Privatization and Restructuring in Concentrated Markets

This paper examines the restructuring of state assets in markets deregulated by privatizations and investment liberalizations. We show that the government has a stronger incentive to restructure than the buyer: A firm restructuring only takes into account how much its own profit will increase. The government internalizes that restructuring increases the sales price not only from the increase in the acquirer’s profit, but also from a reduced profit for the non-acquirer, whose profits decrease due to its rival’s restructuring. We also identify situations where a slow sale can significantly reduce the sales price because of strategic investment and product market effects.Privatization, Asset ownership, Restructuring

Vertical FDI Reviseted

This study explores how relative skilled-wage premia affect FDI. Contrary to previous studies based on factor endowment differences, we find strong support for vertical FDI, in the sense that more FDI is conducted in countries where unskilled labor is relatively cheap. In addition, we find that relative skill-premia also affect FDI activities that have previously been associated with horizontal FDI, i.e. local affiliate sales. Consequently, the potential effects of changes in the relative wage costs on international production reallocation within MNEs are large. In fact, if not for the 8% rise in the US skilled wage premium relative to the average host country between 1986-1994, annual US affiliate sales abroad in relation to US GDP would have been half a percentage point higher.multinational firms, wage differentials

The Effect of Tax Treaties on Multinational Firms: New Evidence from Microdata

This paper uses affiliate level data from Swedish multinationals to examine the impact of tax treaties on both overall affiliate sales and the composition of those sales. In line with previous results, we find little evidence for an effect of treaties on the level of total sales. We do, however, find that a tax treaty increases the probability of investment by a firm in a given country. In addition, we find that a treaty reduces exports to the parent but increases imports of intermediate inputs from the parent. This is consistent with treaties increasing the effective host tax. This suggests that tax treaties impact the behavior of multinationals along some dimensions but not along others.Tax Treaties, Multinational Firms, Foreign Direct Investment

Multinational Firms and Plant Divestiture

Multinational firms not only make acquisitions, but also frequently divest affiliates. Affiliate divestiture is the result of many factors, some internal and some external to the firm. Using detailed confidential survey data of Swedish multinationals, we are able to examine divestiture decisions within the context of the world-wide affiliate network of the firm. In contrast, most existing studies of multinational exit focus on one country only. A model of mergers and acquisitions with financing constraints generates predictions regarding the correlation between affiliate size and the decision to sell. Consistent with this theory, we find that larger affiliates are more likely to be divested, but an increase in relative size of an affiliate reduces the probability of divestiture. Additional network characteristics, the presence of other affiliates nearby and sales of affiliates elsewhere, are also positively correlated with divestiture. We find no support for the notion of footloose multinationals

The Effect of Tax Treaties on Multinational Firms: New Evidence from Microdata

This paper uses affiliate level data from Swedish multinationals to examine the impact of tax treaties on both overall affiliate sales and the composition of those sales. In line with previous results, we find little evidence for an effect of treaties on the level of total sales. We do, however, find that a tax treaty increases the probability of investment by a firm in a given country. In addition, we find that a treaty reduces exports to the parent but increases imports of intermediate inputs from the parent. This is consistent with treaties increasing the effective host tax. This suggests that tax treaties impact the behavior of multinationals along some dimensions but not along others

Venture Capitalists, Asymmetric Information and Ownership in the Innovation Process

This paper constructs a model where entrepreneurial innovations are sold into oligopolistic industries and where adverse selection problems between entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and incumbents are present. We first show that aggressive development of a basic innovation by better informed venture-backed firms is used as a signaling device to enhance the sale price of the innovation. We then show that incumbents can undertake early, preemptive, acquisitions to prevent such signaling driven overinvestment, despite the risk of buying a non-productive innovation. Therefore, to exist in equilibrium, venture capitalists must be sufficiently more efficient in selecting innovation projects, otherwise preemptive acquisitions will take place

Entrepreneurial Innovations in Network Industries

We contribute to the literature network effects by allowing entrepreneurs to sell their innovations to incumbents in addition to entering the industry. We identify three new effects. Stronger network effects make selling innovations attractive, as incumbents bid up the sales price in fear of letting a rival obtain the innovation. This improves innovation incentives. Increased compatibility, however, reduces innovation incentives by reducing the relative advantage the owner of the innovation gets, in turn resulting in a lower sales price. Finally, bidding competition for innovations is crucial. Innovation waves can occur in network industries as bidding competition is fierce in young industries with several players competing for the top spot, but weak in mature industries with a clear leader

Entrepreneurial Innovations in Network Industries

We contribute to the literature network effects by allowing entrepreneurs to sell their innovations to incumbents in addition to entering the industry. We identify three new effects. Stronger network effects make selling innovations attractive, as incumbents bid up the sales price in fear of letting a rival obtain the innovation. This improves innovation incentives. Increased compatibility, however, reduces innovation incentives by reducing the relative advantage the owner of the innovation gets, in turn resulting in a lower sales price. Finally, bidding competition for innovations is crucial. Innovation waves can occur in network industries as bidding competition is fierce in young industries with several players competing for the top spot, but weak in mature industries with a clear leader

Employment Protection and Multinational Enterprises: Theory and Evidence from Micro Data

In this paper we show, theoretically and empirically, that stronger employment protection legislation (EPL) in a host country has important and differing effects on the various activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Using micro data on affiliates to Swedish multinational firms in 20 countries for the period of 19651998, we find that increased stringency in EPL is associated with fewer investments in new affiliates and lower employment in existing affiliates. We also find that it is mainly affiliate exports that are affected negatively by stronger EPL, while the impact on local sales is small. This is in accordance with our theoretical model, which predicts that the impact of EPL on the costs of competing firms is likely to put affiliates at a smaller disadvantage when selling for the local market than in the production for exports