Preface - credit derivatives: where's the risk?

This interview, conducted shortly after the Atlanta Fed's 2007 Financial Markets Conference, discusses credit derivatives and their importance to the market and outlines key themes of the conference.Credit derivatives ; Risk

Mutual funds: temporary problem or permanent morass?

The improprieties in the mutual fund industry that surfaced in the fall of 2003 prompted the passage and drafting of legislation and regulations that cover nearly every facet of mutual fund pricing and operations. While this regulatory flurry is clearly intended to protect shareholders’ interests, the question remains: How will these scandals and regulatory changes ultimately affect mutual fund investors? ; When considering the problems inherent in mutual fund management and the best ways to address them, it is important, the author stresses, to understand current business practices in the industry, who these benefit, and why they exist. ; Mutual fund investors, the author explains, are legally considered owners of a company that pools the investment capital of many investors. In practice, however, investors are often viewed (and often view themselves) as customers of a management firm that acts as an investment adviser. ; Regardless of which view is taken, inherent conflicts exist between investors and advisers because the two parties have differing objectives: Investors want to receive higher returns on their investment while minimizing risk, and advisers want to maximize their own profits without exerting undue efforts (costs). ; The author reviews a number of possible solutions to these conflicts of interest, including compensation-based fee structures, a separation of functions, proposed regulatory and legislative changes, and monitoring and information disclosure. ; By far the strongest weapon investors have in resolving these conflicts is their own demand, the author concludes. “When unfettered and free of frictions, a competitive marketplace will supply the products and services investors demand at the lowest possible price,” she notes.Mutual funds

The financial crisis of 2008 in fixed income markets

We explore how a relatively small amount of heterogeneous securities created turmoil in financial markets in much of the world in 2007 and 2008. The drivers of the financial turmoil and the financial crisis of 2008 were heterogeneous securities that were hard to value. These securities created concerns about counterparty risk and ultimately created substantial uncertainty. The problems spread in ways that were hard to see in advance. The run on prime money market funds in September 2008 and the effects on commercial paper were an important aspect of the crisis itself and are discussed in some detail.

The determinants of the flow of funds of managed portfolios: mutual funds versus pension funds

Due to differences in financial sophistication and agency relationships, we posit that investors use different criteria to select portfolio managers in the retail mutual fund and fiduciary pension fund industry segments. We provide evidence on investors’ manager selection criteria by estimating the relation between manager asset flow and performance. We find that pension fund clients use quantitatively sophisticated measures like Jensen’s alpha, tracking error, and outperformance of a market benchmark. Pension clients also punish poorly performing managers by withdrawing assets under management. In contrast, mutual fund investors use raw return performance and flock disproportionately to recent winners but do not withdraw assets from recent losers. Mutual fund manager flow is significantly positively related to Jensen’s alpha, a seemingly anomalous result in light of a relatively unsophisticated mutual fund client base. We provide preliminary evidence, however, that this relation is driven by a high correlation between Jensen’s alpha and widely available summary performance measures, such as Morningstar’s star rating. By documenting differences in the flow-performance relation, we contribute to the growing literature linking fund manager behavior to the implicit incentives to increase assets under management. We show that several forces combine to weaken the incentive for pension fund managers to engage in the type of risk-shifting behavior identified in the mutual fund literature.Mutual funds ; Pensions ; Investments

Star power: the effect of Morningstar ratings on mutual fund flows

Morningstar, Inc., has been hailed in both academic and practitioner circles as having the most influential rating system in the mutual fund industry. We investigate Morningstar’s influence by estimating the value of a star in terms of the asset flow it generates for the typical fund. We use event-study methods on a sample of 3,388 domestic equity mutual funds from November 1996 to October 1999 to isolate the “Morningstar effect” from other influences on fund flow. ; We separately study initial rating events, whereby a fund is rated for the first time on its 36-month anniversary, and rating change events. An initial five-star rating results in average six-month abnormal flow of $26 million, or 53 percent above normal expected flow. Following rating changes, we find economically and statistically significant abnormal flow in the expected direction, positive for rating upgrades and negative for rating downgrades. Furthermore, we observe an immediate flow response, suggesting that some investors vigilantly monitor this information and view the rating change as “new” information on fund quality. Overall, our results indicate that Morningstar ratings have unique power to affect asset flow.Mutual funds

Broker Incentives and Mutual Fund Market Segmentation

We study the impact of investor heterogeneity on mutual fund market segmentation. To motivate our empirical analysis, we make two assumptions. First, some investors inherently value broker services. Second, because brokers are only compensated when they sell mutual funds, they have little incentive to recommend funds available at lower cost elsewhere. The need for mutual fund families to internalize broker incentives leads us to predict that the market for mutual funds will be highly segmented, with families targeting either do-it-yourself investors or investors who value broker services, but not both. Using novel distribution channel data, we find strong empirical support for this prediction; only 3.3% of families serve both market segments. We also predict and find strong evidence that mutual funds targeting performance-sensitive, do-it-yourself investors will invest more in portfolio management. Our findings have important implications for the expected relation between mutual fund fees and returns, tests of fund manager ability, and the puzzle of active management. Furthermore, they suggest that changing the way investors compensate brokers will change the nature of competition in the mutual fund industry.

The performance of open-end international mutual funds

The 1990s witnessed tremendous growth in the assets of international mutual funds. This growth is likely to continue as more investors seek the diversification benefits of foreign assets, which have relatively low correlations with domestic stock portfolios. Investors may also be attracted to international funds in the popular belief that such funds can earn abnormally high returns because of the relative inefficiency of these markets. But there is little evidence that this notion is valid. ; This article sets the stage for investigating whether exploitable foreign market inefficiencies exist by studying the performance of a large sample of international open-end mutual funds during the 1990s. The analysis sorts funds into thirty-two categories and then applies four commonly used performance measures to characterize the funds' return distributions. ; The results show that a large percentage of well-diversified international funds outperform their passive benchmarks in a statistically significant manner, but regional and country funds do not. In addition, emerging markets funds exhibit volatilities that are generally higher than those of developed market funds but do not exhibit significantly higher average or abnormal returns. ; These findings indicate that the attractiveness of emerging markets investment should be revisited in more detail. The author suggests that the next step is to formulate data tests that can disentangle competing models of international capital markets and thus identify the underlying factors driving the results.Mutual funds

One proxy at a time : pursuing social change through shareholder proposals

Traditional economic wisdom holds that a corporation’s sole goal should be to maximize shareholder wealth. But some investors believe that firms should also act as agents for social change. Activist investors use their shareholder rights to place socially responsible resolutions on corporate proxy statements to be voted on by all shareholders. ; This article examines the controversy behind corporate social responsibility (CSR) and identifies and categorizes activist investors, their objectives, and the firms they target. Using data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) on 2,829 CSR shareholder proposals from 1992 to 2002, the author finds that religious organizations and individuals made the largest number of proposals, but in 2000 proposals by socially responsible mutual funds began to outnumber those by individuals. The three most common proposal topics were international conduct, environmental issues, and antidiscrimination. ; Of the 566 different corporations targeted, seventy-three were targeted ten times or more. Larger, economically powerful firms—especially those that value consumer goodwill and have the “name” to aid in social change—were most often targeted. ; Because a withdrawn resolution usually signals an action by the corporation—dialogue, agreement to resolution, or some other compromise—the author argues that withdrawn proposals can be used as measure of activism’s success. The IRRC data and her own extensive research on the outcome of withdrawn proposals support this argument.