Molecular Basis for Certain Neuroprotective Effects of Thyroid Hormone

The pathophysiology of brain damage that is common to ischemia–reperfusion injury and brain trauma include disodered neuronal and glial cell energetics, intracellular acidosis, calcium toxicity, extracellular excitotoxic glutamate accumulation, and dysfunction of the cytoskeleton and endoplasmic reticulum. The principal thyroid hormones, 3,5,3′-triiodo-l-thyronine (T3) and l-thyroxine (T4), have non-genomic and genomic actions that are relevant to repair of certain features of the pathophysiology of brain damage. The hormone can non-genomically repair intracellular H+ accumulation by stimulation of the Na+/H+ exchanger and can support desirably low [Ca2+]i.c. by activation of plasma membrane Ca2+–ATPase. Thyroid hormone non-genomically stimulates astrocyte glutamate uptake, an action that protects both glial cells and neurons. The hormone supports the integrity of the microfilament cytoskeleton by its effect on actin. Several proteins linked to thyroid hormone action are also neuroprotective. For example, the hormone stimulates expression of the seladin-1 gene whose gene product is anti-apoptotic and is potentially protective in the setting of neurodegeneration. Transthyretin (TTR) is a serum transport protein for T4 that is important to blood–brain barrier transfer of the hormone and TTR also has been found to be neuroprotective in the setting of ischemia. Finally, the interesting thyronamine derivatives of T4 have been shown to protect against ischemic brain damage through their ability to induce hypothermia in the intact organism. Thus, thyroid hormone or hormone derivatives have experimental promise as neuroprotective agents

Attribution of intentional causation influences the perception of observed movements: behavioral evidence and neural correlates

Recent research on human agency suggests that intentional causation is associated with a subjective compression in the temporal interval between actions and their effects. That is, intentional movements and their causal effects are perceived as closer together in time than equivalent unintentional movements and their causal effects. This so-called intentional binding effect is consistently found for one's own self-generated actions. It has also been suggested that intentional binding occurs when observing intentional movements of others. However, this evidence is undermined by limitations of the paradigm used. In the current study we aimed to overcome these limitations using a more rigorous design in combination with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to explore the neural underpinnings of intentional binding of observed movements. In particular, we aimed to identify brain areas sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causality attributed to the observed action. Our behavioral results confirmed the occurrence of intentional binding for observed movements using this more rigorous paradigm. Our fMRI results highlighted a collection of brain regions whose activity was sensitive to the interaction between intentionality and causation. Intriguingly, these brain regions have previously been implicated in the sense of agency over one's own movements. We discuss the implications of these results for intentional binding specifically, and the sense of agency more generally

What is social about social perception research?

A growing consensus in social cognitive neuroscience holds that large portions of the primate visual brain are dedicated to the processing of social information, i.e., to those aspects of stimuli that are usually encountered in social interactions such as others’ facial expressions, actions and symbols. Yet, studies of social perception have mostly employed simple pictorial representations of conspecifics. These stimuli are social only in the restricted sense that they physically resemble objects with which the observer would typically interact. In an equally important sense, however, these stimuli might be regarded as ‘non-social’: the observer knows that they are viewing pictures and might therefore not attribute current mental states to the stimuli or might do so in a qualitatively different way than in a real social interaction. Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of such higher-order conceptualisation of the stimulus for social perceptual processing. Here, we assess the similarity between the various types of stimuli used in the laboratory and object classes encountered in real social interactions. We distinguish two different levels at which experimental stimuli can match social stimuli as encountered in everyday social settings: (i) the extent to which a stimulus’ physical properties resemble those typically encountered in social interactions and (ii) the higher-level conceptualisation of the stimulus as indicating another person’s mental states. We illustrate the significance of this distinction for social perception research and report new empirical evidence further highlighting the importance of mental state attribution for perceptual processing. Finally, we discuss the potential of this approach to inform studies of clinical conditions such as autism