examples, the proposed ACO screen is compared to some alternatives, including the review thresholds set forth in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The results indicate that the proposed ACO screen produces results qualitatively similar to other screens in some instances, but can be more stringent or more lax in others. It is therefore at best premature to conclude that PSAs are a useful tool for screening out potentially anticompetitive ACOs

Competition and Cooperation between Professional Sports Franchises: The Impact on Ticket Prices

An important issue in many antitrust lawsuits involving professional sports leagues and their member teams is the extent to which franchises within the same, and across different, professional sports leagues compete with one another for fans and advertisers. Complicating the issue is the fact that some sports franchises also cooperate with other franchises in the same or different leagues by, for example, participating in a joint venture to build and operate the stadium in which they will play their games or a regional sports network joint venture to televise their games. An extreme form of cooperation is common ownership: some franchises in different sports leagues have common ownership. This study investigates the impact of competition and cooperation among the franchises of the four major professional sports leagues (i.e., the National Football League, National Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and Major League Baseball) on ticket prices for the 2008 season. The regression results suggest that the existence of one or more rival sports franchises in the same metropolitan area does not have a statistically significant impact on ticket prices. On the other hand, there is at best weak evidence that cooperation between sports franchises impacts ticket prices. These findings are consistent with a number of alternative hypotheses